Defining Marks: A Defense of the Predicate View of Proper Names

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ABSTRACT

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At the start of the last century philosophical consensus was that names were more or less like descriptions, and, at its end, that names were utterly unlike descriptions. The former view, Classical Descriptivism, had it that each individual's name was its name in virtue of the individual uniquely fitting some implicit characterization. Names were thus believed to have structure at the level of content: they expressed properties an object can have or fail to have. This view was in turn challenged beginning in the 1970s, most notably by Saul Kripke. Kripke's claim was that an individual's name has no structure at the level of content: it simply stands for a given individual. A name cannot characterize anything, and has no "meaning" save what it names. Kripke's view, Referentialism, in turn became the new orthodoxy.

In my dissertation, I challenge the arguments that have lead us to believe names and descriptions are expressions of two different kinds. But I do not vindicate the old orthodoxy. I chart a middle path between Classical Descriptivism and Referentialism that can recapture many virtues of the former view, while respecting the linguistic data that lead to its abandonment. I do this in defending a competing theory, one that has recently grown in prominence: the Predicate View of names. The Predicate View offers a radically different conception of what a name is, one tied neither to an individual referent (as with
Referentialism), nor to some set of properties an individual might uniquely bear (as with Classical Descriptivism). Instead, on the Predicate View a name such as “Bambi” expresses a property, bearing-“Bambi”, satisfied by all and only Bambis. To fully substantiate this approach requires an investigation of how definiteness — a linguistic marker of something being unique relative to some context, as when “the cat” refers to some specific cat thanks to “the” — is realized cross-linguistically, and how this bears on the way a name like “Bambi” successfully picks out some particular Bambi. I take the proper formulation and defense of the Predicate View to be a preliminary contribution to such an investigation. What it promises is a more refined understanding both of how language expresses thoughts about individuals, and how this language is related to the language of properties, i.e. ways individuals can be.

Names are not proprietary to individuals on the Predicate View. They express shareable properties, they have structure at the level of content, and they have a meaning, which can be characterized schematically: for any name “N”, its meaning is given by bearing-“N”. The Predicate View does not assume the tight connection between name meaning and name denotation than both Referentialism and Classical Descriptivism do (albeit in different ways). The name “Bambi” corresponds to some set of individuals that satisfy bearing-“Bambi”, but does not “refer” to that set or indeed any member of it. Which individuals gets referred to with the name “Bambi” by speakers is a distinct matter, and the denotation of a name is to be understood in terms of acts of referring. In this respect, the Predicate View differs fundamentally from both Referentialism and Classical Descriptivism. Indeed, it differs more
from both of these accounts than they do from one another. The Predicate View assumes a very different structure for name bearing, i.e. how names themselves are individuated and how names are related to what they name.

I show in Chapters 1 and 2 that the semantic behavior of names — especially with respect to time and modality — provides evidence that the Predicate View gets the structure of name bearing right. I argue further that data which were taken to support Referentialism are equally well explained by the Predicate View. This runs counter to a common assumption — that the Predicate View faces a serious problem with modality, since it cannot deliver the result that names are rigid. I show that, on the contrary, the Predicate View offers a more nuanced and explanatory account of name rigidity than Referentialism. The Predicate View also explains a neglected fact that Referentialism cannot: that there are non-rigid occurrences of names. The picture that emerges is one on which names are predominantly rigid, but where they occur non-rigidly as a result of certain presuppositions being satisfied. I conclude that we should abandon Referentialism and embrace the Predicate View.

In Chapter 3, I defend the View against a challenge due to John Hawthorne and David Manley in *The Reference Book*. There they argue that the most dramatic data favoring the Predicate View may have nothing to do with names at all, being adequately explained by an all-purpose mechanism of metalinguistic ascent. Why not say that in constructions like “I know three Caitlins” we are quantifying over what are strictly speaking ambiguous names (in the Referentialist’s sense), rather than revise our semantics in the way the Predicate View
proposes? I argue that in fact on a very natural elaboration of the basic idea behind the Predicate View, the cases of “metalinguistic ascent” that Hawthorne and Manley have in mind are naturally explained on the Predicate View itself, blunting their dialectical force.
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General Introduction

At the start of the last century, the philosophical consensus was that proper names were more or less like definite descriptions — at its end, that proper names were utterly unlike definite descriptions. In this dissertation, I challenge the arguments that have lead us to believe names and descriptions are expressions of two different kinds. But I do not vindicate the old orthodoxy. I chart a middle path between Classical Descriptivism and Referentialism that can recapture many virtues of the former view, while respecting the linguistic data that lead to its abandonment. I do this in defending a competing theory, one that has recently grown in prominence: the Predicate View of names.¹ The Predicate View offers a radically different conception of what a name is, one tied neither to an individual referent (as with Referentialism), nor to some set of properties an individual might uniquely bear (as with Classical Descriptivism). Instead, on the Predicate View a name such as “Bambi” expresses a property, bearing-“Bambi”.

I argue in Chapters 1 and 2 that there is strong linguistic evidence names express such properties. This is a semantic claim compatible with different theories of the property itself, i.e.

¹ Early proponents of versions of the Predicate View include Sloat (1969) and Burge (1973). Later defenders of similar positions included Bach (1981) and Geurts (1997). The current revival of interest in the Predicate View can be traced to Elbourne (2005) and Matushansky (2008), with its philosophical defense undertaken in Gray (2012) and Fara (2015b), which set the current terms of the debate. There is some inconsistency in the literature about what name to give the view I’m defending, with some speaking of the “Predicate View”, e.g. Gray in his (2012) and Bach, in lieu of “Predicativism” (the term used by Fara and her critics). I find the latter ungainly, and so I opt for the former and abbreviate to “PV” in the three main Chapters.
accounts of what it is to bear a name. In sections 1.3 through 1.6, I sketch the account of name bearing that I favor, raise some puzzles for that account, and contrast it with an account offered by Delia Fara. I also consider syntactic considerations both for and against the Predicate View, in section 1.8.

In this Introduction I anticipate those more detailed discussions, and situate the Predicate View vis-à-vis the two main theories of names already mentioned, Classical Descriptivism and Referentialism. Note that I reserve “to refer” and its cognates for the act performed by speakers in the main text, to avoid confusion with a name's having a denotation, a “semantic reference”. I acquiesce in the latter sense of “refers” and “reference” in the Introduction alone, but employ scare quotes to underscore the intended contrast. (Cf. footnote 3.) I hope the gain in clarity makes up for the awkwardness and artificiality of the device.

Consider first Classical Descriptivism. On that theory, the meaning of a given name is (roughly) some unique characterization. Each individual's name is its name in virtue of the individual fitting some characterization, i.e. the name's descriptive content. This has some important consequences. Names express properties an individual can have or fail to have. A name's meaning is therefore independent, in principle, of whether that name has a bearer,

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2 How to think of many aspects of this proposal is of course controversial, i.e. how much and what kind of information names express, how much competent users of the name will grasp about the relevant descriptive content, and what precise logical form to assign it. These details are not especially relevant for appreciating the contrast with the Predicate View. Nor do I mean my remarks to perfectly track the position held by any one of Classical Descriptivism's defenders, but instead I intend to convey the broader conception they more or less share.
i.e. empty names can be sensibly ascribed contents. Furthermore, if name bearing is just a matter of satisfying such descriptive contents, an individual’s name “refers”, i.e. denotes that individual, irrespective of any speaker’s act of referring. The Predicate View differs from Classical Descriptivism on this last point, but likewise makes a name’s meaning independent of whether it “refers”.

Referentialism is the view that a name “refers” (i.e. denotes) just in case there is some individual it stands for. A name's meaning cannot characterize anything, being nothing but the bearer itself. Referentialism's semantics is unlike Classical Descriptivism's in that it does not directly contribute to an account of what makes an individual's name its name. Different metasemantic accounts of this relation are possible for Referentialism, the most familiar being Kripke's causal picture, where name bearing is (roughly) constituted by continuities in the linguistic practices of communities of speakers across time. As on Classical Descriptivism, name “reference” does not depend directly on any speaker’s act of referring. By contrast, a name's meaning directly depends on its “reference”, since a name with no bearer has no meaning, i.e. empty names cannot be sensibly ascribed contents.

On the Predicate View, a name has a meaning independent of whether anything bears it. (“Bambi” could have an empty extension.) But unlike Classical Descriptivism, it tells us what semantic contribution an arbitrary name will make to sentences in which it occurs, and this can be captured by a schema: “N” expresses bearing-“N”. The property bearing-“N” is shareable. For this reason, it is not in general the case on the Predicate View that when a
name “refers” (i.e. denotes) an individual, it is because that individual alone bears the name. That would only be in the special case where “N” has a single individual in its extension (a case discussed in section 1.9). On both Classical Descriptivism and Referentialism, all name bearing is by definition unique name bearing, since each non-empty name is mapped to a single individual. Suppose, for example, that “Bambi” is a non-empty name. On Referentialism, the “reference” (i.e. denotation) of “Bambi” (some specific individual, Bambi) is the whole story about what makes “Bambi” the name it is. On Classical Descriptivism it is strictly speaking the descriptive content of “Bambi” that makes it the name it is. However, the whole explanatory role of the description is that it is uniquely true of the individual, Bambi. On either view, then, name individuation is tied, whether directly or indirectly, to which single individual bears the name.

The Predicate View does not assume the tight connection between name meaning and name “reference” (i.e. denotation) that the other two accounts do. The name “Bambi” corresponds to some set of individuals that satisfy bearing-“Bambi”, but does not “refer” to that set or any member of it. Which individuals gets referred to with the name “Bambi” by speakers is a distinct matter, and the “reference” (i.e. denotation) of a name is to be understood in terms of acts of referring, at a context. In this respect, the Predicate View differs from both Referentialism and Classical Descriptivism. Indeed, it differs more from both of these accounts than they do from one another. The Predicate View assumes a fundamentally
different structure for name bearing, i.e. how names themselves are individuated and how names are related to what they name.

As I will show in Chapters 1 and 2, the semantic behavior of names — especially with respect to time and modality — gives us evidence that the Predicate View gets the structure of name bearing right. I argue that data which were taken to support Referentialism are better explained by the Predicate View. This runs counter to a common assumption — that the Predicate View faces a serious problem with modality, since it cannot deliver the result that names are rigid. I show that, on the contrary, the Predicate View offers a more nuanced and explanatory account of name rigidity than Referentialism. The Predicate View also explains a neglected fact that Referentialism cannot: that there are non-rigid occurrences of names. The picture that emerges is one on which names are predominantly rigid, but where they occur non-rigidly as a result of certain presuppositions being satisfied. I conclude that we should abandon Referentialism and embrace the Predicate View.

While my focus in this dissertation is on these semantic data, the Predicate View also has a motivation foreign to either Classical Descriptivism or Referentialism, namely, it fits certain purely grammatical facts (“I know three Caitlins”, “I was speaking about a different Ada”). The other two views were motivated by philosophical concerns (about ontology, about singular thought) that likely made it seem self-evident that names should be individuated by their bearers. But if one were not motivated by those concerns, it is unclear whether an
investigation into the linguistics of names would have found this individuation self-evident at all.

The Predicate View, in refusing this individuation, offers a corrective shift in perspective: we can take a more capacious view of what data is relevant to a theory of names and how these data relate to neighboring phenomena involving determiners and noun phrases. To fully substantiate this approach requires an investigation of how definiteness — a linguistic marker of something being unique relative to some context, as when "the cat" refers to some specific cat thanks to “the” — is realized cross-linguistically, and how this bears on the way a name like “Bambi” successfully picks out some particular Bambi. I take the proper formulation and defense of the Predicate View to be a preliminary contribution to such an investigation. What it promises is a more refined understanding both of how language expresses thoughts about individuals, and how this language is related to the language of properties, i.e. ways individuals can be.
Chapter 1. Name Rigidity on the Predicate View

1.1 Introduction

In his (1980), Kripke argued for a set of theses that transformed our basic understanding of what proper names are. Those theses, now orthodox, are the following:  

(R1) Names stand for individuals, and only contribute individuals to statements made using them.

(R2) Names do so unmediated by any further meaning, i.e. “direct reference”.

(R3) A given name cannot vary in what individual it stands for.

A further thesis naturally complements these:

(R4) Names are distinct if they stand for different individuals.

The combination of (R1)–(R4) is the current standard theory of names, Referentialism. Here I argue Referentialism is false.

I embrace a different theory, recently revived by philosophers and linguists, the Predicate View of names (henceforth PV). The theses that make up PV are as follows:

(PV1) Names express properties, which are instantiated by the individuals that bear them, i.e. names are predicates.

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3 I eschew talk of “semantic reference” in what follows, and reserve “refer” and its cognates for the speaker notion. So, for example, “referential” uniformly means “can be used to refer” by a speaker. “Stand for” is used throughout for the relation between a name and its bearer that Kripke assumes, on which the name/referent relationship need not be construed in terms of any speech act of referring.
(PV2) Names combine with a definite determiner to form a referential expression, the 
bare singular form of a name, i.e. PV is a form of Descriptivism.

(PV3) A given name can vary in what individual it stands for.

These entail the denial of (R4) above: names are not proprietary to individuals on PV. They are 
paradigmatically shareable. All Bambis have one and the same name, “Bambi”.

I aim to show that what has been treated as a major problem for PV — the explanation 
of names’ modal behavior — is something Referentialism gets wrong and PV gets right. The 
correct explanation of why names behave rigidly is not, in fact, (R3). It cannot be the correct 
explanation, for the simple reason that names are not intrinsically rigid, as Referentialism has it. On Referentialism, the semantic type of names guarantees that they are rigid. As I will 
show, the data that names are rigid can be explained on a semantics, like that of PV, that does 
not build rigidity into their semantic type, and that there are further data that are hard to 
explain if rigidity is built in. To avoid cumbersome qualifications, when I write about “the 
rigidity of names” below, I mean their rigidity when they display it and not that they are 
generally rigid in virtue of names’ semantic type, a commitment of Referentialism that I deny.

I will start by laying out the background motivations for PV to situate my own project in 
relation to them.

1.2 Setting up PV

The basic data motivating PV are that names take explicit determiners (“some Bambis 
are academics,” “one Bambi died, but that Bambi lived”), and occur in predicate position (“I’m
a Bambi, not a Brandy"). These data are in tension with Referentialism. As Referentialism defines names, they have no semantic structure. It makes no sense to quantify over them or predicate them of anything. Hence the occurrences of “Bambi” just cited are not names, on Referentialism, and ambiguous with respect to “Bambi” as it occurs in “Bambi sat down.” In contrast, PV says names have predicate-type meanings. For any name “N”, its meaning is the property bearing-“N”. So, a given name, such as “Bambi”, expresses a property bearing-“Bambi” satisfied by all and only Bambis. This predicts names can combine with determiners and be predicated of individuals.

1.3 Circularity

Here it is worth dispelling a common and immediate misconception about the basic proposal: isn’t it circular to define names in this way, that is, to analyze “Bambi” in terms of the property bearing-“Bambi”? In Naming and Necessity Kripke objects to the proposal of Kneale (1962) — which closely resembles PV — on the grounds that it is “circular” (see his (1980): 68–70). On Kneale’s account, the meaning of a name such as “Socrates” is the individual called “Socrates”. Kripke’s objection is that the relevant sense of “calling” is itself semantic in nature, hence cannot provide a non-circular account of name meaning. My remarks in the present Section and especially in Sections 1.5-1.6 partly speak to this concern, without any pretense of fully answering it.
can be referred to with “Bambi”. But neither is it the case that everything in the extension of “Bambi” must, at some point or other, be the referent of “Bambi”. The speech act of giving something a name need involve no act of referring with that name, nor need it involve knowledge of the name by the name giver (“I hereby christen thee with whatever name is highest up on page 236 of the Dictionary of Minor Planet Names”); nor need it even involve any inscription of the name being in actual existence. Suppose, for example, I decide to name someone according to a certain code or cipher. I have stipulated that the unique output of the code is the person’s name. But the code itself need never be put to use, nor indeed the output written down or spoken aloud, for it to be the person’s name.\(^5\)

What makes it the case that a thing bears-“N” comes apart from facts about reference with “N”? On the version of PV I defend, to give something a name is (roughly) to associate it with some orthographic or phonological string for the purpose of referring to it with that string.\(^6\) This is consistent with that purpose going unrealized, i.e. an expression may be

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\(^5\) Other variations are possible, for example a name that can be inscribed but not pronounced. Such was famously the case with the singer-songwriter Prince, who in 1993 adopted an unpronounceable symbol as his name. Notoriously this forced a workaround, so a definite description came into use as a means of referring to him, “the artist formerly known as Prince”. As examples like this suggest, it is easy to imagine borderline cases where it is unclear whether a given symbol should be treated as a name or as some form of iconic representation. If I adopt a small symbol depicting my own face as my name (in the manner of an emoji, say) there will naturally arise contexts in which its status as a pictorial representation and its status as a linguistic sign will compete in the symbol’s interpretation.

\(^6\) It is unclear what to say about names that are, by their nature, impossible either to inscribe or to pronounce. Suppose I assign someone a name that corresponds to an infinitely long string of numerals, where this results from some mathematical operation. Does it follow that the string could not be used to refer to anything, even in principle? Is this a coherent naming practice? Here
introduced as a device of reference without its ever being used to refer to anything in fact.

And while the conventional way of stating the semantic proposal ("N" expresses the property bearing-"N") is formally circular — a name expresses a condition which contains that very name as a constituent — it is not a problematic form of circularity. It would only be problematic if there were no further account of the relation bearing-"N" itself.

As I have just suggested, PV can offer such an account. Bearing-"N" amounts to a certain linguistic practice involving a string of letters or sounds, and no name is identical with any such string. I claim that "N" expresses the property a thing bears just in case a given string is associated with that thing as a means of referring to that thing — paradigmatically, a name's standard written expression and its corresponding pronunciation. If there are communal standards for what creates this association — and a suitably formulated condition on competent speakers, which must include some sensitivity to or tacit knowledge of these norms — then that association is wholly independent from whether or not the name is tokened in thought or speech or ever used to refer to the thing it names. And since association with "N" is only indirectly related to acts of referring with "N", bearing-"N" is not trivially

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we find a difficulty about the relationship between names and specialized systems for tagging objects, like numeral systems, which is beyond the scope of my discussion here. Cf. footnote 40.

7 Slippage between using “name” to pick out a name and using it to pick out the corresponding string is as common in everyday speech as slippage between “numeral” and “number”. Consider the example I used above, “I hereby christen thee with whatever name is highest up on page 236 of the Dictionary of Minor Planet Names.” On PV, this is actually not a misleading way of talking — I have put you in the extension of “Lacroute”, along with the planet. On Referentialism, this is highly misleading, since “Lacroute” can only be the name of the planet, “Lacroute” being a distinct but homonymous name I give to you. More on this point below.
satisfiable. I do not become a Bambi just in being referred to as Bambi.\(^8\) PV can thus offer a coherent explanation of why names behave like predicates in “some Bambis”, “a Bambi”, and so forth.

1.4 String theory

A worry about the proposal I have just outlined is that, in practice, name individuation is more fine grained than it suggests. A number of puzzles about sameness of name immediately arise for PV when \textit{string} identity does not track \textit{name} identity, or when the strings associated with the name (phonological and orthographic) diverge in a way that gives inconsistent predictions for name identity. (I suggest a way of responding to the first kind of case and briefly explain why the second may be more difficult, despite appearing more trifling.) These are instances of a highly general problem about the metaphysics of linguistic types,\(^9\) so it is tempting to think the burden is not on PV to solve it. But this is doubtful. Since a selling point of PV is its ability to capture intuitive sameness of name, it is a bad result if it fails to predict it — or worse, if sameness of name (on PV’s individuation condition) proves to be an unworkably confused notion.

\(^8\) This is of course to say that acts of referring cannot coincide with acts of naming. Suppose an adorable Yorkshire Terrier wanders into the room. I exclaim “Muffin!”, both referring to the dog and making it the case that it bears-“Muffin” with a single utterance. But this is no different from other cases where one utterance can effect multiple speech acts, e.g. you yell “Go!” into two different phone receivers, emphatically advising one friend to attend a well-reviewed play and rudely telling the other to get off the line.

\(^9\) I am thinking in particular of mid-twentieth century discussions around nominalism and attempts to reduce talk of \textit{types} to talk of \textit{equiformity}. Cf. in particular Zemach (1974), which nicely sets out the issue as treated in earlier work by Quine and Geach.
Suppose I go out for drinks with Beckett Bould and Samuel Beckett. True or false: “I went for drinks with two Becketts.” Or suppose I greatly admire Ben Franklin and Ahmed Ben Bella: “I admire two Bens”? Or suppose I have just read biographies of Honus Wagner and Richard Wagner: “I read the biographies of two Wagners”? Taking these in reverse order, the “Wagner” sentence ceases to be coherent when pronounced (owing to the differing pronunciations of “Wagner”); the “Ben” sentence is problematic because the latter occurrence is of the Arabic particle meaning *son of* and so is not intuitively a “detachable” part of the name; and in the “Beckett” sentence there is a mixing of given name and family name.¹⁰

These fine-grained distinctions among names even have manifestations of a syntactic sort. Consider the following contrast, which was pointed out to me by Edwin Williams. It is perfectly acceptable to elide an occurrence of a common family name as follows:

(1.1) John and Robert Kennedy walked into the bar and ordered scotch.

But this becomes unacceptable when the relevant family names are ambiguous between different *actual families*. For example, Edwin Williams is no relation of the country singer Hank Williams. But the following seems acceptable only if they are familial relations:

(1.2) Edwin and Hank Williams walked into the bar and ordered scotch.

¹⁰ Thanks to Beau Mount for discussion and for suggesting the examples.
Along with the “Beckett” and “Ben” cases, the contrast between (1.1) and (1.2) seems to show that the information encoded by family names and related devices (e.g. patronyms) can influence our grammatically judgments about names which are string identical.

The result looks less problematic, though, once it is observed that family names are often rather indirectly related to bearing-“N”. As Fara points out in her (2015b), there are perfectly good uses of family names where there is no entailment to bearing-“N”, e.g. “Maria Shriver is a Kennedy.” This gives at least some plausibility to the thought that family names are not functioning as names in many of their uses, but instead just express an extralinguistic condition — being a member of the relevant family. This may explain why family names do not pattern exactly as we would expect were they governed only by bearing-“N”.11 (It is nonetheless clear they do sometimes pattern as PV predicts, e.g. “She’s not a Feinstein, she’s an Einstein... like the physicist.”)

Observe that PV counts an expression as a name just in case it licenses the following sort of inference:

(1.3) There are three Bambis in the room.

(1.4) Therefore, three things that bear-“Bambi” are in the room.

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11 To pick another example, consider the name “Ruth Bader Ginsburg”. It is true that Ruth Bader Ginsburg is a Ruth, a Bader, and a Ginsburg. She is a Ruth only in that she bears-“Ruth”. But her being a Bader and her being a Ginsburg are tied to specific extralinguistic facts — not just bearing-“Bader” or bearing-“Ginsburg” — according to known conventions.
This is non-trivial, simply because there are perfectly acceptable sentences structurally identical to (1.3) from which one cannot infer a sentence like (1.4). There may be three Kennedys in the room, but if Maria Shriver is among them there are not three things that bear-“Kennedy” in the room. The same criterion rules these out as genuine occurrences of names:

(1.5) She’s an Einstein! *(remarking on someone’s brilliance)*

(1.6) He bought a Cattelan at auction. *(i.e. a work by Maurizio Cattelan)*

Since neither the Cattelan nor the Einstein in question bear those names — but instead satisfy worldly properties that are related to specific Famous Bearers of those names — we conclude they are not names from the standpoint of semantic theory.\(^{12}\)

The cases where orthography and pronunciation come apart are more worrying. Consider the following type of case, discussed by Gray in his (2015). Suppose I have two talented logic students who both got perfect scores on the big exam. Both have the first name “Wagner”. However, the first was so-named in honor of Honus Wagner and the second in

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\(^{12}\) Such cases are extensively discussed by Jeshion in her (2015). There she argues that the sheer diversity of predicative uses of names that do not express bearing-“N” should disincline us to single out the property bearing-“N” as the core meaning of a name. This has the makings of an awkward stalemate — do we use the inference to bearers of “N” to distinguish the genuine names? Or do we instead class bearing-“N” with other extended uses, i.e. alongside occurrences of “N” that express made by “N” or looks like “N” (on a Referentialist semantics)? I see no decisive argument for the conclusion that names are used “literally” only when they express bearing-“N”, but take it to be a consequence of a desirable overall package, i.e. a compositional semantic theory that accounts for a wider range of phenomena than Referentialism. For more on Famous Bearers and their influence on intuitions about names, see footnote 47.
honor of Richard Wagner. Hence the names have different pronunciations. Gray claims I can truly report the results by writing down:

(1.7) Two Wagners aced the exam.

Granted that (1.7) is true when written down, it seems nevertheless that that any utterance of (1.7) must communicate something false, since one must commit to one or the other pronunciation. Despite an air of silliness, this is arguably more problematic for PV than the cases discussed earlier — those all involved richer meanings than PV proposes for names. Here the problem arises for names which are used literally by PV’s own lights. My own inclination is to bite the bullet and deny that (1.7) is strictly true when written down. This is a genuine cost to the theory and Gray is correct in maintaining

1.5 Being called

Delia Fara responds to the objection considered in Section 1.3 — that PV is circular — somewhat differently than I have. In lieu of bearing-“N”, Fara maintains that names express a being called condition, first defined in her (2011) and appealed to in her (2015b). Here I briefly sketch Fara’s theory of calling and explain why it is both inessential to answering the objections and problematic in its own right.

Fara distinguishes something’s being called “N” from its being called N. The thought is that in the former condition, the name is mentioned, and in the latter, used — this is reflected in Fara’s convention of using quote marks to distinguish these relations. Only being called “N” is trivially satisfied by a thing when referred to with “N”. (I can call you “Bambi”, even though
you are not called Bambi.) On Fara’s view, confusing the two different senses in which a thing can be “called Bambi” is what leads to the false notion that PV is circular, or even trivial. (See Fara (2015b): 64.)

I want to focus here on the being called \(N\) relation, and leave to one side Fara’s appeal to the use/mention distinction. With respect to the problem of circularity, Fara’s notion of being called \(N\) is not significantly different from bearing-“\(N\)” as articulated above. For either notion, we need to know in virtue of what individuals come to bear the relevant property, and — crucially — avoid presupposing anything about the name’s semantics that undercuts the motivation for PV. (In the next Section I will say more about the latter worry.) Fara’s line is that PV need have no settled commitments about what puts individuals in a name’s extension. But she does gesture at broad norms governing who has the “authority” do so, and in what circumstances:

“I cannot have called Quine Willard, since I did not have the special authority required to name him. In order for him to have been called Willard, he must have been called Willard by someone who did have that authority — his parents at the time of his birth (“Let’s call our baby Willard”), himself when he was an adult (“I hereby call myself Willard”), or any others whose use of the name eventually caught on.”

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And, as Fara also points out, there is no reason PV cannot be combined with a broadly Kripkean causal picture of how individuals get into the extension of a name.\textsuperscript{14}

One can offer Fara’s style of reply without assuming a special meaning of “call” and cognate expressions that we should theorize first. A case where the language of “calling” is especially inappropriate is one where a name is introduced by very indirect means. Consider again my example of a name generated by a code, from Section 1.3. Suppose it is common knowledge the code’s output is some unique string, and that the unique string is a given person’s name. For some reason, the string is never tokened. In such a scenario, there is no temptation to say someone comes to be “called” anything at all, in any sense of that word. It is still true that someone \textit{comes to bear a name}, that is, the code’s output. This should dispel any impression that \textit{being called N} promises something like a reductive analysis of what it is to bear a name. It is just a colloquial way of saying that something bears a name — one that is not even appropriate for all instances of the latter relation.

Last, while it is certainly true that certain individuals in certain settings get “authority” over whether something bears-“\textit{N}”, I am inclined to think successful dubbings are more easy than this would suggest and more subject to the private intentions of speakers. Suppose an astronomer puts down “Bambi” in her records, intending it as a name for a newly discovered astral body, and suddenly drops dead. In one scenario, it is perfectly clear from the surrounding notes what astral body she meant. People might have gone on to refer to that

\textsuperscript{14} Fara (2015b): 73.
star as Bambi, but in fact they do not. Everyone still knows it was a name of that astral body, and it seems right to say it is, even if it does not catch on (in the way it would if her dubbing had been “authoritative”). Now suppose in another scenario, it is impossible to reconstruct from the astronomer’s notes what she meant to refer to with “Bambi”. My intuition is that even then, with no possibility of her dubbing being “authoritative”, “Bambi” is among the names of the star (unbeknownst to us). I am not entirely confident in this intuition, however.  

1.6 A deeper circularity?

I take the considerations of the last few Sections to show there is no straightforward circularity problem for PV. But there is a deeper circularity objection that is beyond the scope of my discussion here and which I flag as a topic for further investigation. Consider the sort of account given in Schiffer (1972) and Evans (1973) of what it is to be the name of an individual. Roughly, “N” is a name of an individual x in a community just in case in that community there is a practice of referring to x with “N”. (Again, this will crucially assume some knowledge of the practice among members of the community.) This is prima facie consistent with either PV or Referentialism, the only difference being whether “N” can be the name of multiple individuals.

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15 There is some dialectical pressure on PV to deny this intuition. It is better, all else being equal, if PV can avoid any hint of Humpty Dumptyism about bearing—“N”, which threatens to trivialize the view. (Humpty Dumptyism is the absurd thesis that words can mean whatever a speaker intends them to mean, so-called in tribute to Humpty Dumpty’s claim that his words mean whatever he wants them to — “neither more nor less” — in Through the Looking Glass. The analogous view for names would be that bearing—“N” can be made true of an individual at will.)
or not. I have argued PV escapes the circularity worry in part because one can set up a practice of referring to \( x \) with “\( N \)" (e.g. by a christening) without the name later being used to refer.

Now imagine a community in which there were christenings, but a prohibition on ever using those names subsequently. In this community there is a religious taboo where all children receive a forbidden name at birth. Could these really be names, given that no one in the community could coherently intend them to be used to refer? This seems to suggest that dissociating bearing: “\( N \)" from reference with “\( N \)" can only happen when reference with “\( N \)" is at least sometimes possible for some names. This is the deeper circularity worry — that it is backwards to start from an account of bearing-“\( N \)" and go on to explain reference with “\( N \)" partly in terms of it. The thought is that referring with a name is conceptually prior to name bearing in a way PV fails to capture.\(^\text{16}\)

But perhaps the scenario I was considering, with its forbidden names, only leads to absurdity if we imagine a linguistic community where there are no referential expressions whatever. If the speakers had demonstratives in their language, say, it is transparent what it would be to refer to something with one of the forbidden names, even if no one ever could in practice. This suggests that even while referring (in general) may have some conceptual priority over name bearing, this is not in tension with the independence of bearing-“\( N \)" from referring with “\( N \)". I will not further develop this line of thought here, but instead turn to how

\(^{16}\) Thanks to both Stephen Schiffer and Bob Stalnaker for pressing me on this point.
PV handles referential uses of names.

1.7 Bare singulars

Consider “Bambi” as it occurs in “Bambi sat down,” where just one among the Bambis is picked out. Call this a *bare singular* occurrence of Bambi — bare in the sense it has no explicit determiner. It is a grammatically singular noun phrase.\(^\text{17}\) The standard story with PV is that bare singulars are definite descriptions where the determiner is not obligatory at surface form.\(^\text{18}\) So in “Bambi sat down”, the word “Bambi” means *the x such that x bears-*“Bambi”. Intuitively, then, the description is satisfied by whatever is the-“Bambi” of the situation.

I will treat this descriptivist semantics for bare singulars as part and parcel to PV. There are, of course, other ways to give a semantics of bare singulars while retaining the core commitments of PV. Most notably, one could treat bare singulars as a kind of complex demonstrative, i.e. “Bambi” means *that-*“Bambi”. My reasons for simply identifying PV with the descriptivist proposal are the following. First, it is the most familiar and commonly

\(^{17}\) Bare plurals are occurrences like “Bambis” in “Bambis are most frequently women, though the famous fictional deer was male.” Fara uses the term bare singular in her (2015b). Her usage follows the syntax literature, where “bare” is foremost a surface structure notion — “bare” noun phrases are sometimes argued to have a functional determiner despite no lexical item occupying that role. Since different predictions follow from assuming such “null” determiners, it is a genuine empirical issue whether lack of an explicit determiner shows there is none at all. (More on this in Section 1.8.) “Bare singular” is sometimes used interchangeably with “referential occurrence” (Gray 2012) or “referential name” (Schoubye forth b). This gives the impression that when bare singulars occur it follows that something is being referred to, or someone is at least making “as if” to refer — a claim Gray goes on to challenge and that Schoubye affirms. Since I argue later that bare singulars can or must receive a non-referential interpretation in certain linguistic environments, I avoid language that suggests otherwise.

\(^{18}\) I shall mean definite description by “description” in what follows, unless I say otherwise.
defended form of the view. Second, the data I discuss in Chapter 2 strongly favor it. Third, it avoids the awkwardness of constantly qualifying the view I defend as “the-predicativism”, and at no great loss of clarity, since all points about PV not having to do with the analysis of bare singulars generalize.

Referentialism, in contrast to PV, starts from the assumption that only bare singulars are names, and predicts bare singulars are always rigid in virtue of their semantic type. Since, by (R1), any non-empty name contributes an individual to propositions and, by (R2), does so with no intervening propositional constituents, (R3) follows, i.e. claims involving names are evaluated with respect to the individual alone.19 This is why, on Referentialism, names have special status vis-à-vis descriptions: their rigidity is guaranteed by the kind of expression they are.20 And this special status is justified, first of all, by linguistic intuitions about sentences containing names. If PV is true, then names do not have a special status, at least not the kind they do on Referentialism. Why?

On PV, rigidity does not follow from the semantic type of names. On the contrary, PV’s descriptivist semantics for bare singulars predicts that they can have non-rigid occurrences. A

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19 Since this argument is generally accepted by defenders of Referentialism about names, I shall treat (R2) and (R3) as commitments of Referentialism. But they are independent theses.

20 Other expressions are believed to satisfy analogues of (R1)–(R3), such as pronouns (“she”, “they”) — constrained, unlike names, by grammatically encoded features of gender and number — and pure demonstratives (“this”, “that”) — which place impossible demands on interpretation if overused. Since names are associated with distinct strings, these interpretive demands are much attenuated (though less so for very common names).
given description may be rigid or not depending on its restrictor\textsuperscript{21} — e.g. “president”, in “the president” — and other factors bearing on its evaluation. So the defender of PV not only owes us a story of how names act rigidly when they do, but also proof they are sometimes non-rigid.

The basic dialectic is as follows. Referentialism gives a simple account of bare singulars’ modal behavior. But by identifying names with bare singulars, it gets some counterintuitive results. Names come out massively ambiguous, both between individuals — no two individuals have the same name — and between occurrences within sentences — so that an utterance of “Bambi is the first Bambi I’ve met” does not contain the same name twice over, but tokens of different expression types. Since bare singulars and predicative occurrences bear systematic relations, Referentialism needs additional principles to explain these. For example, one can make intuitively valid inferences from one “type” of name to another, e.g. “No Bambis came to the party. So: Bambi did not come to the party.”\textsuperscript{22} If those are occurrences of different expressions — a Predicative Name and a Referential Name, in the terms of Schoubye (forth b)\textsuperscript{23} — the account of Referential Names must be somehow modified to explain why the inference is good. On PV there is a direct entailment.

\textsuperscript{21} “Restrictor” is used by analogy with paradigmatic quantified noun phrases, e.g. “every cat,” where “cat” restricts the domain of “every”. (In earlier literature on descriptions the term “nominal” was sometimes used instead, notably by Neale in his (1990).)

\textsuperscript{22} Cf. Schoubye (forth b): 6.

\textsuperscript{23} I discuss the view Schoubye defends, the Type Ambiguity theory, as a sophisticated version of Referentialism, since it is the most natural way of retaining the core commitments of Referentialism while accounting for predicative occurrences of names. This is not quite
More generally, the following principle is attractive: all else being equal, we should prefer a theory of names where what are intuitively different occurrences of a single name just are different occurrences of that name. This is what PV delivers. One and the same expression occurs predicated, quantified, and as a constituent of bare singulars. PV thus avoids systematic ambiguity. In treating predicate occurrences as basic, it gains a resource Referentialism lacks. Bare singulars can be accounted for compositionally if a determiner at logical form is assumed, and this in turn accounts for all the referential occurrences of names.

Alternative versions of PV that assign bare singulars a different logical form — that of a complex demonstrative, for example — are possible. Different predictions will follow depending on the choice of determiner. These differing predications matter for the legitimacy of the determiner-based approach to bare singulars. Such an approach is legitimate only if the determiner being assumed is shown to have its characteristic semantic effects. (Otherwise, the approach looks ad hoc, a mere fix for PV to account for referential occurrences.) For example, suppose “Bambi” as it occurs in “Bambi sat down” is semantically equivalent to that-“Bambi”. Given a Kaplanian account of the demonstrative determiner, “Bambi” comes out obligatorily rigid. As I argue in Chapter 2, this is the wrong result, based on evidence that bare singulars can occur non-rigidly. If those data are genuine and my

Schoubye’s way of presenting things, however. In his (forth b) he first defines the commitments of Millianism and lays out his own view about bare singulars, which treats names on the model of pronouns, not on the model of individual constants. For my purposes, it is a terminological issue whether Type Ambiguity is a form of Referentialism/Millianism or not.
explanation of them correct, it lets us adjudicate between different choices of determiner and motivates treating bare singulars as descriptions.

To sum up, with PV we gain a uniform account of the semantics of names, but we lose the simple account of bare singulars' modal behavior that Referentialism provides. This is for the best. The simple account is mistaken, and the descriptivist account of bare singulars is not a defect of PV. On the contrary, only the descriptivist semantics can account for the full range and diversity of data concerning names. I provide evidence that non-rigid occurrences of bare singulars exist where Referentialism predicts they cannot. Referentialism incorrectly explains the modal behavior it does predict and fails to predict other modal behavior that PV does. The upshot is that the fundamental source of rigidity moves out of the grammar of names and back to where it belongs — with the beliefs and intentions of speakers. In Sections 1.9–1.12 of the present Chapter and in Chapter 2, I make the case for PV's descriptivism as I just outlined.

But first, I turn to a crucial detail that I have glossed over thus far. Determiners have a syntax, and I claimed in the Introduction that PV is partly motivated on syntactic grounds. But how does PV's account of bare singulars cohere with current syntactic theory?

1.8 Syntactic variation

On a common conception of their function, determiners change predicates to arguments.\(^{24}\) Given this, it is unsurprising their pattern of occurrence and nonoccurrence is

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\(^{24}\) On Russell's account of the definite article's semantics, this is not so, hence the qualification. Thanks to Chris Peacocke for pointing this out.
related in complex ways to the referential potential of expressions.\textsuperscript{25} Since PV explains the rigidity of bare singulars by appeal to determiners, it is hostage to these complexities — a scientific, if not a dialectical, virtue. Current research on determiners plays out against the background of the DP Hypothesis (Abney 1983), on which the syntactic head of phrases like “the cat” is not the noun phrase (NP) “cat” but the determiner “the”, with “the cat” being a full determiner phase (DP). The leftmost syntactic projection of a DP belongs to the functional category D, for determiner. This position is paradigmatically occupied by determiners (“the”, “a”, “that”) but is also occupied by other types of expression. For example, in a genitive NP like “John’s cat”, it is “John’s” that occupies D. Names on PV have the syntax of count nouns (like “cat”) and must combine with a determiner to form a full DP.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25} Witness the controversy over bare noun phrases. On one theory, that of Carlson (1977), bare plurals (“cats”) are unambiguously kind terms, and only pick out individuals (i.e. their specimens) derivatively; on another, defended by Gerstner-Link & Krifka (1993), they are polysemous, occurring either as kind terms (equivalent to “the cat” interpreted generically) or as plural indefinites, where they pick out individuals. It is notable in this connection that names, unsurprisingly, behave unlike kind terms: “Sarah from Alaska is scary” has no generic reading, where “Sarahs from Alaska are scary” does.

\textsuperscript{26} To distinguish the class of expressions and the functional category, what I call "determiners" are often relabeled as determinatives. Expressions that are sometimes said to be “determiners” in the sense of occupying D, but without belonging to the lexical class, also include pronouns and names. The thought is that pronouns and names do not generally take determiners (i.e. determinatives) but just are determiners, i.e. they can constitute complete DPs in themselves and act like definite determinatives with no phonologically realized nominal element (Cf. Postal 1969). This thesis conflicts with accounts, including PV, where names are in NP position in a complete DP (e.g., Longobardi (1994), not a defender of PV, argues this is so for English). Although the DP Hypothesis is controversial (and is rejected by Chomsky, among others), it is widely assumed in the syntax literature relevant to PV.
In this section I flag some difficulties associated with PV’s syntactic assumptions, without attempting a defense of them. Such a defense would need to address the distribution and behavior of the full range of determiners, including cross-linguistic variation in what determiners there are and how the functions of determiners are achieved in languages where there are none. Assimilating names to count nouns weighs as much in PV’s total evaluation as the implications for reference and modality that are my main object.

PV is meant as a theory of names as such, and achieves its uniform treatment of names only by assuming that bare singulars take a definite article at logical form. Some cross-linguistic data appears to support this, and it is common to gesture at Italian, German, and especially Greek, as languages where names take articles more freely or even obligatorily. But the full range of facts about cross-linguistic variation looks fatal to PV. Articles are both uncommon among world languages (only about a third have them at all) and geographically concentrated (being most prevalent among the languages of western Europe). 27 Some languages allow bare nouns as arguments but not as predicates (e.g., Japanese and Chinese), others as predicates but not as arguments (French). 28 These considerations are less fatal than they first seem, however. At worst, PV turns out to be a theory of names for only some languages. Such an outcome would be theoretically instructive, not just an interesting finding

27 De Multer and Carlier (2011).

28 These and other observations are used by Chierchia in his (1998) to argue there is systematic variation across languages in what NPs are allowed to pick out (by the grammar), his “Nominal Mapping Parameter”.

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— consider the question of whether a name can “belong” to any given natural language. While there is some temptation to deny this,29 many considerations favor it. Names inherit phonological, morphological, and syntactic features common to the linguistic communities that use them,30 and which sorts of expressions fall into the rough category of “argument-type” is subject to cross-linguistic variation.

Given this, it would not be surprising if names vary in their fundamental grammar too. As much as this may offend our a priori conception, the question is surely empirical. How languages without lexicalized determiners achieve their characteristic effects (e.g., through word order, case, agreement, or focus) is an ongoing subject of research. Perhaps then PV, while not straightforwardly applicable to these other languages, can contribute to our investigation of what mechanisms they have for achieving definiteness. PV strongly suggests these should turn up in how such languages handle names.31 Another syntactic issue raised by PV is why the determiner is typically aphonic. There is no in-principle obstacle to assuming

29 The general idea behind this is that names do not have the right kinds of contents to be part of a language, as in this passage from Vendler: “we might fall back on the intuition that proper names have no meaning (in the sense of “sense” and not of “reference”), which is borne out of the fact that they do not require translation into another language...Accordingly, dictionaries do not list proper names; knowledge of proper names does not belong to knowledge of a language.” (Vendler (1967): 38) Though see Burgess (2005) for a brief exploration of correctness conditions for translating names and how these conditions bear on the semantics of names.

30 Languages where names are declinable, carry gender marking, or have additional satisfaction conditions beyond bearing-“N” are significant in this connection. A good example is the filiation condition an individual must satisfy to bear a given patronym.

31 It may even be that Referentialism makes names problematically inaccessible to grammar, in claiming they do not have the kind of structure that could be variably realized from language to language.
covert structure, which is frequently appealed to in noun phrase syntax. But the defender of PV must show this is methodologically sound and preferable to other mechanisms for unifying the same data.

Much of the appeal of PV comes from the systematic way names interact with explicit determiners. Fara in her (2015b) argues — following Sloat (1969) — that the unusual interaction of the definite article with names (as opposed to other count nouns) singles it out as special among English determiners. Fara’s view is that the distributional data for names and count nouns are so similar that the correct approach is to identify them, then seek an

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32 A relevant example is Longobardi (1994), which argues that the interaction of the determiner in Italian with pre- vs. post-nominal possessives and adjectives (“Il mio Gianni studia” / “Il Gianni mio...” / “Gianni mio...”, but not “Mio Gianni studia”) shows D structure can be present even when there is no explicit determiner in Italian. “Gianni mio” is grammatical because “Gianni” raises to D — the name plays the determiner role. English is not parallel (“My John studies”, but not “John my studies”), and based on additional syntactic evidence, Longobardi argues for a phonologically null determiner occupying D for English. Recent defenses of PV have specifically assumed a covert definite article — an assumption I will argue helps the defender of PV explain rigidity. But one could equally assume a null determiner with the relevant semantic effects, without further assuming its strict identity with the explicit definite article.

33 For example, what prevents us from just saying names shift type in certain environments? Or that the predicative occurrences result from an all-purpose metalinguistic transformation, one with no direct bearing on the semantics of names? These I consider in the next two Chapters.

34 As already noted in connection with Longobardi’s work, one might also consider the possibility bare singulars take a determiner that is never explicit, one non-equivalent to any lexical item. Schoubye (forth b) cites an anonymous referee suggesting names on PV could have their own dedicated “phonologically null preproprietal article”. Schoubye claims this looks badly unmotivated. It is clear though what would motivate it, however: null determiners’ syntactic and semantic effects on the behavior of their voiced complements.

35 The contrary suggestion — that names having count noun syntax is a peculiarity — is also common. So, for example, Stowell conjectures names have count noun syntax exceptionally, “when they do not pick out a unique referent” (see his (1991): 38). This of course raises the
explanation for the definite article's infrequent appearance with name: if “Bambi” has the meaning *the x such that x bears*—“Bambi”, what explains the fact that the definite article only explicitly fronts “Bambi” in certain constructions? On Fara’s account, this apparent anomaly gets explained by systematic deletion of the definite article from surface structure in all but a few environments. I don’t think Fara’s deletion principle can be correct: the occurrence or nonoccurrence of explicit definites with names have effects on interpretation that would be surprising if it were. (See for example the examples discussed in Section 2.8.) But then I also argue bare singulars admit of referential and attributive uses, which helps make the case for Fara’s approach.

This admittedly leaves my defense of PV in a quandary, with a partial vindication of analyzing bare singulars as definite descriptions, but no going explanation for the nonoccurrence of the English definite article with names at surface grammar. Of course, there is no straightforward incoherence in assuming a PV-like semantics and making no claims about “aphonic determiners”. For example, this is the case with the Nominal Description Theory defended by Bach — see his (1981) and (2002) — which claims only a semantic equivalence between “N” and “the “N”-bearer”. But this is an uncomfortable compromise and seems to take a step back precisely where recent work on PV has moved the debate forward. PV cannot really be evaluated in isolation from intricate and ongoing debates about the noun problem of how names are individuated with respect to their bearers, a topic I cover in the next section.
phrase. Fortunately, there are ways PV that can contribute to those debates even in the face of cross-linguistic data that seem to disconfirm it. PV suggests a promising line of investigation which takes PV’s account of determiner–name interaction — true of languages that have a definite article — and adapts it to languages that express definiteness differently.

Restricting ourselves to the English data, the dialectic around PV’s syntactic commitments comes down to whether the best theory is one which yields either:

(1) A uniform treatment of bare singular, quantified, and predicative occurrences of names, emphasizing the parallels with count nouns, e.g. “which Jack was it?”, “I mean the new Jack”, “I know a Jack”, and so on;

or

(2) A treatment of bare singulars as the basic case, emphasizing structural parallels with expression types other than count nouns, e.g. pronouns and “some”-indefinites, as in “some person”. (This also yields a simple account of the relative infrequency and awkwardness of names taking the definite article, e.g. “I saw the Jack yesterday.”)  

It is plain that these syntactic considerations are bound up with the dialectic between PV and Referentialism. PV requires that names take extra syntactic material in their referential

36 Recent advocates of (2) in linguistics include Longobardi (2005), who argues for a basic distinction between object and kind expressions among nouns (with names in the former category and count nouns in the latter). Coppock and Beaver (2015) present distributional data where predicative uses of descriptions do not always pattern with predicative uses of names, a sign the data Fara adopts from Sloat’s paper may need examination against a richer background.
occurrences. If names are instead assigned a syntax that makes them "self-standing" (i.e. they function as complete DPs), this is inconsistent with PV. I ultimately argue that names' meaning and function (that is: the property expressed by the predicate, on PV, and what names are for) put them in a distinguished subclass of count nouns — a subclass where we expect rigidity on pragmatic, not semantic, grounds.

But first, to get a grip on how PV is positioned vis-à-vis Referentialism concerning modality, I need to revisit and elaborate some of the points touched on in the General Introduction. The next section will hence make a detour through the dialectic Kripke was concerned with in his (1980) — between Referentialism and Classical Descriptivism.

1.9 The classical dialectic

On Classical Descriptivism, names behave like descriptions that uniquely characterize their bearers. Semantically speaking, names are such descriptions. Names have meanings, which are informative about what they name. This presupposes that for every referent there is a corresponding set of properties only that referent has. But even supposing this, it is normally conceivable some other thing could have had just those properties, or that, similarly, the bearer could have had entirely different properties. This observation forms the basis of Kripke's rejection of the theory. Since these modal intuitions drive our evaluation of sentences containing names and descriptions — and makes the truth conditions of sentences containing them come apart systematically — Classical Descriptivism must be wrong. Kripke
concludes that a name simply stands for some individual ((R2) above, or “direct reference”), and statements made with the name always involve that individual ((R3), the rigidity thesis).

Note that a rigid predicate — one that always picks out the same property — will make the corresponding description rigid. “The even prime”, for example, picks out 2 at every time and possibility. Few predicates are like this, so few descriptions are rigid in this way. In particular, names on PV are not rigid in this way. They express a shareable property. They do not uniquely characterize anything. This is generically true, not necessarily true of names. It is a contingent fact that any given name has multiple bearers, and clearly conceivable there could be a convention of keeping names unique to their bearers. Such a system, while conceivable, presupposes peculiar background conditions. This is especially obvious if one considers the trade-off between cognitive demand and population size. Imagine we use five-digit hexadecimal strings. The system yields just 983,040 distinct names — roughly the population of Fiji. This points to a basic tension in the practice of naming that fits more naturally with PV’s account than Referentialism’s. There must be enough names that differ from one another to help us discriminate among bearers, without so many that they become unmanageable as a system. For instance, suppose it became harder to recognize when a given expression was a name, because of the overwhelming abundance and diversity of different

37 This example is given by Sainsbury in his (1979): 100, footnote 4.

38 I say “fits” because I do not mean to suggest Referentialism cannot provide a story here: certain facts about names’ function in discourse are independent of facts about their semantics.
names. This would be nearly as problematic as a system in which the number of names was vanishingly small, or where the referential vocabulary was restricted to a very small number of pronouns or demonstratives. This dynamic, of a large but bounded naming “lexicon”, fits much better with a conception of names as shareable linguistic properties than one of names as individual constants.39

A distinct, but related, fact about names is their so-called arbitrariness. To sharpen the thought, suppose names were non-arbitrary. Then a given name could not possibly — due to that name’s essence? — name anything other than what it does. This would be a magical sort of belief to have;40 one might even wonder whether a person who believed a name could be related to a bearer in this way had an adequate grasp of the naming relation. Here again, PV gives an illuminating picture of why this is so. As discussed in Section 1.3, I maintain that name bearing amounts (in part) to an individual being associated with some orthographic or phonological string. Properties of such strings (e.g., their length, facts about articulatory phonetics) may make them good or poor candidates. But so long as they could in principle fulfill their role — that of facilitating reference to individuals — there can be no obstacle to the relevant association (via a dubbing, say). Hence any name is reusable, is able to name

39 This conception has its share of common sense as well. If you yell “Fido!” at a dog show, after all, it’s the Fidos that come running. Cf. Szabo (2011): 1859.

40 The obvious point of reference here is the Cratylus. One exception that is sometimes cited is the case of numerals. Cf. for example Kaplan (1968): 194, where he suggests that “[numerals] necessarily denote their denotations” in virtue of how the conventions of the notation system relate them to their corresponding numbers. Since it is only because the numbers themselves have certain properties that such a naming practice is possible, this is clearly an outlier.
things other than what it does, in the sense that other things can (in principle) be added to its extension.\footnote{Again, I do not mean to suggest that Referentialism cannot give some parallel account of name “arbitrariness”. But it is inherently more awkward, because of the tight analogy with individual constants, which cannot be ambiguous, as Bach points out in his (2004): 89, and are unshareable by stipulation. This means that for each Bambi, its name is arbitrary only in the sense that another string could have been picked for that individual — not in the sense that “Bambi” is a name that could have been given to any individual whatever.} \footnote{In the next Chapter I lay out the theory of such covarying readings — where a given name has different satisfiers across time or modality — and explain the role of presuppositions in being able to access them. I ultimately argue they provide the strongest evidence that Referentialism is false.}

Of course, an ad hoc convention can be adopted to restrict what can and cannot bear a name, and one can evaluate a sentence presupposing that restriction. Such a case is given by Rothschild (see his (2007): 104). Suppose a law is passed in Ancient Greece that at most one person can bear—“Aristotle” at a given time. In a context where this is presupposed, one can get a reading of the following sentence on which the name is non-rigid: \footnote{In the next Chapter I lay out the theory of such covarying readings — where a given name has different satisfiers across time or modality — and explain the role of presuppositions in being able to access them. I ultimately argue they provide the strongest evidence that Referentialism is false.}

(1.8) Aristotle might have been a sailor.

But ad hoc conventions, being contingent and defined against the background of our actual naming practice, cannot tell against it (just imagine possible uses of the name if one continues, "...but supposing the law gets struck down..."). Communal agreement may ensure that at most one person may bear a name at a given time, or even (assuming somewhat fanciful background conditions) that a given person be the sole bearer for all time, but not that a given person be the sole bearer in all possible situations.
The property names express on PV is not sense-like, i.e. it does not by itself do the work of returning some individual as its value. Bearing-“N” is a “thin”, purely linguistic property. This means it is not caught up in certain problematic commitments of Classical Descriptivism — for example, the notion that knowledge of what is being referred to with a name is knowledge of some mutually accessible, language-independent specification of the referent with which the name is somehow linked. But like Classical Descriptivism, it does not predict that names are all and always rigid.

PV also differs from both Referentialism and Classical Descriptivism in how it individuates names. On the latter two theories, there are many entries spelled and pronounced “Bambi”, each with its own referent. Suppose we are talking about our mutual friend, Bambi. The name can be a type, tokened on occasions when we talk about our mutual friend. Suppose instead we are talking about a famous politician, Bambi. That name can be a different type, tokened when we talk about the politician. There can be no name type common to the mutual friend and the politician on Referentialism. There can only be a common string, which is tokened whenever those distinct names are tokened. This is the

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43 In this connection, it is worth recalling an advantage of Classical Descriptivism: its solution to the problem of negative existentials. Here, PV’s form of descriptivism is at a disadvantage. Names on PV do not express some interesting set of properties that might be uniquely instantiated by some individual. Hence PV cannot capture the significance of empty names in the manner of Classical Descriptivism. “Pegasus” just expresses bearing-“Pegasus” on PV, not properties associated with the mythic Pegasus such as being a winged horse

44 My discussion here is informed by the distinction Kaplan (1990) draws between common currency and generic names.
narrow individuation. On another individuation, “Bambi” is the name of a fictional deer, a linguistic anthropologist, and a Serbian food manufacturing company. Given PV’s semantics, there can be a single name type which is tokened when any object that bears “Bambi” is referred to, quantified over, or predicated of something. To sum up, PV tells us names are generic in nature and determine sets of individuals. Referentialism tells us names are proprietary in nature and determine sets of individuals in a derivative sense at best, through the homonymy of sets of names.45

This gives PV a generality that Classical Descriptivism and Referentialism lack.46 On those views, names have many distinct contents, each corresponding to some object (if non-empty).47 By contrast, PV provides a name schema. This is a structural characterization of when an arbitrary string behaves as a name, and so contributes to an account of what it is for

45 This way of putting things is a bit loose, albeit harmlessly so. Even if Referentialism is right that each name has but one bearer, it non-derivatively determines the corresponding singletons. Thanks to Beau Mount for catching this.

46 A point noted by Bach in his (2015). The crosslinguistic considerations of Section 1.8 mean the claim to generality must be attenuated, though not necessarily abandoned.

47 I think there is a bias — call it the Famous Bearer bias — that helps explain why the narrow individuation feels natural and was common ground between Classical Descriptivism and Referentialism. Even for names that are widely used, there can be certain bearers so salient that they are overwhelmingly preferred in interpretation. This phenomenon is notable for celebrities and politicians, for example. Although the observation is consistent with either account of name individuation, it goes a long way toward explaining why it is easy — on a diet of examples like “Aristotle”, “Pegasus”, or “Kurt Gödel” — to think of names as having senses, or as standing for that particular Aristotle, that particular Pegasus, or that particular Kurt Gödel that we know and expect. In most uses “Pegasus” can be counted on to be the mythical winged horse, not a Turkish airline, an asset management firm, or a Law School library catalogue (all likewise bearers of “Pegasus”). My use of “Bambi” as my main example is both a nod to Bart Geurts’s well-known example sentence (see (2.1) below), and an attempt to call attention to this easy slippage.
a speaker to know that an expression is a name, to interpret it as such. The point can be brought out by contrasting garden variety predicates and the kind of predicate names are, on PV. Consider an object that satisfies some predicate homonymous with some name. My grandmother named our pet goldfish “Fish”. It is true that Fish is a fish and a Fish. It is a fish in virtue of what it is, and a Fish in virtue of our linguistic practice. Since on PV all names are instances of a predicate type and express instances of a certain linguistic property, it gives a unified, general account of name content.

A last point of clarification. On Classical Descriptivism, each name is identified with a distinct description it semantically expresses, but names are not descriptions in general on PV. Only bare singulars are descriptions, expressing definiteness plus bearing - “N”. Reference with a bare singular occurrence of a name is reference with a description that contains the name. The name is the restrictor. A name’s content must be true of a particular object for it to be the name’s referent on Classical Descriptivism. On PV, one and the same name is true of many objects. The name of any particular object is either actually or possibly the name of other objects. Aristotle, then, has in its extension not only the Ancient Greek philosopher, but also Aristotle Onassis, and any other Aristotle. Each of these can be the Aristotle of a given time or situation.

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48 Names’ reusability seems to fall somewhere short of being a hard fact about what kind of expression they fundamentally are. That said, I think it is firmly enough entrenched that we systematically accommodate such a presupposition. For any name, no matter how exclusive a name may seem to some particular thing, it is never more than surprising that some other thing also bears it.
Bearing all these features of PV in mind, I turn now to the first part of my case for PV: if bare singulars are descriptions and descriptions are in general not rigid, how can PV account for familiar modal intuitions about the truth-conditions of sentences containing bare singulars — intuitions that lead most everyone to conclude that bare singulars are all and always rigid?  

1.10 Referring with bare singulars

Bare singulars are descriptions on PV. It is also widely assumed that bare singulars cannot vary in what they stand for, i.e. bare singulars are rigid. Hence the question of when and why a description can be rigid is highly significant for the defense of PV. This is, of course, a longstanding debate in the philosophy of language. It turns on a number of non-coincident distinctions whose relationship and explanation are controversial: contrasts of scope (de re and de dicto), speech act type (referential and attributive), and proposition type (singular and general). The defender of PV must commit to a one or another theory of how these distinctions interact, and how they might explain the intuitions that seem to favor Referentialism.

Fara in her (2015b) maintains that since incomplete descriptions are rigid, the rigidity of bare singulars follows from their being such descriptions. Recall that bare singulars, being multiply satisfiable descriptions on PV, are “incomplete” in the sense that different things can be the x such that x bears-“N”. As per Fara, PV just inherits an account of rigidity for bare singulars from the theory of incomplete descriptions and without special stipulations.
But different things may be packed into the claim “incomplete descriptions are rigid” that should not get conflated. Distinguish: (i) a linguistic observation about a given expression type; (ii) a theory of that linguistic observation; and (iii) a theory of the expression type.

The linguistic observation, made by Strawson in his (1950), is that descriptions like “the table” or “the party” are overwhelmingly used to refer to specific tables and specific parties. Occurrences of those expressions are then rigid with respect to those tables and parties. This much is largely theory-neutral. Then there is a view about what class of descriptions “the table” and “the party” belong to — incomplete, where a description is incomplete just in case it is not uniquely satisfied. Then there is a further view, on which the incompleteness of the descriptions somehow accounts for their rigidity.\(^{49}\) One can set out to explain the linguistic observation without assuming a theoretically significant class of “incomplete” descriptions. But Fara correctly identifies what, on PV, a theory of rigidity for bare singulars must look like.

Our best theory of how descriptions like “the table” or “the party” get rigid interpretations

\(^{49}\) A common approach has been to posit some mechanism of supplementation or restriction that “completes” the incomplete description and yields a unique referent. Fara endorses the view that no particular “completion” gets into the proposition expressed by utterances containing incomplete descriptions, on the grounds that any number of such completions are compatible with the sentence’s intuitive meaning when uttered. She further claims that such incomplete descriptions are intuitively de re when uttered. Elsewhere, however, (see her (2015a)) she appeals to a theory defended by Jason Stanley, on which there is a “completion” involving saturated variables at logical form.
must also account for how bare singulars rigidly pick out some particular bearer on PV — for the simple reason that bare singulars just are such descriptions.

One fairly immediate reason to be dubious about Fara’s argument is her choice of examples. Parties are essentially parties. (At least, it is rather unnatural to consider whether an event that is a party is only contingently a party.) This strongly suggests incompleteness may not be what accounts for the linguistic intuitions. Contrast “the winner” or “the mayor”, descriptions which are incomplete but whose satisfaction is contingent in a highly salient way. Non-rigid interpretations of either are easy. Of course, it is not difficult to set up contexts in which a description like “the table” is non-rigid as well — not because of any contingency, but simply because different tables can coherently satisfy “the table” across time and possibility. A nice example of this is given by Gray in his (2012): 54. Consider the sentence:

(1.9) In ten minutes, the table will be covered in food.

It is most natural to imagine a specific table being referred to. But suppose we work in a furniture production line. Tables, chairs, and desks pass by our station at regular five minute intervals. Some of our colleagues have gone on strike and are having a raucous party upstream to ostentatiously defy management. First a chair passes on which a lone beer can sits, then a desk covered in cigarette butts. Observing a table with dirty cutlery go by, I utter sentence (1.9). In such a scenario, “the table” clearly applies to whatever table is on the conveyor belt at the later time.
These points are familiar, and Fara goes on to concede that “there are many complications in the rigidity thesis that incomplete definite descriptions are rigid designators” (2015b, 103). Non-rigid occurrences of incomplete descriptions are easy to come by if you pick the right property, but even for properties that do not naturally encourage the non-rigid reading, the right scenario can make it accessible. These points have immediate implications for bare singulars on PV’s treatment. Bearing “N” is contingent, like “the winner”. So how can PV explain the following contrast:

(1.10) The winner always takes the prize.

(1.11) Bambi always takes the prize.

The non-rigid reading of (1.10) is obvious, that of (1.11) strongly dispreferred.50 I address this issue in Chapter 2. I show that there are scenarios where bare singulars behave like “the table” in (1.9) and that a suitable framework can be given for explaining when and why certain scenarios have this effect on what readings are available for a given bare singular.

When Fara argues PV has no problem with rigidity, she leaves the impression this means PV can get just the same predications Referentialism does. But as we have just seen (and as Fara is aware), incompleteness and rigidity come apart. This risks misrepresenting the dialectic between PV and Referentialism. A core commitment of Referentialism is that names

50 Relatedly, with a sentence like “someone else could have been Bambi”, it is hard to get the true reading that PV’s semantics should allow. Thanks to Daniël Hoek for discussion and for suggesting these examples.
and descriptions are fundamentally different types of expression. Supposing Referentialism is true, we should expect non-rigid readings of bare singulars to be infelicitous generally.\textsuperscript{51} Here the defender of PV and the Referentialist disagree about the data. However, if non-rigid readings are sometimes felicitous despite being (strictly) semantically deviant, Referentialism must account for it differently than PV.\textsuperscript{52} (This is a disagreement about the data’s explanation, not the data.) I have been careful to formulate the disagreement between PV and Referentialism in somewhat stronger terms than either Fara or Gray. PV should not (in my view, cannot) have the project of showing bare singulars only have rigid occurrences, and its defenders should avoid formulations that imply otherwise. The prediction that names can display non-rigid behavior is a positive feature of PV — not a bug to be fixed.

1.11 A Dual Article solution?

In his (forth a), Anders Schoubye argues against Fara as follows. Suppose rigidity is a matter of incompleteness. Then we should expect complete descriptions to allow non-rigid readings. But this is not so with names: bare singulars with unique bearers are rigid too. (Just pick a name that happens to have only one bearer and evaluate a sentence with it.)\textsuperscript{53} Is there a

\textsuperscript{51} As Schoubye alleges in his (forth a) and (forth b).

\textsuperscript{52} This style of response is discussed in Gray (2012) and developed in Hawthorne and Manley (2012). I turn to it in Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{53} Because virtually any phonological string is in principle deployable as a name, there is something peculiar about arguing from the possibility of a name being uniquely instantiated. See earlier remarks in footnote 48.
change of modal profile?\textsuperscript{54} Hence the incompleteness of bare singulars (assuming PV’s semantics) cannot explain rigidity, as incompleteness is neither here nor there with respect to rigidity, as observed in the previous section. This is of course the whole point of classic example cases, e.g. “The murderer, whoever that is, is insane.”\textsuperscript{55} Failure of uniqueness alone cannot explain rigidity, without a systematic explanation of why the “incomplete” descriptions nevertheless get the non-rigid interpretation when in certain linguistic environments and assuming certain contexts.

As Schoubye recognizes, the defender of PV is better off trying to explain the linguistic observation in terms of descriptions having referential uses, where these in turn explain the rigidity of bare singulars. However, he explores just a single way to implement this, which I will call the Dual Article solution. This is the view that descriptions are ambiguous in general between term uses (which are rigid) and quantificational uses (which are non-rigid), and that

\textsuperscript{54} Fara herself (appealing to considerations developed at length in Gauker (1997)) denies that facts about whether or not a description happens to be uniquely satisfied could matter for the evaluation of a given occurrence, supposing reasonable beliefs and intentions on the parts of speakers and interpreters. The thought is this: it cannot be that merely because all but one of a given kind of thing has been destroyed (unbeknownst to the speaker or interpreter say) that the description somehow becomes complete and has different modal properties.

\textsuperscript{55} It is often assumed to be the presence or absence of referential intentions that make the difference. But Lepore illustrates how non-rigid incomplete descriptions can occur in settings where the referential reading is not possible at all: “Suppose someone utters ‘Every US president is married to the woman to his right,’ in a context where every living past and current US president is standing directly to the left of his wife. Knowledgeable people will take the speaker to have said something true. But suppose that everyone on stage is lined up so that the president first in line has several women to his right, only one of whom is his wife.” (Lepore (2004): 45, fn. 3). As Lepore observes, a speaker may truthfully utter that sentence simply knowing the protocol at such public events, not knowing how many or which presidents are assembled, etc.
these correspond to distinct definite articles with distinct semantic behavior. This is of course just one way of theorizing about the referential/attributive distinction drawn by Donnellan in his (1966), i.e. when one successfully refers to a man drinking water with “the man drinking the martini”, the description gets a semantics analogous to Referentialism’s for bare singulars. Since Schoubye is unfriendly to PV, and wants Dual Article to be both the best chance for PV to explain rigid occurrences and a failure, we should carefully scrutinize whether this is in fact best for PV and whether there is a nearby solution that does not fail.

Schoubye rejects the Dual Article approach he proposes on behalf of PV, and for two sets of reasons. First, there is no compulsion to infer lexical ambiguity from Donnellan’s examples and good reason not to, supposing the referential/attributive distinction holds for speech acts involving other expressions; there is no evidence that any natural language draws the distinction lexically, so the assumption it is ambiguously encoded in English looks strange on empirical grounds (Cf. Bach (2004)). Second, recall the uniformity rationale for PV: better to say names are one expression of a given type that allows all their behavior to be explained,

Further motivation for Dual Article can be found in the Argument from Convention that Devitt gives in his (2004). According to Devitt, the sheer preponderance of referentially used descriptions, along with certain alleged defects of explaining these in pragmatic terms, mean that we should give them a semantics analogous to names on Referentialism. As I will shortly argue, considerations against Devitt’s proposal that Schoubye presents in his (2012) help show why a pragmatic account of referentially used descriptions can vindicate PV. I should also note that while Devitt means to challenge the Russellian theory of descriptions specifically (hence talk of a “quantificational” article), nothing about the points I make here turns on considering the Russellian theory vs. the Frege–Strawson theory. That debate is basically orthogonal to the debate around PV (though prominent defenders of PV, e.g. Elbourne and Fara, do opt for the Frege–Strawson analysis).
rather than say names are ambiguous between two expression types, each with its own behavior. Introducing ambiguity at the level of the article is in tension with uniformity, since simply assuming an ambiguity for names instead seems equally reasonable, if not preferable.

The reasoning here is questionable. Suppose the semantic ambiguity interpretation of Donnellan were independently motivated and true. It would simply follow that the defender of PV could appeal to that view in explaining how names compose to form bare singulars. So it is not ad hoc in any real sense: we have no more reason to deny the defender of PV can argue this way (in principle) than we originally had for rejecting semantic ambiguity itself. What is genuinely problematic is an implementation of Dual Article where the term-forming article only serves to secure the rigid occurrences of bare singulars, without there being a systematic account of the term-forming article itself. That would look ad hoc.

On the view that bare singulars only have rigid occurrences, the term-forming article alone occurs in bare singulars — that is just the explanation Dual Article gives for their rigidity. This would seem to suggest, though does not entail, that the non-rigid reading should be systematically available when the determiner is explicit, and not silent as it is for bare singulars. Schoubye presents no argument that on Dual Article — recall this is the view he is sketching on behalf of PV, then rejecting! — every instance of an explicit definite article with the name is quantificational. But he clearly assumes the contrast with the covert, term-forming definite article is exhaustive and exclusive, and not without prima facie plausibility. It
is true that the explicit definite article can at times encourage the kind of non-rigid reading we
associate with a quantificational semantics for the definite article.

For example, Hawthorne and Manley have argued (in their (2012): 236) that there is a
contrast between the following sentences unfriendly to PV:

(1.12) In every race, the colt won.
(1.13) In every race, John won.

Their judgment is that (1.12) readily allows an attributive reading of “the colt”, where this is
not possible for the bare singular in (1.13). Contrast:

(1.14) In every race, the John won.

As my discussion in Chapter 2 will indicate, it does not take much stage setting to get a good
non-rigid reading of (1.13) as applying to different Johns at different races. Still, it remains the
case that the explicit determiner practically guarantees such an interpretation, a fact the
defender of PV should explain.57

Schoubye’s line of thought about the explicit definite article leads him to another
objection to Dual Article: why would bare singulars only take the covert term-forming article,
when other count nouns systematically take either article? While I reject Dual Article on
general grounds (because it is a false theory of descriptions), this objection is partly

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57 Note however that not all explicit occurrences of the definite article encourage a non-rigid
reading. Some in fact can look as rigid as bare singulars, e.g. “He is not the John Woods I was
talking about.” This seems to indicate the interaction of explicit definites with names is more
complex than some defenses or criticisms of PV imply — a matter for further investigation.
misguided. Schoubye assumes the desired result is that all bare singulars be obligatorily rigid. But the data I present in Chapter 2 — cases where bare singulars are non-rigid — are in fact compatible with there being covert occurrences of both the term-like article and the quantificational article. A structurally identical sentence can allow either rigid or non-rigid readings of a bare singular. Hence PV does not face the problem Schoubye believes it does — of not being able to find a use for the quantificational article. The issue is rather that Dual Article is not independently motivated and not necessary, since we can explain the rigid/non-rigid alternation with a single definite article. That rigid readings of descriptions exist is something all theorists have to account for, whether or not they endorse Dual Article; these are “incomplete descriptions” in the linguistic observation sense articulated earlier.

So why does Schoubye suppose Dual Article is what the defender of PV needs in order to account for rigidity? It is unclear. As Schoubye himself argues in an earlier paper (see his (2012)), we should reject Dual Article on the grounds that object-dependent propositions can be communicated with a range of determiners, assuming the speaker has the relevant referential intentions. Just as one can intend an individual with a description, one can intend multiple individuals with a quantifier. A referential use of “the man at the bar drinking the martini” can communicate a proposition about someone (martini drinker or no), and there is no reason “every man at the bar drinking a martini” cannot be similarly used. To make this observation is not yet to have a full account of the pragmatics. (I will sketch one in the next section.) But given that the referential/attributive distinction exists for expression types other
than descriptions, Dual Article faces an overgeneration problem. It is extremely unattractive to suppose “every” and other quantifier phrases are semantically ambiguous between a quantifier and a term-forming expression. This should incline us to look for an alternative, one that explains the referential use of descriptions — and their associated modal profile — in pragmatic terms.

1.12 Spelling out a pragmatic story

It is a platitude that names are primarily devices of reference. Viewed one way, how could PV contradict this? Viewed another way, how can PV not be in tension with this platitude, since it makes names predicates *firstly* and referential expressions *derivatively*? I don’t think this tension is very deep — and explaining why can clarify some important features of PV.

On PV the meaning of a name is bearing-“N” and this is a property an object has in virtue of our linguistic practice. We can ask what the function of that linguistic practice is. It seems unobjectionable to say that it is to tag objects, i.e. to assign them linguistic markers that can (in principle) be used to reidentify them across discourse.\(^{58}\) PV differs from Referentialism in conceiving of such tags as coming from a common stock, where each tag is “reusable” for different individuals. This typing of names is entirely consistent with saying their role is normally exhausted by referent retrieval, i.e. “N” itself only serves to distinguish

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\(^{58}\) Paradigmatically, names facilitate consistent reference to entities that are relatively stable over time, in contrast to, for example, deictic pronouns (“Bambi” vs. “he”). But this is not any deep fact about names. We name vanishingly brief events and “episodic” or vague entities, e.g. storms.
an object for the purpose of referring to it. Here I assume, following Larson and Segal (1995), that bare singulars are just *referentially used descriptions* in the overwhelmingly majority of their occurrences. Can this contribute to an account of why bare singulars are in paradigm cases *rigid* — a claim the defender of PV cannot deny?

On one understanding of the question, the answer is straightforwardly no. This follows from the definition of rigidity we have been assuming (Cf. the claim labeled (R3) at the start of this Chapter). Rigidity is the property a type of expression has just in case an instance of that type, i.e. a specific name or description, cannot vary in what it stands for. No descriptions, excepting special cases like “the even prime”, have this property, whether or not they are being used to refer. Reference *with* descriptions is simply irrelevant to their rigidity.

On another understanding of the question, the answer is not so straightforward. Much turns on what one takes the phenomenon of interest to really be, what one thinks a term of art like “rigidity” ought to be reserved for, what it was getting at. As Neale argues in his (2008), by defining “rigidity” as first and foremost a taxonomic notion (i.e. *these* are the “referring expressions”, *those* are not) philosophers have put a consequence of an important phenomenon before the phenomenon itself. Here is Neale's understanding of “rigidity”:

“[An] expression *E* rigidly refers to *x* if and only if the truth of what a speaker says by uttering a sentence containing *E* depends upon how things are with *x*. […] The seemingly important rigidity difference between the proper name ‘Aristotle’ and the definite description ‘the greatest philosopher of antiquity’ is a difference is respect of truth conditions: object-dependent truth conditions in
connection with sentences containing the name but object-\textit{independent} truth conditions in connection with sentences containing the description."\textsuperscript{59}

Of course, if utterances containing \textit{names} systematically generate object-\textit{dependent} truth conditions, the taxonomic claim will hold, i.e. their denotation will not vary across times and possibilities. In this way, the two notions of "rigidity" very nearly coincide for the Referentialist, encouraging a slippage in what is meant by "rigidity" that Neale wants to correct.

Of course, the notion of a proposition's object-dependence/-independence is badly in need of further explication, which I do not undertake here. I introduce Neale's notion of rigidity because it suggests how PV's account of bare singulars might be made to square with the modal intuitions behind Kripke's argument for Referentialism. If these are fundamentally about object-dependent truth-conditions, as Neale suggests, the defender of PV need only account for how referentially used descriptions systematically generate \textit{those} for the relevant class of utterances. This is entirely consistent with bare singulars not being "rigid" in the taxonomic sense, since there could be a different class of utterances involving bare singulars that do not generate object-dependent truth-conditions. (In the next Chapter I argue that this is true.) In this way, an expression that is not "rigid" can still have "rigid" occurrences — namely, by figuring in utterances that express object-dependent truth-conditions.

\textsuperscript{59} Neale (2008): 386.
How might this go? As argued in a neglected paper by Thomas Bontly (see his (2005): 8-9), its being common ground what object satisfies a description can matter to its interpretation. If I utter a sentence of the form “The F is the G”, and it is common ground that some object b is the F for the purposes of the conversation, it will be taken for granted that I intend the object-dependent proposition, that b is the G. Absent some positive reason — i.e. did the speaker mean someone else’s baby by “the baby”, not his little newborn Bambi, when he said “the baby is the culprit”? — an interpreter will not need to first wonder whether the object-dependent proposition is relevant, nor whether the speaker’s evidence that “the baby is the culprit” depends on his knowledge that little newborn Bambi is both “the baby” and “the culprit”. On the contrary, it looks like the default interpretation. For any number of descriptions, it is most natural to assume — here based on general world knowledge and expectations about likely discourses — that some particular object is meant, whether or not one is even party to the conversation at all. Sentences like “I went to the office”, and “Save the planet!” are examples of this kind, where the former suggests a familiar context and the latter has a characteristic use. If we find out that the planet that needs saving is not Earth but TRAPPIST-1f, or that the speaker went to an office that is not his or her workplace, this has an air of correction.60

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60 Similar data were remarked on in earlier work by RM Sainsbury, who discusses descriptions like “the baby” as being ones where “the predicate used […], or the descriptive phrase as a whole, plays a special role in the speech of the speakers and hearers concerned.” (Sainsbury (1979): 100)
The line of thought is promising, but has limitations. For one, it is difficult to get clear on what the “default” status consists in, and how strong it actually is for descriptions. One option is to say that the object-dependent propositions arise out of a generalized conversational implicature (the view endorsed by Bontly in his (2005), Cf. also Bach (2004): 24). But is the “air of correction” I pointed to really tantamount to canceling an implicature? With standard examples, the impression of a default interpretation seems much stronger than for examples involving descriptions. If I say “I think the theory is true”, I have implicated that I do not know the theory is true. Like all implicatures, this can be canceled by a continuation.61 But it seems plausible that the verb “to think” generates this implicature as a matter of course, and so counts as generalized. But as is pointed out by David Lumsden (see his (2010): 302), while continuations and asides can naturally force one reading or another of a description (“the chap over there”, “and I mean whoever did it”), both readings are usually on a par, with neither being the default one cancels to get the other. Talk of “the murderer” can just too easily go either way, and so the assimilation to generalized conversational implicatures seems imperfect. This is an issue worth further consideration, and that more empirical work on the relevant linguistic intuitions might help to settle.

61 See for example these lines from Renata Adler’s 1976 novel Speedboat: “There is a passage in Dante when he and Virgil, traveling through the Inferno, stop beside a man buried to his neck in boiling mud. He does not care to speak to them. He has his own problems. He does not want an interview. Dante actually grasps him by the hair and gets his story. Some sort of parable about reporting there, I think. In fact, I know.” (Adler (1976): 24)
Despite some obscurities in the notion of object-dependence, and despite the need to better define and motivate the appeal to generalized conversational implicatures, this is an attractive approach for the defender of PV. It makes sense of why bare singulars could count as either "rigid" or "non-rigid" depending on the utterance and context in question, and yet be always the same type of expression semantically. It moves beyond the notion of rigidity as a brute fact about certain types of linguistic expression — which is suggested by the taxonomic conception — and instead locates it squarely on the side of full-fledged propositional contents. When confident that a given description is systematically used for some particular individual in an actual or imagined linguistic setting, we default to the object-dependent proposition, as a *pragmatic* effect. In this way, "the baby" can function within a given group of speakers as a byword for some individual, and so generate rigid occurrences of that expression. A bare singular like "Ada" functions similarly. The more pronounced tendency of bare singulars like "Ada" to produce this effect is not due to a difference at the level of semantic type, but instead to the special role the property bearing-"N" has in discourse, namely of distinguishing among referents in a *purely linguistic way* that ascribes no "worldly" properties to the thing named.

I turn now to further evidence that the pragmatic account is correct. If the rigidity of bare singulars is not semantically hard-wired — as it is on Referentialism, and on that-PV, i.e. a version of PV where bare singulars are Kaplanian complex demonstratives — we would expect it could be overridden under certain conditions. That is, we expect "attributive" uses of
names, where an utterance with a bare singular expresses an object-*independent* proposition. If Referentialism is true, there can be no genuine attributive uses of names.

This may appear puzzling given how Kripke, the arch Referentialist, himself argues in his (1977). Kripke distinguishes two cases: in one, I say “Jones is raking the lawn,” but refer to someone named Smith; in another, I say “Jones is raking the lawn,” and refer to Jones, i.e. the man named Jones I meant to refer to. Kripke presents this example as witnessing the referential/attributive distinction for names. This in turn suggests that a systematic semantic ambiguity is implausible as a theory of that distinction. So isn’t one of the considerations favoring Kripke’s pragmatic account of Donnellan’s distinction precisely that there are attributive uses of names? As Salmon points out in his (2004), what Kripke provides are in fact two referential uses of a name: one where Jones is referred to by “Jones,” and one where Smith is referred to by “Jones”. “Jones” is another individual’s name — and this is an entirely different thing than “Jones” being used attributively. On Referentialism, it is simply incoherent that a name could have a genuine non-referential use. PV, by contrast, predicts the existence of such uses. It is the task of the next Chapter to substantiate PV’s prediction, by showing that in certain settings what a bare singular stands for is not a particular individual but instead varies across times and possibilities.
Chapter 2. Names with Varying Satisfiers

2.1 Non-rigid bare singulars

I have argued that PV must appeal to independently motivated facts about the pragmatics of descriptions to explain the behavior of bare singulars. Rigidity is the norm for bare singulars, but not because Referentialism is true. PV can adequately explain the modal intuitions that motivate Referentialism, while retaining a rationale for rejecting it — that names are prevalently, not universally, rigid.

Here I take up the non-rigidity part of this argument. I show that under certain conditions, the default interpretation can be overridden so that the bare singular's interpretation corresponds to what we would describe (in speech act theoretic terms) as an attributive use. In such cases, the-"N" does not pick out some one object, but instead has different satisfiers in different situations. This is the covarying (or "relativized") reading of a description.62 These are non-rigid occurrences of names.

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62 I prefer "covarying" because "relativized description" is potentially misleading. For example, Neale in his (1990) specifically means relativized to an assignment by that phrase. (Thanks to Gary Ostertag for pointing this out.) Unfortunately this choice puts my terminology somewhat out of step with the current literature. Rothschild (2007) just refers to the "narrow scope" reading, though as Gray rightly points out this "implies a privileged sort of explanation of the readings" (2012: 55). Gray talks of (modally or temporally) relativized descriptions, and Schoubye (forth a) follows Gray. Gray and Fara (in her (2015b)) use "covarying" specifically for cases where there is explicit quantification and binding (as in Donkey sentences), though I also use it for cases without explicit quantifiers (notably in Section 2.8). I do not think the "covarying" terminology implies a privileged sort of explanation any more than "relativized" does. Insofar as a Referentialist accepts the relevant examples are felicitous at all (and offers a different explanation of how they get the reading), it is common ground that the names are "covarying", i.e. evaluated with respect to different bearers in different situations.
In this Chapter I present the relevant data, defend their status as data, and argue that PV best accounts for them. The last two tasks are interrelated. Many take it for granted that names are never non-rigid. Felicity judgments about the relevant examples vary. It is sometimes suggested the examples are just plain defective. Still others find the data equivocal, with some impression that a “non-literal” or pragmatically enriched use is in question. If the correct explanation of the covarying readings is coercion, they cease to be evidence for PV. To make the case for PV’s account of the non-rigid readings, some story should be given about why speaker judgments might vary in this way. I argue that with a better understanding of what elicits such readings, we can both account for their mixed reception and vindicate their significance for PV, which is best positioned to explain why such non-rigid names should occur at all. The upshot is that we should prefer PV over Referentialism in light of the relevant data and also reject versions of PV that hard-wire rigidity into the semantics of bare singulars.

2.2 A framework for covarying readings

Here is a well-known example of a covarying reading, due to Geurts in his (1997):

\[\text{Schoubye, for example, reports finding such cases “borderline infelicitous” in his (forth b): 35.}\]

\[\text{As Gray notes, if covarying readings “only appear in marked contexts ... this hardly vindicates the assumption that names are definite descriptions. To the contrary, it would naturally suggest that we should think of these cases as some sort of non-literal coercion of the basic referential use of names towards a descriptive purpose” (Gray (2012): 52). I partly address this worry in Section 2.4 and return to it in Chapter 3.}\]
(2.1) If a child is christened “Bambi”, and Disney Inc. hear about it, then they will sue Bambi’s parents.

Despite “Bambi” being a bare singular, intuitively the sentence's truth depends not on some individual, Bambi, but on how things are with a range of Bambis, and whether each of their respective parents would be sued by Disney Inc. This is straightforwardly consistent with PV’s entry for “Bambi”, since the x s.t. x is called-“Bambi” is non-rigid, and has the right satisfaction condition. Referentialism’s entry for “Bambi” must be some individual, which gets the truth-conditions wrong.

For PV to vindicate its account of the covariance data, it needs to say when and why this reading is available, or obligatory, as in (2.1). Since (2.1) is explicitly metalinguistic, it is easy to see why a Referentialist would want to resist it and how — by claiming it tells us nothing about names in particular but just witnesses a general purpose mechanism of metalinguistic ascent. All cases are not like (2.1), however, and a predictive framework for covarying readings must be in place before this style of objection can even be properly formulated.

Under what conditions does one get a covarying reading? As observed by Rothschild in his (2007), it is partly a matter of world knowledge. Speakers must presuppose there is at most one individual who satisfies a description at any point of evaluation. Only certain descriptions will have this feature, or be treated as having it for the purposes of the

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65 Hawthorne and Manley in their (2012) take this line. I give my response in Chapter 3.
conversational. Whether one does depends on what is presupposed about the relevant property.

Take “the president”. Since it is presupposed that within a given country or organization, the property *being the president* is had by at most one person, sentences like the following have the covarying reading:

(2.2) The president always swears an oath.

Call presuppositions like this — presuppositions that guarantee there is one and only one satisfier per situation — role presuppositions. The added presupposition that any given president only swears the Oath of Office one time resolves what logical form to assign (2.2). The description is interpreted as bound (by the adverb of quantification), and the sentence is true because all the satisfiers at their respective times swear the oath. The covarying reading is obligatory for (2.2). A referential construal — with a single president swearing many oaths — is not incoherent, of course. It simply conflicts with world knowledge along with the most obvious interpretation of “oath.” The world knowledge supplies the role presuppositions.

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66 In Rothschild’s paper, he draws a distinction between descriptions which are role-type and others which are particularized. But why? Descriptions are simply being evaluated against the background of the relevant presuppositions or not. Different explanations can then be given of how these presuppositions enter in, some of which do not even turn on a feature proper to the description itself. Hence opting for talk in this Chapter of role presuppositions alone. We also avoid talk of a single description “changing” from particularized to role-type (as Gray does in his (2012): 56), which conflicts with the fact (not observed by Gray) that a sentence/scenario pair may be consistent with either reading. See the next Section for such an example. Thanks to Karen Lewis for suggesting this simplification.
Most descriptions are not like this. They express highly shareable properties—we expect they could be multiply satisfied at a given point of evaluation. Rothschild’s suggestion is that without speakers presupposing a unique satisfier across situations, a description will be interpreted outside the scope of temporal or modal operators. This correctly predicts that most descriptions will behave rigidly in most settings by default. We look for a satisfier first, then consider that object with respect to time or modality. On the face of it, Rothschild’s picture here looks rather different than the one I gave in the previous Chapter. He offers a “negative” condition, i.e. bare singulars are rigid when role presuppositions are absent. However, what we are each saying does not conflict except in uninteresting ways. I take Rothschild to describe the possible outputs of an interpretation, not to really explain why this or that interpretation occurs. Insofar as he does—by appeal to common ground and world knowledge—it is unclear whether there is any real gain in simplicity over the account I sketched earlier. We still need a “positive” characterization, that is, the part played by speakers’ beliefs about what the rigid description picks out, not merely that its interpretation is not “relativized” to an operator. This neither I nor Rothschild really provide, in my case because invoking “object-dependent propositions” does little more than label what we want to explain. As for whether one should think of the rigid occurrences as arising due to an implicature, or rather as a different logical form the sentence literally expresses (like in Rothschild’s discussion), I doubt anything about the data decisively favors one or the other, and will not try to adjudicate between them here. What matters for my purposes is that
Rothschild has identified the mechanism whereby bare singulars get the non-rigid reading that PV predicts them to have, namely, role presuppositions.

For some descriptions, role presuppositions are strong (like “the president”), but for others additional scene setting or explicit signaling is needed to encourage them. It is not a matter of descriptions meeting or not meeting some sharp criterion, but one of degree. Take “the murderer”. If one follows up with “whoever that is”, one explicitly signals one is considering different satisfiers across different epistemic possibilities. Alternatively, the speaker’s intentions or the scenario can be characterized in a way that yields the covarying reading or an example chosen which encourages accommodation. (I give examples of all these below.)

On PV, names are clearly the sort of predicate one expects to disfavor role presuppositions. They express an eminently shareable property. It is not natural to presuppose there will be a unique Bambi or a unique Ada across a range of situations — that is, without additional scene setting or explicit signaling. This contributes to a principled explanation of why the covarying reading is difficult to get for bare singulars: when is the property of being a Bambi or being an Ada something we need to track across times or possibilities? Rarely. But this is so in (2.1), where what matters is that there are salient possibilities containing Bambis. More generally, the strategy for getting covarying readings is this: to find scenarios where what is most relevant is that something or other bears a given name, in all the relevant circumstances, and not which thing happens to bear it. As noted
above, on an assumption about names that should be theory-neutral — that they are specialized tags for referent retrieval — we should expect such scenarios to be rather unusual. For a thing to be relevant only insofar as it has this or that name, and not in itself under this or that name, mildly subverts the function of names — albeit in a way perfectly consistent with their semantics.

To sum up, a covarying reading becomes available as a function of certain presuppositions, typically grounded in common knowledge about a description's pattern of satisfaction. Some descriptions readily allow it, supposing “one satisfier per situation” is already common ground for the description, for example, “the winner”. For most descriptions, it only becomes available when role presuppositions are somehow introduced or spontaneously accommodated. Hence it is to be expected that such cases may seem strained or artificial. Descriptions normally receive a default interpretation, as being uniquely satisfied by some one individual.

Rothschild's framework is thus applicable to PV essentially without modification. Indeed it must be so, since if PV is true, bare singulars are semantically just descriptions of the form *the x such that x bears*—“N”. Given this, it is predicted that bare singulars behave just as

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The appeal of Rothschild's framework for the defender of PV is obvious: to account for the modal behavior of bare singulars on PV, we apply an independently motivated account of the modal behavior of descriptions in general. The application is considered by Rothschild himself in his (2007). It is likewise appealed to by Fara in her (2015b) and is explored by Gray in his (2012) dissertation. I build here on the earlier discussions by Rothschild and Gray to offer a full defense of this approach. I also rebut challenges to it made by Schoubye in his (forth a).
they are observed to: rigid nearly always and by default, and exceptionally non-rigid when overriding role presuppositions are introduced or accommodated.

2.3 The cases

Here I apply the recipe for getting covarying readings already sketched. Recall that what is needed is scenarios where bearing-“N” is most relevant (more than what bears-“N”) across some range of situations, each of which is presupposed to contain some unique bearer of “N”. This is so with (2.1), the Bambi conditional: we consider the respective parents of the Bambis, these only being relevant in having “Bambi” as a name.

Other cases with slightly different structures will turn on presuppositions about the name’s distribution (i.e., what sorts of things are the “N”-bearers) or on some range of situations each of which presupposes a unique bearer of “N”. These need not, as with (2.1), have some explicit linguistic antecedent (“if a child is christened ‘Bambi’”). All that is required, as outlined in the previous section, is that the relevant presuppositions be satisfied. Consider a case like the following:

*I am shooting a pet food commercial and am told dogs named Lassie and Bruiser are our pet models. Surprised to discover Lassie is a Chihuahua and Bruiser a Collie, I remark:*

(2.3) That’s odd; Lassie is usually a Collie.

The covarying reading is obligatory, despite there being a maximally salient Lassie at the context of utterance. The adverb is raised and binds “Lassie”. (Of course it makes no sense to
say of a given dog that it is “usually” of a certain breed.) The relationship between the property bearing-“Lassie” and the property of being a Collie is what is at issue. In most of the relevant situations, that is, the Lassie of that situation is a Collie. As noted in the previous section, the role of world knowledge here is considerable. Structurally, any name about which it is common knowledge that its bearers reliably have or fail to have some further property would do. My example just gains in naturalness from the knowledge Collies are frequently named Lassie (in tribute to the fictional character).  

Another route to the covarying reading is a range of relevant situations which themselves require some unique “N”. These are most naturally thought of as cases where (for some reason) a bearer of “N” is needed qua bearer of “N”. These do not rely directly on world knowledge about names’ distribution, as in (2.3). Here is a case of this kind:

_Gwendolyn Fairfax wants to marry an Earnest. She tries to elope whenever she finds such a suitor. Her plans are always foiled by her imperious mother, Lady Bracknell. I say:_

_(2.4) Earnest, if there is one this season, is in for a nasty surprise._

The contrast between (2.4) and (2.1) helps illustrate what is and is not required to get the covarying effect. In (2.1), bare singular “Bambi” occurs in the consequent of a conditional,

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68 An identical sentence could be used with reference to different Collies playing the fictional character Lassie, in which case “Lassie” expresses a richer condition corresponding to that role—the property playing-the-character-Lassie— not the bearing-“N” condition.
whose antecedent explicitly restricts us to “Bambi”-worlds, as it were. Based on that example, one might suspect covarying readings require something explicitly about names to specify the relevant situations, as with (2.1)’s talk of christenings. If this were so, it would be in tension with the account I defend here. My account requires only that role presuppositions be somehow accommodated for a given name. The sentence itself need not raise names and naming to salience in any overt way. Rather, things are just as the account predicts: once there is some way that being the-“Lassie” or the-“Earnest”of a situation matters for some range of situations, this informs which logical form we can assign to a sentence containing “Lassie” or “Earnest”. This alone makes the covarying reading available. Whether it is obligatory can depend on further features.

For example, “Earnest” in (2.4) is sentence-initial, where a referential use is most natural. But it cannot be so understood. “If there is one this month” makes it explicit that the range of relevant situations might not include what is actual. Drop the aside and the covarying reading is still available, assuming the speaker does not or cannot have the relevant referential intentions. Plausibly, this could be due to ignorance of who the-“Earnest” of the season is, and whether there is one.

It also matters that either the covarying or referential interpretation are sometimes available for a single sentence. Only then is it clear we have the same exact expression in either case, that is, one and the same bare singular bound or unbound with respect to quantification over situations. If not for such cases, the Referentialist could simply reply that
the data cited in favor of PV — either predicate position occurrences or the covarying readings — are not data that bear on the semantics of names at all. Rather, these are expressions that merely look like names and are improperly called names. (Only bare singulars are genuine names, and these are all and always rigid.) Why these other expressions look like names can then be explained without implications for the basic semantics of genuine names. This is basically the line taken by Schoubye in his (forth b) where he assumes a separate category of expression, Predicative Names, which are systematically related to Referential Names. The trouble is that if a given bare singular can be compatible with either reading, that line becomes less plausible. (I develop this thought in greater detail in Section 2.9.)

For now, it suffices to get the flavor of the phenomenon. Consider another case like (2.3), involving domestic animals:

\begin{quote}
Suppose my grandmother always owns a cat, just one. She is unimaginative about names for cats, however. She gives each successive cat the same name, Cleo. I tell you:
\end{quote}

(2.5) Cleo is always a shorthair.

Like the two previous examples, the covarying reading is obligatory. As with (2.3), the “Lassie” sentence, this is due to the nature of the predicate.

But consider the same scenario, with a different predicate:

(2.6) Cleo is always a nuisance.
This could be truly uttered either intending a particular Cleo or with the same kind of meaning as (2.5). (Imagine a continuation: “always a shorthair and always a nuisance.”)

Finally, some sentences trigger the relevant presuppositions without needing any setting up of the context to make them interpretable. These are spontaneously accommodated. Paul Elbourne gives one such an example:

(2.7) Every woman who has a husband called John and a lover called Gerontius takes only Gerontius to the Rare Names convention. 69

Here is another, which relies on the obvious fact that no single Zed or Zoe could be at issue:

(2.8) In most schools, Zed and Zoe are last to be called to assembly.

As one would expect, these cases of spontaneous accommodation are ones where the names themselves have interesting properties that bear on the sentence’s correct interpretation. 70

Wrapping up, the logical forms that PV predicts for sentences with bare singulars are essentially these:

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70 Note that there are other cases where the property bearing-“N” can explain a reading that Referentialism’s semantics cannot. Here is one such case from Gray (his (2012): 50), who refers back to similar styles of example given in Bach (2002). Suppose our mutual friend Bambi was due to marry PJ Orcutt, but broke off the engagement. She exclaims:

(2.9) I might have been Bambi Orcutt!

PV delivers the right interpretation: Bambi pick out herself in a counterfactual scenario where she bears that name.
(Referential) The x such that x is called-N is, in all/no/most... situations P, F.

(Covarying) For all/no/most... situations P, the x such that x is called-N is F.

With a principled explanation of why (Referential) is preferred in most contexts along with cases where (Covarying) is obligatory for principled reasons, plus cases where (Referential) or (Covarying) are both possible logical forms to assign a given sentence, Referentialism does not simply lose its apparent advantages over PV concerning the explanation of name rigidity. Rather, it is shown to have a mistaken conception of the nature and extent of name rigidity.

Note that this not only give PV the edge over Referentialism, but also rules out some alternative ways of implementing the core thesis of PV, that names are predicates. For example, it rules out versions of PV which make names obligatorily rigid, as Matushansky does in her (2008). Matushansky introduces a covert indexical element for bare singulars. If such an element were always present, the covarying readings would not be possible. The proposal would make the same basic predictions for bare singulars as the version of PV discussed in Chapter 1, where the determiner is not the definite article but a Kaplanian demonstrative determiner.

There are also sound methodological criticisms that Schoubye makes of Matushansky’s approach:

“Attempting to capture [bare singulars’] rigidity by revising the semantics of definite descriptions [...] will, initially, affect all definite descriptions — including descriptions without names. But given that descriptions are not generally rigid, such a revision will be too general. Consequently, special
provisions must be made so that only [bare singulars] are affected. [...] But [...] the only plausible justification for such a revision is that it predicts the rigidity of referential names."

So in addition to conflicting with the data under consideration in this Chapter, a version of PV that hard-wires rigidity into bare singulars looks ad hoc.

2.4 Accommodation

Since the notion of accommodating role presuppositions plays such a major role in the defense of PV, it is worth dwelling on it at length. Here I consider a different route to the covarying reading, one which supplies the role presuppositions in a slightly different way either than (2.1), where an explicit linguistic antecedent is in the sentence, or by (2.3)–(2.6), where the context makes facts about whatever bears-“N” more relevant than any one of the Ns alone, for some range of situations. The case in question, the “Quintus” case, is one where an explicit additional constraint is placed on what can bear-“N”, i.e. to become a bearer of “Quintus” one must satisfy a further condition, without which one cannot legitimately be given that name.

Examining the “Quintus” case helps clarify the varieties of accommodation that support the covarying reading, and how one ought to reason about them. I also show that a debunking explanation, tempting for the “Quintus” case, does not properly generalize to examples (2.3)–(2.6). As an added bonus, the same considerations rule out a different

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71 Schoubye (forth a): 13.
debunking explanation the Referentialist might offer for the covariance data: that they are
due to a specific kind of pragmatic enrichment, the phenomenon of referential transfer
discussed by Geoffrey Nunberg in his (1993).

2.5 Quintus

Consider a scenario analogous to that given in Section 1.9, where a Greek law
stipulates that only a single individual at a time could bear-“Aristotle”. Suppose a society
dictates that the names “Quintus” is reserved for fifth sons and that all fifth sons must bear
that name. I then say:

(2.10) In any family, Quintus is the fifth son.

It is the description the fifth son that supplies role presuppositions, and the name applies to
whatever satisfies that role — and vice versa.72 Although the name itself suggests being fifth,
this is inessential. The “Quintus” case corresponds to a perfectly general formula for
generating covarying readings: first, introduce a descriptive condition that itself secures role
presuppositions, then make bearing the name directly depend on that condition.

An illuminating comparison can be drawn between “Quintus” in (2.10) and the
phenomenon of descriptive names.73 Recall these are cases where a bare singular is

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72 This assumes, as I think is right, that the scenario is intended to be one where the name Quintus
is not given to anything else not a fifth son. (If so, (2.10) could be false.)

73 At one time I suspected examples like (2.10) — and even moreso the variant (2.16) below — were
being judged marginal by some informants because they were quasi-descriptive names. I am less
confident now what will explain which covarying readings informants find felicitous or not, and
suspect it would take a well-designed study to say anything conclusive about that question. I do
introduced such that it stands for whatever uniquely satisfies some further description, either at the time that it’s introduced or at some specified or presupposed time. A descriptive name evaluated at the time of its introduction — a “fresh” name, to borrow a term from Zoltan Szabo — may not count as a name in any sense relevant to the semantics of names. Why? A fresh name’s content is wholly dependent on the description that introduced it.\textsuperscript{74}

This suggests a debunking explanation of the non-rigid behavior, one the Referentialist might offer. On this debunking explanation, what “Quintus” stands for depends on some description, like “the fifth son”, that introduces role presuppositions. The bound reading of the name is coerced, being a pragmatic repair for a sentence that is interpretable (because of the description’s semantics), but deviant (because of the name’s semantics). If this explanation fits all covarying readings, it’s bad news for PV.

2.6 Referential transfer

As noted previously, another obvious way for the Referentialist to explain away the covariance data is to claim the names are somehow pragmatically enriched. If there is non-

\textsuperscript{74} Szabo’s view (p.c.) is that a name switches from being “fresh” to rigid when presuppositions concerning the name change: when it is no longer presupposed that the name’s users know its reference-fixing description. His conjecture is that name rigidity results from a kind of “deferred ostension” — speakers intend to pick out whatever everyone else is picking out, since they do not know how the name was introduced. Of course, on PV there will also have to be such intentions (to refer to the same thing as someone else by a name). But this is consistent with names themselves not being individuated by referent.
literal usage, the data tell us nothing about the core semantics of names. In this connection, Gray discusses a somewhat elaborate example akin to (2.4), the “Earnest” case:

Suppose we have a strange friend who prefers always to be dating one person named Helen and one person named Jane. We have come to suspect that our friend is unhappy dating the current Helen and the current Jane for shallow reasons — status anxiety, say. I remark:

(2.11) Next month, Helen will be an investment banker and Jane will be an artist.\(^75\)

Gray considers the following Referentialist line about (2.11). We already know from the classic examples given in Nunberg (1993) that referential terms can be pragmatically modified so that they communicate something about the referent’s role, something that cannot be true of the referent itself.

In Nunberg’s example, a condemned prisoner utters:

(2.12) I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal.\(^76\)

Here the first-person pronoun does not make its normal contribution. Instead, the role of the condemned prisoner is somehow able to supersede — due to its conspicuous relevance — the

\(^{75}\) Gray (2012): 51.

\(^{76}\) Nunberg (1993): 32.
referent of “I” in the utterance's interpretation. So by referring to himself, this one condemned prisoner succeeds in communicating something about condemned prisoners in general. (For the purposes of my point here I don’t, as far as I can see, need to take a stand on how exactly this occurs or whether this is exactly the right characterization of the pragmatic mechanism.)

What prevents the Referentialist from saying (2.11) is just an instance of this broader phenomenon? In the scenario of (2.11), the roles the partner named “Jane” and the partner named “Helen” are conspicuously relevant. So an utterance of (2.11) can succeed in communicating something about those roles, even if “Helen” and “Jane” are given a Referentialist semantics and stand for our mutual friend’s current partners. Again, if this explanation fits all covarying readings, bad news for PV.

2.7 Reconsidering the cases

Neither pragmatic repair (of the kind I sketched to explain the Quintus case) nor referential transfer properly explain all of (2.2)–(2.6), however.

Recall the “Cleo” scenario, with my grandmother’s succession of identically named pet cats. Suppose my grandmother, unbeknownst to me, once harbored a nameless longhair stray. In such a context the following sentence is false:

(2.13) My grandmother’s cat is always a shorthair.

It seems though that (2.5) can still be true (“Cleo is always...”) even if (2.13) is false. There is no tension between my saying something true of all the Cleos under the false belief they are the only cats my grandmother has ever cared for. This seems to show that while bare singulars get
evaluated relative to a restricted range of situations, these restrictions do not get into the satisfaction condition the name itself expresses. This suggests “Cleo” makes the semantic contribution PV predicts (bearing-“Cleo”) and is not being dominated by some description (i.e. “the cat my grandmother owns”) in the manner of the “Quintus” case. Furthermore, pragmatic repair cannot make sense of sentences like “Cleo is always a nuisance”, or (after my grandmother’s passing and the end of the line of Cleos) “That is the room Cleo always slept in”. Since these have a perfectly accessible “non-deviant” reading, there is nothing to pragmatically repair. Yet the covarying reading is still accessible.

This suggests a simple reply concerning “Helen” and “Jane” in (2.11). The defender of PV should grant that referential transfer is a possible explanation, but deny that it makes sense to give that as the explanation of (2.11), in light of there being highly similar data to which that explanation cannot apply.

It is worth reflecting further on how the “Quintus” case in particular differs from earlier examples. Not all Lassies are Collies, nor all Collies Lassies. Who the Earnests are has nothing to do with Gwendolyn’s preference for Earnests. The facts about what objects bear what names — that is, the facts directly relevant to the names’ semantics — are independent of our interests in, and beliefs about, things having this or that name. It is these, our name-oriented interests and beliefs, that make the covarying reading accessible in the “Lassie” and “Earnest” cases. By contrast, if a name’s extension is stipulated to exactly coincide with that of some description, the description itself “settles” what objects bear it — and our intuitions can be
driven entirely by that description alone. I conclude from this disanalogy that the “Quintus”
case is unlikely to serve as the basis for making general statements about how covarying
readings work.

“Quintus” is not, for that matter, properly a descriptive name. Recall that certain claims
involving descriptive names have been alleged to have a priori status. (It does not matter for
my point whether they in fact do.) Let’s suppose it’s a priori in the imagined society of (2.10)
that the following is true, said of some particular individual:

(2.14) Quintus is the fifth son.

That this is a priori has nothing to do with knowledge about the name “Quintus”, on
Referentialist assumptions. To see this, consider a paradigm descriptive name, Kaplan’s
“Newman”. “Newman” is stipulated to stand for whatever is the first child born in the twenty-
second century. Hence the following is a priori (again, let’s suppose):

(2.15) If anyone is the first child born in the twenty-second century, it will

be Newman.

Descriptive reference-fixing, if successful, yields a specific object as the name’s referent. The
intuition that (2.15) is a priori depends on that being so: “Newman” stands for some individual
just in case the description is uniquely satisfied.

But what, on Referentialist assumptions, explains the sense in which (2.14) is a priori?
Not a fact about the name “Quintus”, which is some individual’s name if it has any content,
and nothing about being a fifth son, which no one presupposes is uniquely satisfied. Rather, (2.14) can only be a priori in virtue of something common to different names, the names spelled and pronounced “Quintus”. Of course, the property that names express according to PV just is that common something.

Observe also that on PV there is really no such thing as a descriptive name in the sense there is for the Referentialist.\(^77\) Since names are also descriptive contents on PV, a descriptive name is just one where bearing: “N” is satisfied by a thing whenever it satisfies some distinct description. What results is overlap with the name’s extension, either for many objects (as with “Quintus” and “fifth son”) or for a single object (as with “Newman” and “the first child born in the twenty-second century”).

I think this situates the problem of “descriptive names” where it ought to be and removes a complication introduced by Referentialism — one that makes a problem fundamentally about mental acts appear linguistic.\(^78\) The fundamental problem is whether de re thoughts can be had concerning what satisfies the first child born in the twenty-second century. Referentialism generates a distinct problem, since it assumes names should yield de re propositions just in virtue of their semantic type. This is a red herring from the perspective

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\(^{77}\) Thanks to Aidan Gray for setting me straight on the significance of this point.

\(^{78}\) Here I am in broad agreement with the line advanced by Hawthorne and Manley in their (2012), and especially by Crane in his (2012) review of the same.
of PV. On PV, such propositions are not automatically de re — a proposition containing a bare singular may or may not be used referentially, may or may not have object-dependent truth-conditions. This does not solve any problems about the nature of such attitudes themselves. (Semantics cannot solve them.) But it does situate our uncertainty about “Newman”-type cases where it really is: with the thoughts of speakers, and what those thoughts can and cannot be related to.

To further develop the idea: on PV, we are hesitating between two different interpretations of a single complex expression (\(\text{the } x \text{ such that } x \text{ bears-"N"} \)) that admits either — one where the speaker intends some specific object, another where the speaker does not. The former interpretation is troubling, given the epistemic state of the speaker. Referentialism introduces an unhelpful complication, where we are uncertain what the expression itself is — a name or a description.

Bearing all this in mind, consider again the reductive explanation I sketched earlier on behalf of the Referentialist. The thought was that covarying readings are just cases where some expression (not semantically a name, despite appearances) stands in for the associated

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79 Here I am in agreement with Robin Jeshion in her (2001), who rightly observes that the puzzle about descriptive names ultimately turns out not to be about names at all, but that it is just a non-obvious form of Frege's puzzle. We have two different guises for “N”: one associated with it being the F, the other associated with being the object I fixed on using “the F”. One is informative and looks empirical, the other uninformative and a priori. The real issue (as Jeshion observes) is whether these descriptive “ways of taking” “N” both result in de re beliefs, and why they would do so.
description. A close cousin of (2.10) helps show, even more clearly than (2.3)–(2.6), that this cannot be right.

Suppose our neighbor Joan has four sons, named Primus, Secundus, Tertius, and Quartus. I say:

(2.16) If Joan had had five sons, Quintus would have been bullied by the others.  

Unlike with (2.10), “In any family, Quintus...”, there is no stipulation about what sorts of things can bear the name. This makes it implausible “Quintus” simply means the fifth son in this context, or, for that matter, Joan's fifth son. In fact it seems it must express bearing-“Quintus”. Suppose it's common knowledge my pet turtle is named Quintus. Then, in the same scenario as (2.16), the following seems true:

(2.17) If Joan had had five sons, there would have been two Quintuses on our block.

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80 Elbourne (2005): 181–82. In Elbourne's original example, we find John, not Joan. The unique ordering of children by birth is of course crucial to how the example works. Since the property of being a mother's son, but not a father's son, yields this — in principle many sons of the same father can be born simultaneously — so I have amended the example.

81 Thanks to both Aidan Gray and Gary Ostertag for helping me see the significance of this difference between (2.10) and (2.16). Thanks as well to Aidan for pointing out the relevance of examples like (2.17) below.
With (2.16) and (2.17), we can clearly distinguish what the name expresses (bearing—“Quintus”) from the circumstances presupposed in evaluating it. But there is no pressure to think it is any different for (2.10), merely because the Quintuses are the fifth sons by some linguistic convention. The defender of PV can resist the reductive explanation even in (2.10), and maintain bearing—“Quintus” is what “Quintus” expresses in the imagined scenario.

To sum up, Referentialism predicts that “Quintus” can neither be bound nor shared, as in (2.10). But the Referentialist can offer a debunking explanation: covarying readings just involve descriptions (“the fifth son”) written down to look like names (“Quintus”). It is the disguised description, not the name, that explains the appearance of binding and non-rigidity. In examples like (2.10), some form of pragmatic repair predominates over the semantics of the relevant expressions. If covarying readings were in general like (2.10) and so explicable along these lines, Referentialism would have a strong case against PV’s analysis.

But this is not so. Again, we can see this from the fact that “Cleo” in (2.5) picks out just the Cleos of the relevant situations (the ones involving my grandmother’s cat ownership), but that this is consistent with other things, not named Cleo, being my grandmother’s cat. Or indeed (on PV’s explanation) from the fact that “Quintus” in (2.10) selects for individuals who have that name, not for fifth sons, even supposing these are the same individuals. Accommodation restricts the relevant range of situations to those which each contain some unique “N”-bearer. There is no need to suppose pragmatic modification of the bare singular itself. Hence covarying readings are evidence for PV’s semantics, and against Referentialism’s.
2.8 Challenges to the framework

In his (forth a), Anders Schoubye casts doubt on the significance of covarying readings for the debate around PV, calling the data “subtle and inconclusive” and claiming that to get the covarying reading of a bare singular “is much more difficult than it is for a run-of-the-mill definite description.” ⁸² He correctly notes it is incumbent on the defender of PV to say why this is so.

My answer to this was anticipated earlier in the present Chapter: it is highly unusual that someone or other bearing-“N” is relevant enough to encourage role presuppositions, to make us look for the “N”-bearer across a range of scenarios. For the same reason, even spelling out such scenarios can sound odd. ⁸³ But this is unsurprising. The whole function of bearing-“N” in discourse is to facilitate talk of individuals, the Ns themselves. Since there is a similar difficulty in getting covarying readings for other descriptions when they likewise discourage role presuppositions, there is no particular problem here for PV.

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⁸² Schoubye (forth a): 23.

⁸³ As Gray points out (in his (2012): 53), the ready availability of certain readings can obscure the fact that they correspond to different scenarios. This is especially true for descriptions that highly encourage role-type presuppositions, e.g. “Next year the president will be a Republican.” Since it is so effortless to get both readings, it creates the false impression that no role-type reading exists in cases where the right scenario is hard to imagine.
Schoubye gives a contrasting pair of examples meant to substantiate his worry that bare singulars cannot behave as PV predicts. The first involves a garden variety description. Here is how Schoubye sets up the case.\footnote{Schoubye (forth a): 23.}

Suppose we are hosting a party in honor of circus clowns. We therefore agree that a clown should greet guests at the entrance. However, a lot of clowns are coming to the party and no clown has yet accepted the job as greeter. Nevertheless, we are discussing what is appropriate attire for whatever clown will greet arriving guests. I say:

(2.18) The clown should wear a red nose.

Schoubye argues that substituting a name into this basic set-up fails to make a covarying reading of the name available. Imagine in lieu of a party honoring clowns, it is a party honoring people named Louise. Similarly, a person named Louise will greet the guests, and we’re discussing attire. I say:

(2.19) Louise should wear black.

In Schoubye’s view, the utterance is “bordering on defective”.\footnote{Schoubye (forth a): 23.} While I'm less persuaded than Schoubye of that, it is certainly true the covarying reading of (2.19) is more strained than in
I do not, however, think this is specific to names, or any objection to PV. In fact, the same problem arises for other descriptions where it is difficult to not hear them as referring to some specific satisfier. This makes them infelicitous in a context where there are many such satisfiers.

Imagine in lieu of a party honoring people named Louise, it is a party honoring men I met at the zoo. A man I met at the zoo will greet the guests, and we’re discussing attire. I say:

(2.20) The man I met at the zoo should wear black.

It is very hard to get the covarying reading of (2.20), perhaps even more so than (2.19). It seems to naturally invite the question: but which? One can proliferate cases where garden variety descriptions similarly fare no better, or even worse, than (2.19).

Consider, to change examples, the contrast Gray identifies between (2.21) and (2.22) below. He finds there to be “a noticeable difference ... in the relative naturalness” of the covarying reading:

(2.21) In each of my classes today, Helen asked the best question.

(2.22) In each of my classes today, the Canadian asked the best question.

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86 If introduced in the right way, however, the covarying reading of (2.18) is more accessible. Consider: “I am going to need a Louise here and a Bambi there, Louise should wear black.” Thanks to Daniël Hoek for pointing this out.

87 Thanks to Justin Khoo for discussion here.

Let's grant there is a contrast here that needs explaining. (As with Schoubye's “Louise” sentence, I'm not convinced the covarying reading of (2.21) is all that strained.) Can role presuppositions explain it?

To change the example slightly, suppose a retiring grade school teacher is describing many years of experience dealing with young pupils. The teacher might say:

(2.23) Blake is always the troublemaker.

Primed to expect a range of different Blakes across time — as there will have been, in the school teacher's career of many decades — the covarying reading is preferred. Unprimed, it is more natural to suppose in (2.21) a single Helen taking different subjects with one teacher, not seven different Helens with, say, one Helen per subject.

It's also worth noting how the peculiarities of a given scenario — let's stay in the classroom setting — can shift the interpretation of descriptions where the covarying reading is typically dispreferred. For example, “the guy in the corner” is a paradigm case of a description we expect to see used referentially, as in:

(2.24) The guy in the corner should have stayed home tonight.\(^\text{89}\)

But consider instead:

\(^{89}\) The example is from Nasta (2015): 204.
(2.25) In each of my classes today, the guy in the corner asked the best question.

Since in a classroom setting it's natural to imagine different occupants of a given spot for different class meeting, a description that normally would be interchangeable with the corresponding complex demonstrative ("that guy in the corner") occurs non-rigidly.

This helps drive home a point made earlier: whether a description carries role presuppositions is not a sharp matter. So while a covarying reading of "the clown" is certainly less natural then "the president" or "the winner", it is still natural enough to imagine someone or other being the clown of some situation — certainly more natural than someone or other being the Louise of some situation. That fact explains the contrast in acceptability between (2.18), "the clown should...", on the one hand, and sentences (2.19) and (2.20), i.e. "Louise" and "the man I met at the zoo", on the other — better, I think, than assuming it is anything special about names.

Schoubye's examples do raise some other issues the defender of PV should address. I sketch a reply to them here, though what I have to say is inconclusive. First, as Schoubye rightly observes, introducing an explicit definite article helps encourage a covarying reading. So, for example, a slight modification of the party example yields:

(2.26) The Louise should wear black.
I share Schoubye's judgment here that covarying readings are often easier to obtain with explicit articles. Why should this be, if the determiner is already present at logical form?

Another point these examples bring out, not explicitly raised by Schoubye, is that my examples all involve some form of adverbial modification or quantificational element in the sentence: "usually," "always," "if there is one," and so on. It is not as easy to get the covarying reading otherwise. Another case of Schoubye's will illustrate.\textsuperscript{90}

\begin{quote}
A woman is looking for a person named Barack Obama — say for a documentary about having the same name as the president. She says:

(2.27) Barack Obama should be no more than 55 years old.
\end{quote}

In response I can reapply the main point of this section: that it is really no different from the vast majority of descriptions, which are likewise helped into a covarying reading by the presence of quantificational material. The following sentence is intuitively awkward, though, and in much the same way as (2.27),\textsuperscript{91} even if I'm shooting a documentary about men I met at the zoo, and we're talking about which to interview first:

\begin{quote}
\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{90} See his (forth b): 36.
\end{footnote}
\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{91} I think the difficulty of getting the reading for some other Barack Obama when there is a maximally salient Barack Obama also contributes to the problem with (18). See similar observation about the Famous Bearer issue in footnote 47 above. A related reminiscence: my middle school geography teacher featured in TV spots for the History Channel in the mid-90s, along with other educators who shared names with historically significant figures. He was John Hancock.
\end{footnote}
\end{quote}
(2.28) The man I met at the zoo should be no more than 55 years old.

Supposing this is correct, the earlier question about the interaction of names with explicit articles also matters for (2.27). As Schoubye observes, a definite article and explicit restriction fixes (2.27):

(2.29) The Barack Obama for the documentary should be no more than 55 years old.

It seems that setting up the role presuppositions can only go so far in getting the right reading for (2.27), at least as compared to (2.29).

This leaves the defender of PV in a quandary. On the one hand, the modal behavior of bare singulars is well accounted for by the peculiar form of Descriptivism it offers: covarying readings are rare, but occur in a fairly systematic way. And there are analogies with other cases of linguistic explanation. For example, recall the third reading, in addition to de re/de dicto, that is possible for attitude ascriptions:92

(2.30) I want to buy an inexpensive coat.

In addition to the two obvious readings, there is another that is accessible that will almost never be accessed without being elicited. This is the reading on which there exist inexpensive

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92 Here I draw on Szabo’s discussion in his (2010): 33, which outlines the work of Janet Fodor in her (1970) dissertation.
coats, such that I want to buy one of them. This will be true, for example, if I am told my friend is selling coats, believe them to be expensive (wrongly: they can be had for cheap), and want to buy one of them (whichever). We learn something about the semantics of (2.30) in knowing it has this reading, though it is non-obvious. Similarly, I maintain, covarying readings are theoretically significant for the semantics of names, despite being rare.

On the other hand, the notion that there is a syntactically real definite article under deletion (as Fara and Matushansky maintain) does not cohere well with the apparent optionality, and apparent influence on interpretation, that the article displays in many settings. Although the semantic claim of PV does not force one to accept any particular syntactic story by itself, it is an uncomfortable compromise.

How to understand the contribution of quantification is even less clear. We earlier considered the view that covarying readings were pragmatically coerced — that names appear bound because they are being treated as equivalent to some description. If this is so, these examples are semantically deviant and cannot bear on the core semantics of names. I rejected this proposal, made on behalf of the Referentialist, because names don’t seem to simply stand in for descriptions in the relevant cases, nor need we assume the names have enriched meanings beyond bearing-“N”. We can distinguish between (i) the restricted situations, those which each call for some unique N and so supply role presuppositions for

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93 As noted earlier, Kent Bach has long defended the former without making any related syntactic conjectures.
bearing-“N”, and (ii) bearing-“N” itself. If the adverbs seem to make a difference, however, it suggests a different line the Referentialist could take.

What if the quantificational element is what drives the pragmatic repair? The thought would be that in a case like (2.5) above, “Cleo is always a shorthair,” the unavailability of a coherent semantic interpretation is what forces quantifier raising, and yields a deviant interpretation of “Cleo”. Remove the adverb, and the effect disappears, even assuming the exact same context:

(2.31) Cleo is a shorthair.

This is a plausible challenge to PV’s account. But it makes an incorrect prediction: that all covarying readings of bare singulars are obligatory. The “good” interpretation would otherwise be accessible — the one the Referentialist maintains is uniquely “good” — and so no pragmatic repair would occur. As already noted, contexts like the one of (2.5), the “Cleo” scenario, also allow sentences where either interpretation is available. This is witnessed by (2.6), “Cleo is always a nuisance.” This seems to show covarying readings become available just in case the relevant presuppositions are satisfied, as I maintain, not just because the sentence underwent a forced reinterpretation. Otherwise, it is unclear why covarying readings are sometimes available where the bare singular could equally well be understood as referential.

94 Thanks to Gary Ostertag for suggesting this type of Referentialist response to the data.
2.9 Conclusion

The starting point for my defense of PV was the following observation: it is not the norm for sentences containing descriptions to be true in virtue of just any satisfier, since they are almost always uttered with some specific satisfier in mind. I argued that this observation could form the basis of an account of bare singulars’ rigidity, one consistent with PV’s form of descriptivism. In Sections 2.6–2.8, I showed under which circumstances there are exceptions to the norm: with the right presuppositions in place, bare singulars are not rigid. This, I argued, shows that Referentialism is false. These considerations combined favor a specific version of PV, one that explains rigidity and non-rigidity in terms of referentially used descriptions (i.e. bare singulars) and role presuppositions.
Chapter 3. A Metalinguistic Challenge to PV

In the previous chapter, I made a significant assumption: that the semantics and pragmatics of descriptions explain why bare singulars can get the covarying reading. Here I defend that assumption. I consider an alternative explanation proposed by Hawthorne and Manley in their (2012). They suggest that the data presented in Chapter 2 can be explained without taking a position on the semantics of bare singulars at all.\footnote{In this chapter I will be concerned only with the objection, which is independent of the general framework for English noun phrases Hawthorne and Manley develop in the book, with its apparatus of \textit{singular restrictors}. As they themselves make clear — they close the section on names with a subsection labeled “a tentative verdict” — the application of that framework to the case of names is less thoroughly developed and determinate than that given for descriptions or demonstratives. To fully assess its merits \textit{vis-à-vis} PV would require a thorough engagement with their positive proposal, which I do not undertake here.} Rather, the data can be explained by an all-purpose mechanism of metalinguistic ascent. Since Referentialism is trivially compatible with such an explanation, its truth would take away the dialectical edge I have claimed for PV. Here I develop the analogy with scope ambiguities discussed in the previous chapter. If this analogy is systematic and depends on “N” univocally expressing bearing-“N”, that is reason to resist the metalinguistic explanation.

A pun will help illustrate the Hawthorne–Manley objection. Suppose I discover four flying mammals in Ada’s basement. Alarmed, I run upstairs, ask Ada for a wooden stick, and run back down with it to do battle with the pests. Ada quips: “Now there are five bats in the basement.” Here there is quantification over both the flying mammals and the stick as “bats”, despite ambiguous meanings. Why not say the same is true of “three Caitlins”, and that we...
are free to quantify over what are strictly ambiguous (but homonymous) names? Grant that one can reinterpret all the data where bearing-“N” predominates in the interpretation, and not some particular N, along just these lines. Is there any reason, given this, to prefer bearing-“N” as the semantics of names, over Referentialism supplemented by metalinguistic ascent?

For the quantified cases, there is a clear contrast between the ease and automaticity with which we get the relevant reading of names as opposed to (garden variety) common nouns. No context-fixing is required for an occurrence of “three Caitlins” to get the reading PV predicts, arguably even given radically different satisfiers for the name.96 By contrast, an arbitrary occurrence of “five bats” will get one or the other disambiguation outside the context I described. This matters to the dialectic, since Hawthorne and Manley mean to specifically explain away the covarying readings in metalinguistic terms. Referentialism does not even predict the explicitly quantified cases. For this reason, if Hawthorne and Manley provide an explanation for covarying readings that should apply to those simpler cases but does not, it renders that explanation suspect.

96 One might question whether a use of “three Caitlins” where not all the Caitlins were persons — suppose there was a boat named Caitlin, a tropical storm named Caitlin, and a novel named Caitlin — would violate interpretive expectations to the same degree as with “five bats”. But is it problematic in the same way? As a matter of world knowledge, we expect most things called Caitlin will be women from English-speaking communities. As a matter of linguistic understanding, we know any object whatsoever can in principle be given the name Caitlin. This means that even if there is a similarly strong impression of oddness in that case as when we quantify over lexically ambiguous “bats”, we have reason to expect its explanation may differ, as I maintain it does.
Hawthorne and Manley give the following pair of cases in support of a debunking explanation of covarying readings.  

(3.1) Whenever I am given a choice between going to the movies with someone called “Harold” or with someone called “Maud”, I choose Maud.

(3.2) Whenever I am given a choice between something called a “bank” and something called a “bat”, I choose the bank.

The thought is that (3.2) requires a hearer to “construct a new meaning on the fly” to interpret a deviant use of “bank”. The second occurrence of “bank” (the one that is not explicitly metalinguistic) gets a special interpretation — as expressing the property of being a thing that on one standard meaning “bank” is true of. There is no temptation to complicate the lexical entry for “bank” to account for this. But since (3.1) and (3.2) are structurally parallel, it is plausible the same explanation fits (3.1). But then why complicate our semantics for names to account for it? If the same explanation fits and the analogy is good, PV looks unmotivated. But it is unclear whether the same explanation does fit, and reason to suspect the analogy is faulty.

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First, there is good prima facie evidence that lexical ambiguity cannot help make sense of covarying readings. Unlike with the former, names allow distinct satisfiers under verb phrase ellipses:

\[(3.3)\text{ Ada went to a bank and Caitlin did too.}\]

\[(3.4)\text{ Ada met a Mark and Caitlin did too.}\]

It cannot be in (3.3) that Ada was off to deposit a check and Caitlin was down by the river. Contrast (3.4), where the preferred reading is one where there are two individuals. Hence we should expect somewhat different phenomena are at issue.

Second, it is unclear what the deviant interpretation of “Maud” in (3.1) is supposed to be. Names on Referentialism do not express properties. So it is not merely, as with “bank” in (3.2), that via pragmatic repair a different property can be substituted — one that generalizes over different properties an interpreter may think “Maud” expresses, on different disambiguations of “Maud”. On Referentialism, the relation “Maud” stands in to individuals is not satisfaction but semantic reference, standing for some individual. This makes the analogy difficult to spell out explicitly. (Hawthorne and Manley do not make the attempt.)

To see the difficulty, suppose we try to give an interpretation analogous to that proposed for (3.2), by minimally adapting its formulation for use on (3.1). Then the final “Maud” in (3.1) expresses being something that, on one standard meaning, “Maud” stands for. But this condition makes no sense by the Referentialist’s own lights. On that view, “Maud” has no
standard meaning! It must be one of many distinct expressions for different objects whose meanings are given by each of those objects respectively. By contrast, “Maud” does have a standard meaning on PV. This means that a fundamentally different type of pragmatic repair must be involved in getting “Maud” to covary in (3.1), one that delivers the very meaning (bearing-“Maud”) that PV attributes to that name. It is hence misleading to represent PV as departing from a standard meaning of “Maud” in a way at all analogous to how “bank” departs from its standard meaning in (3.2). And it begs the question against PV to treat its semantics for the name “Maud” as a revision of that name's standard meaning, given there is no standard meaning for Referentialism to supply.\(^99\)

There is a more legitimate worry about PV's “revisionary” status that also motivates Hawthorne and Manley's analysis. Referentialism is the standard account, and the burden of proof is on its challenger. If the data are marginal, the felicity of covarying readings dubious, we should not revise our semantics. This is the line Hawthorne and Manley take,\(^100\) and it

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\(^99\) There are of course plausible Referentialist stories about what an utterance of (3.1) can felicitously express, and why it would be felicitous in certain contexts. But these break the analogy with (3.2) and are incompatible with the covarying interpretation. For example, Schoubye in his (2015b) argues that the Referentialist should, by analogy with pronouns, make being-called-“N” a constraint on admissible referents of a name. Just as “she” encodes number and gender as constraints on value of that expression, so can “Maud” only stand for an individual that is also called-“Maud”. Thus if the speaker intends a particular individual named Maud, (3.1) expresses a very coherent thought — that particular individual is someone who satisfies the being-called-“Maud” condition. But this is not the thought Hawthorne and Manley need (3.1) to express, for the analogy with (3.2) to be good.

\(^100\) With reference to the first “Quintus” example discussed in the previous chapter (see (2.10)), they note that they “do not find these data to be particularly strong” (Hawthorne and Manley (2012): 237).
provides additional motivation for them to adopt the specific account they do: one where covarying readings are licensed for exceptional reasons, in a way unrelated to whatever “core rules” govern names. They primarily want to explain the relative rarity of covarying readings, especially the “difficulty” of binding into names. This why they are dissatisfied with the type of account defended in Chapter 2.

In a long parenthetical, Hawthorne and Manley outline how Rothschild's account in terms of role presuppositions predicts that bare singulars will rarely occur bound, even saying it “may be part of what is going on.” But while they accept that the relevant presuppositions may track the phenomenon, they maintain the preference against bound names is “arguably more resilient than that explanation alone would predict.” This risks making the debate turn on subtle intuitions (about relative badness or marginality) and even subtler criteria of theory choice (about which explanation does a better job accounting for the exceptional character of covarying readings).

There is a way out of this potential stalemate, however. Hawthorne and Manley proceed as though the covariance data can be singled out and explained independently of the other data in favor of PV. Here the unity of PV's account gives it an advantage, and in two ways.

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First, recall the point made at the start of this section: “three Caitlins” is just as inconsistent with Referentialism as covarying readings of bare singulars. This is a dilemma for Hawthorne and Manley’s style of approach. On the one hand, their explanation must generalize from covarying readings to quantified names and to names in predicate position, since the contribution of the name is intuitively the same in all three types of case. On the other hand, their pragmatic repair story is motivated partly by the fact that covarying readings are “difficult” to get. But this is simply untrue for quantified names and names in predicate position, which have not the slightest whiff of “difficulty” or marginality about them. One can solve the first problem (that of coverage) only at the expense of the latter explanation. Suppose one took the view that rampart type shifting means there is no “core” semantics of names at all. This opens up the possibility that one and the same linguistic transformation delivers “three Caitlins”, “is a Mark”, and the covarying readings, but means nothing is special about the latter, and so cannot predict they are rare or equivocal.

Second, if covarying readings resulted from pragmatic repair, one would expect certain sentences to force the “deviant” interpretation and that this exhausts the phenomenon. One would not expect that a single sentence could allow either the referential

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103 One reason to go this way is that names turn up in many other forms, such as predicative mass nouns (“How much Bambi is there on the road?”), attributive adjectives (“These are my new Marséll shoes.”), predicative adjectives (“Those new shoes are Marséll.”), and predicative verbs (“Let’s Skype.”). Given this, there is a legitimate question of why the predicative count noun form is being singled out on PV. This is an issue defenders of PV should grapple with further, but beyond the scope of my discussion here. Thanks to Eric Snyder for discussion.
or the covarying interpretation. But as I argued in Chapter 2, there are such cases. Recall example (2.6), “Cleo is always a nuisance,” where in the stipulated context one could either be generalizing about the Cleos across times or making a claim about a specific Cleo. The existence of such cases shows why role presuppositions are not “part of what is going on”, but are in fact more predictive and explanatory than Hawthorne and Manley’s discussion allows. When either reading is available, what makes the covarying reading available? Since there is no explicit binding into the bare singular, it cannot be that it is being reinterpreted to save the meaningfulness of the sentence. By contrast, PV says that referential use is a default for bare singulars which role presuppositions can override. This allows for cases in which role presuppositions are in effect, licensing the covarying reading, but where the sentence has a form compatible with either reading.

I noted in the previous chapter that this has the flavor of a scope ambiguity. As in a sentence like “the president could go bald”, the bare singular can be interpreted outside the scope of the modal (where whoever satisfies “the president” is resolved and the modal claim is made about the satisfier) or within it (where at least one satisfier of “the president” is bald across modal space). So we can represent the logical forms of the two readings like so:

(i) The $x$ such that $x$ is called-”$N$” is, in all/no/most... situations $P$, $F$.

(ii) For all/no/most... situations $P$, the $x$ such that $x$ is called-”$N$” is $F$.

Of course, this requires that bare singular “$N$” univocally express bearing-”$N$”. Hawthorne and Manley’s account leaves the connection between covarying reading of descriptions and that
of bare singulars unexplained. But since exactly the same presuppositional effects generate both readings, and since the structural parallels are clear, this is a bad result. It is also dubious whether Hawthorne and Manley can help themselves to this story by somehow adapting it. If pragmatic repair is what converts a “normal” occurrence of a name into a “deviant” predicate-type occurrence, this would need to precede the assignment of form (ii) to a sentence. But what could trigger such a repair in the first instance if (i) is also available?

I conclude that Hawthorne and Manley are wrong to say there is not “a sufficient contrast between the tangential phenomenon of apparent bare name binding” and examples like (3.2) to justify adopting PV over Referentialism-plus-pragmatic-repair.104 Of course, since there is no way to determine just how many pragmatic repair strategies are possible — their being, by definition, special exceptions to the normal course of linguistic interpretation — there can be no decisive answer to this challenge. It cannot be conclusively demonstrated that no special interpretive effect, applicable to names but not peculiar to names, will undermine the evidential force of covarying readings for PV. What I have shown is that PV gives a more systematic account of the data, which nevertheless can respect the relative infrequency of covarying readings — a fact that Hawthorne and Manley mistakenly assume can be dealt with in isolation from other facts about bare singulars and descriptions.

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104 Hawthorne and Manley (2012): 239.
COMPLETE LIST OF EXAMPLE SENTENCES

(1.1) John and Robert Kennedy walked into the bar and ordered scotch.

(1.2) Edwin and Hank Williams walked into the bar and ordered scotch.

(1.3) There are three Bambis in the room.

(1.4) Therefore, three things that bear-bambi are in the room.

(1.5) She's an Einstein!

(1.6) He bought a Cattelan at auction.

(1.7) Two Wagners aced the exam.

(1.8) Aristotle might have been a sailor.

(1.9) In ten minutes, the table will be covered in food.

(1.10) The winner always takes the prize.

(1.11) Bambi always takes the prize.

(1.12) In every race, the colt won.

(1.13) In every race, John won.

(1.14) In every race, the John won.

(2.1) If a child is christened “Bambi”, and Disney Inc. hear about it, then they will sue Bambi’s parents.

(2.2) The president always swears an oath.

(2.3) That's odd; Lassie is usually a Collie.
(2.4) Earnest, if there is one this season, is in for a nasty surprise.

(2.5) Cleo is always a shorthair.

(2.6) Cleo is always a nuisance.

(2.7) Every woman who has a husband called John and a lover called Gerontius takes only Gerontius to the Rare Names convention.

(2.8) In most schools, Zed and Zoe are last to be called to assembly.

(2.9) I might have been Bambi Orcutt!

(2.10) In any family, Quintus is the fifth son.

(2.11) Next month, Helen will be an investment banker and Jane will be an artist.

(2.12) I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal.

(2.13) My grandmother's cat is always a shorthair.

(2.14) Quintus is the fifth son.

(2.15) If anyone is the first child born in the twenty-second century, it will be Newman.

(2.16) If Joan had had five sons, Quintus would have been bullied by the others.

(2.17) If Joan had had five sons, there would have been two Quintuses on our block.

(2.18) The clown should wear a red nose.

(2.19) Louise should wear black.

(2.20) The man I met at the zoo should wear black.

(2.21) In each of my classes today, Helen asked the best question.
In each of my classes today, the Canadian asked the best question.

Blake is always the troublemaker.

The guy in the corner should have stayed home tonight.

In each of my classes today, the guy in the corner asked the best question.

The Louise should wear black.

Barack Obama should be no more than 55 years old.

The man I met at the zoo should be no more than 55 years old.

The Barack Obama for the documentary should be no more than 55 years old.

I want to buy an inexpensive coat.

Cleo is a shorthair.

Whenever I am given a choice between going to the movies with someone called “Harold” or with someone called “Maud”, I choose Maud.

Whenever I am given a choice between something called a “bank” and something called a “bat”, I choose the bank.

Ada went to a bank and Caitlin did too.

Ada met a Mark and Caitlin did too.
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– Bach, Kent. 2002. “Giorgione was so-called because of his name.” *Philosophical Perspectives* 16 (s16):73-103.