

**The Transcendence of Political Views Across  
National Borders:**  
The Relationship Between Chinese Immigrants'  
Attitudes Toward the CCP and their Western  
Partisan Preferences

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### **Abstract**

With the growing number of migrants across the world, the study of how ideologies translate from one political spectrum to another will become increasingly valuable. This thesis acts as a pioneer to this pertinent topic in Political Science by comparing individuals' agreeability to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with their allegiance to Western political parties. Through a series of semi-structured interviews with 30 first-generation Chinese immigrants to the United States, Australia, and France, we manage to position the CCP relative to some of the most prominent parties in these three countries. Focusing on the "Children of the Reform," or those who left after the CCP's great transformation of 1978, we find that immigrants who agree most with the policies of the Communist Party tend to be more socially conservative and economically liberal. However, when mapping the CCP alongside Western parties on a political grid, we find that Chinese immigrants consider the Communist Party quite conservative, both economically and socially. These findings can help predict how Chinese individuals moving abroad will influence the political climate in their receiving country, and provides a frame of reference to understanding the CCP through Western political ideology.

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## I. Introduction

When asked about their current country of residence, most first-generation Chinese immigrants interviewed had positive things to say. They described their new home as politically freer than China, with less censorship and an emphasis on personal liberty. Many mentioned sociocultural diversity, and spoke of an environment where people from various backgrounds have come together to exchange ideas. These features of Western societies, more specifically those of the United States, France, and Australia, were not unexpected to our interviewees when they first immigrated. As one pointed out, Chinese for “United States of America” is, after all, *meiguo*, or “beautiful country.”

Another common response, however, was that their country of residence was less politically and economically efficient than China. Naturally, with diversity in opinion and multiple political parties come slower decision-making. But describing the Chinese political system as a mere single-party authoritarian regime masks the complexities of the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology. Indeed, their political standing remains a mystery to many in the Western world. This thesis relies on testimonies from individuals who have lived in both Chinese and Western societies to situate the CCP, both economically and socially, relative to other political parties around the world. Moreover, it explores how individuals who were more or less favorable to the CCP’s policies interact with their receiving countries’ political parties, revealing the degree of transcendence of political views across national borders.

Beyond the Chinese-Western case, this field of research is becoming ever so relevant. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, the global population of those with dual citizenship is quickly expanding. The United Nations reports that the number of international migrants worldwide grew from 154 million in 1990 to 232 million in 2013. (United Nations Department of

Economic and Social Affairs 2013) Meanwhile, as of 2020, 76% of countries allow citizens to acquire the citizenship of another country, without losing their citizenship of origin. (Maastricht Center for Citizenship 2020) In 2018, the number of immigrants living in the United States alone reached 44.8 million, accounting for 13.7% of the total U.S. population. (Budiman 2020) Of those, 28% were from an Asian country and 6% came from China specifically, making Chinese immigrants the second largest origin group. These numbers are expected to grow, with the total U.S. foreign-born population projected to reach 78.2 million by 2065.

Consequently, the number of foreign-born voters is also expanding. Of all immigrants, 20.7 million are naturalized citizens and 12.3 million are permanent residents. Between 2000 and 2020, the size of the immigrant electorate nearly doubled to 23.2 million, representing 10% of the nation's overall electorate. (Budiman et al. 2020) Of those, 6.9 million were born in Asia and 1 million in China specifically. Interestingly, two-thirds of Asian eligible voters are immigrants. 45% of U.S.-born Asian Americans voted in 2016, compared to 52% of foreign-born Asian Americans. This increase in the immigrant electorate can be traced back to two main causes: the overall growth in immigration with the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, and the rising share of naturalization. (Budiman et al. 2020) In 2018 alone, 756,000 immigrants naturalized. Meanwhile, in the last two decades, the U.S.-born eligible voter population has only grown 18%. Understanding how political views transcend national borders will help us better predict this fast-growing population's voting patterns and behaviors.

In addition to Chinese immigrants to the United States, this research includes interviews with some who live in Australia and France. Each of these countries has a different democratic system of government; while the United States has a presidential system, Australia and France have parliamentary and semi-parliamentary systems, respectively.



For the purpose of this study, a total of 30 first-generation Chinese immigrants living in these three countries were interviewed between December 2021 and February 2022, via Zoom or in person. They were asked 30 questions regarding their immigration stories, their political behaviors, their thoughts on the Chinese Communist Party, and their Western policy preferences. They came from 23 different cities in China, emigrated between 1970 and 2020, and have various academic and professional backgrounds.

Using the data collected in these interviews, we found that Chinese immigrants consider the CCP more conservative than most Western political parties. However, those individuals who agree most with the CCP's policies tend to be more economically liberal and socially conservative. These findings have far-reaching implications across several fields in Political Science. We reveal how Chinese emigrants think of the CCP relative to their receiving country's parties and introduce a method to map the policies of an authoritarian regime against those of a democratic one. With more research, our findings can be applied to other sets of countries that have comparable political systems. In other words, one's degree of allegiance to the party in a single-party authoritarian state can help predict their allegiance in a multiparty system. Furthermore, our research provides valuable insight on the political behaviors and voting patterns of the fast-growing Chinese immigrant community in the United States.

The next four chapters are organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a brief description and timeline of the Chinese Communist party, then discusses the history and voting patterns of Chinese immigrants in the United States, Australia, and France, and concludes with this thesis' research question and hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the study's research methods and variables, while Chapter 4 introduces our sample. Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive explanation and analysis of

the data collected. Lastly, Chapter 6 presents the summary of our findings, the policy implications, and further research that should be conducted in the future.

## II. The Children of the Reform

### *A. The CCP Explained*

In July 1921, Henk Sneevliet, a Dutch functionary of the Soviet-led Communist International (Comintern) group, met with 12 Chinese deputies including Mao Zedong. (Fairbank and Goldman 2006) Together they formed the Chinese Communist Party and named their meeting the First National Congress. By 1922, the CCP consisted of fewer than 200 members, compared with 200,000 members of the opposing Kuomintang (KMT). (Fairbank and Goldman 2006) In 1923, the two parties merged under the first United Front to combat Chinese warlords. Four years later however, KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek violently purged the Communists from the Front, starting a decade-long civil war between the parties. When the Japanese invaded China in 1937, the CCP and KMT came together again under the second United Front to fight their common enemy. But when World War II ended in a Japanese defeat, the parties resumed their civil war. In 1949, the Kuomintang was driven out of mainland China to Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China was established under Mao.

The following decade saw a series of CCP-led national campaigns. (Fairbank and Goldman 2006) The first Five-Year Plan that lasted from 1953 to 1957 saw the creation of 156 new industrial and mineral projects including the formation of steel mills, coal mines, and hospitals. In 1956, the 100 Flowers Campaign encouraged academic debate and public expression to further discourse among intellectuals. When some voiced disagreement with Mao however, the 1957 Anti-Rightist Movement was launched to punish those that had been too critical. In 1958, Mao initiated the Great Leap Forward, meant as a continuation to the first Five-Year Plan. People's Communes were created, in which the means of production were centralized, and inhabitants could receive


free food, healthcare, and education. This caused a depletion of produce and livestock, leading to wide-spread famine and an estimated 20 to 30 million deaths.

Mao resigned from first-line management of the CCP after the Great Leap Forward. (Fairbank and Goldman 2006) The few individuals that replaced him implemented policies that countered his but led to the gradual improvement of the national economy. Realizing that his communist philosophy was being doubted, Mao and his allies ignited the Cultural Revolution to re-instill communist ideology across China. Mao soon regained power and attacked schools and government authorities. The founder of the People's Republic China died in September 1976.

After Hua Guofeng's brief leadership, the 3<sup>rd</sup> plenum of 11<sup>th</sup> Central Committee in 1978 confirmed Deng Xiaoping and endorsed economic reform. The 1980s saw a period of growing "socialism with Chinese characteristics," in which China rejoined the IMF and the World Bank, decollectivized farmland, instated economic zones, and made joint ventures possible. (Cheek et al. 2021) With one exception, the individuals interviewed in this study emigrated after this period of "Reforms and Opening Up," giving them the name of the "Children of the Reform." Contrary to those who emigrated before them, these individuals left a China that was growing increasingly prosperous and globalized.

In 1989, student protests in Tiananmen Square lead to a violent government crackdown, causing some dissidents to flee China. The ensuing decade of the 1990s saw unprecedented economic growth, which continued into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 and avoided the worst of the 2008 financial crisis. As the years went by, the country grew richer, and more of the CCP's policies endorsed the free market economy. (Fairbank and Goldman 2006)

In 2012, Xi Jinping became the new Party General Secretary at the 18<sup>th</sup> National Congress and launched a series of his own campaigns. Among them was his anti-corruption campaign, which sought to investigate the expenditures of national and local Party officials alike, leading to some accusations with little merit. In 2015, Xi began a successful campaign to alleviate poverty nationwide. In his keynote speech at the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in 2017, he announced that socialism with Chinese characteristics had entered a new phase, one in which China moves “closer to center stage,” (Buckley and Bradsher 2017) indicating a desire to better China’s position on the world stage. Additionally, the Chinese government under Xi has extended mainland China’s control over Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan and increased surveillance domestically.



*Figure 1: CCP Internal Hierarchy (Lawrence and Martin 2013)*

Today, the Chinese Communist Party has over 95 million members; 1 in every 15 people in China is in it. (Cai and Chen 2021) The pyramid above shows how the party leadership is organized. (Lawrence and Martin 2013) The members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) have ranks, from one to seven, and are also members of the broader Politburo. Xi Jinping is

currently the top-ranked member of the PSC, and serves as the chairman of the Central Military Commission and as State President. The Politburo is elected by members of the Central Committee, which in turn is elected by the Party Congress. The Party Congress meets every five years in meetings called Party National Congresses, while the Central Committee meets annually for plenums in the other years.

The CCP application process lasts a few years—candidates must apply through their local party organization and attend several events and interviews. They also have to pass a series of background checks. A 2011 poll by the Chinese government found that 80% of 250,000 students across 140 universities wanted to be a party member. (Cai and Chen 2021) Although many of these students certainly agree with the CCP's policies, being a member also has a plethora of personal benefits. Most, if not all, individuals in prestigious managerial positions in China are party members. In fact, the share of intellectuals in the Party has grown significantly in the last two decades. The proportion of blue-collar workers dropped from 41.5% to 34.4% between 2007 and 2019, while the share of managers and professionals rose from 22.4% to 26.7%. (Cai and Chen 2021)

As is the case in many communist societies, Chinese citizens are introduced to the CCP at a very young age. In elementary school, starting at age 6, students become Young Pioneers. (Eckholm 1999) They learn about the Party's core principles, recite slogans, and beginning in sixth grade wear a red kerchief around their neck to school every day. The most studious of students are elected as faction leaders by their peers. At age 14, Young Pioneers automatically become members of the Youth League. Most students in China become members of this organization by the end of high school—it is practically a requirement to enroll in a good university. As will be

discussed in the following chapters, most immigrants interviewed for this study were either Young Pioneers or part of the Youth League.

## ***B. The History of Chinese Immigration***

### ***1. To the United States***

Chinese migration to the United States started with the discovery of California gold in 1849. That year, 325 Chinese passed through San Francisco's customhouse, growing to 450 in 1850, 2,700 in 1851, and 20,000 in 1852. (Luo 2021) By the late 1850s, 10% of California's population was Chinese. As the Gold Rush came to an end and an economic depression hit the United States, Chinese immigrants were perceived as taking jobs away from white Americans. Anti-coolie clubs and violence against Chinese Americans spread. In 1882, President Chester Arthur signed into law the Chinese Exclusion Act, which banned the immigration of Chinese laborers and prohibited those who were already in the U.S. from becoming naturalized citizens. (Luo 2021) These laws were only repealed in 1943, allowing 105 Chinese to immigrate to the US every year. Because this research focuses on Chinese immigrants' views on the Chinese Communist Party, the individuals interviewed left China after Mao's formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. That year, The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Act encouraged Chinese scientists and engineers to enter the country. Refugee status was granted to 5,000 highly educated people fleeing the new regime. (The Bancroft Library)

In the 1950s, the complicated Cold War-era relationship between China and the United States affected migration flows between the two countries. The State Department closed its embassy and consulates in mainland China, causing the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong to become the only processing center for Chinese people looking to enter the United States legally. (Brooks 2019) The U.S. consul-general in Hong Kong at the time was Everett Drumright, who in 1955 published a

report portraying all Chinese immigrants as communist subversives. The Immigration and Naturalization Service subsequently cooperated with the FBI to investigate Chinese immigration fraud throughout the country and pursue thousands of paper sons and daughters. In 1956, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association worked with the federal government to implement the “Chinese Confession Program,” wherein individuals living in the country illegally were encouraged to confess their status in exchange for the possibility of obtaining U.S. citizenship. (Brooks 2019) Because many of the first Chinese to come forward had fought for the United States in World War II, they could naturalize relatively easily. In the following years however, many leftist immigrants were not offered citizenship status. Because China and Taiwan refused to allow these individuals to return, many stayed in the U.S. as stateless people.

As the 1960s Civil Rights Movement gained momentum across the country, Chinese Americans joined other marginalized groups in fighting for civil liberties and immigration reform. (Xie 2019) This led to the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Acts, ending nationality-based immigration quotas. However, emigration restrictions from Mainland China meant most immigrants to the U.S. throughout the 1960s and early 1970s came from Hong Kong or Taiwan.

Only in 1978, with the creation of new economic policies in the People’s Republic of China, did immigration from the mainland become significant. (Hooper and Batalova 2015) This migration wave was dominated by students and skilled workers. Between 1978 and 2007, 1,210,000 Chinese students went abroad and only 320,000 returned to China, showing how being an international student was a common path to citizenship at the time. (Miles 2020) The rise of Silicon Valley led to a large migration movement to the San Francisco Bay Area from Hong Kong in the 1980s, then from the PRC in the 1990s. Due in large part to the crackdown on the 1989



student-led protests in Tiananmen Square, many Chinese students who received their Ph.D. degrees in the United States in the 1990s remained there afterwards. These circumstances produced fears within the PRC of “brain drain.”

This trend shifted at the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Between 2008 and 2012, from the 1,400,000 Chinese students who went abroad, about 800,000 returned to China, producing the reverse phenomenon of “brain gain.” Out of the 81,772 Chinese people who obtained lawful permanent resident status in 2016, 31,658, or approximately one third, did so through being the immediate relative of a U.S. citizen. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2016) Meanwhile, 19,942, or about one fourth, obtained their green card through employment-based preferences.

## ***2. To France***

Chinese immigration to France grew significantly in the aftermath of the Indochina conflict in 1975. (Nyiri and Savel'ev 2019) France welcomed refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 50,000 of which were ethnic Chinese. Many of them were businessmen, students, and artisans fleeing communist regimes. In the 1980s and 1990s, the start of university student exchange programs, legal family reunification schemes, and clandestine migration caused a steep increase in France's Chinese population, growing from 200,000 in 1990 to 300,000 in the early 2000s. In 1999, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees published a report stating that France was the top country in Europe in terms of asylum applications by Chinese, while mainland China became the leading country of origin of asylum seekers in France. Today, France has the largest ethnic-Chinese population in Europe, reaching around 700,000, or double that of the United Kingdom. (Aw 2019)

### ***3. To Australia***

Similarly, Chinese immigration to Australia began in the 1970s, when the country's "White Australia" policy officially ended in 1973. (Gao 2017) That same year, the Australia China Family Reunion Agreement was initiated by Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and Premier Zhou Enlai, allowing several thousand nationals from Xinjiang to immigrate. Between 1976 and 1986, the ethnic Chinese population grew from 50,000 to 200,000. Many of them were highly educated; in 1992, 13% of first-generation, 16.4% of second-generation, and 10% of third-generation Chinese settlers had a tertiary education, compared with a 5.4% average among all Australians. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, many students immigrated to Australia through the English language Intensive Course for Overseas Students scheme. Furthermore, following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, about 45,000 Chinese students were provided with a four-year temporary residency. Today, approximately 1.2 million people living in Australia, or 5% of the entire population, have Chinese ancestry. (Mao 2020)

#### ***C. Chinese Immigrant Political Behaviors and Voting Patterns***

In recent years, political scientists have grown increasingly interested in the voting patterns of Americans by racial group. Recent data has shown that Asian American turnout increased by 10 percentage points between 2016 and 2020, more than any other racial or ethnic group. (Montanaro 2021) In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Asian Americans tended to vote for Republican presidential candidates. (Tures 2020) In 1992, the New York Times exit poll found that Asian Americans preferred Republican George H.W. Bush to Democrat Bill Clinton 55% to 31%, by 24 percentage points. In the following presidential election of 1996, this gap decreased to a mere 5 percentage points, with 48% of Asian Americans supporting Republican Bob Dole and 43% supporting Clinton. But for the first time in 2000, Democrat Al Gore emerged victorious among

Asian American voters, receiving 54% of the Asian American vote compared to Republican George W. Bush's 41%. This trend has continued in all presidential elections since, with Asian Americans preferring the Democratic nominee every time. In the latest, Biden received an estimated 68% of the Asian American vote, compared to just 26% for Trump. (Ramakrishnan and Sadhwani 2021) Several polls have shown that some of the most important issues for Asian Americans in 2020 were universal access to health care, national mask mandates, police accountability for abuses, and the Green New Deal, all for which they tend to agree with progressives.

Throughout the covid-19 pandemic, hate crimes toward Asian Americans increased dramatically. In a 2021 Politico/Morning Consult poll, 66% of Chinese respondents blamed this trend on President Trump. (Dugyala and Jin 2021) Meanwhile, as demonstrated in a recent Pew Research Center report, Republican politicians are growing increasingly vocal about China on social media, often using terms such as "lie," "investigation," and "hold accountable" in posts mentioning covid-19 and China. (Widjaya 2021)

However, some studies in recent years have focused on Chinese Americans that have supported Trump in the last two presidential elections. Specifically, research has emerged recently on how Chinese liberal intellectuals have idolized him. This group is defined as being critical of the Party-State and supporting China's liberal democratization, especially following the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. Many of them moved overseas in the early 1990s. Some believe that Trump's Chinese fanbase, known as '*Chuanfen* [Trump Fans],' were happy to see an American president who finally recognized China's importance on the global stage, and its potential for threatening American hegemony. (Lin 2020) Others have hypothesized that the reasoning is less tactical; Chinese intellectuals who support Trump hope that his trade war against China will encourage the CCP to

loosen its grip on the Chinese economy and, eventually, on the rest of Chinese society. One paper published in 2020 speaks of “Western beaconism” as the cause for the rise of Trumpism amongst Chinese liberals. Politically, they are attracted to Trump’s neoliberal economic policies and his hostility toward *baizuo*, or the ‘white left.’ Culturally, they have a ‘Fall-of-the-Western-Civilization’ paranoia that has given rise to racist and anti-immigrant sentiments. Lin’s (2020) paper concludes by questioning whether there are specific age or generational groups amongst Chinese liberal intellectuals that are prone to Trumpism, and whether the access to distorted or “fake” news may also be a cause.

Due in large part to France’s “color-blind” approach to public policy, which led to a 1978 law banning the collection and computerization of racial data, little to no research exists about Chinese French voting patterns. (LaBreck 2021) However, during the 2017 presidential elections, a poll of 230 Chinese voters conducted by the Paris-based Chinese publication *Huarenjie* found that center-right candidate François Fillon was a favorite among the Chinese community in the first round. (Hui 2017) For the second round, which Fillon did not make, 61% were planning to vote for centrist Emmanuel Macron, against only 24% for far-right candidate Marine Le Pen. This mirrors the overall second-round election results, in which President Macron won with 66.1% of the vote. Two issues that French Chinese voters seem to pay the most attention to are immigration and economic policy. (Hui 2017)

In Australia, Chinese voters are becoming increasingly influential. A 2019 study published months after the last federal election shows that more and more politicians are using WeChat to communicate with their Chinese-Australian electorate. (Sun 2019) Current prime minister Scott Morrison, leader of the Liberal Party, created his WeChat account in February 2019, while then-Labor Party leader Bill Shorten created his in late 2017. Candidates of Chinese heritage are also

using their WeChat accounts to build a following amongst Chinese communities. Polling data from this last federal election demonstrates that most Chinese Australian voters favored the Coalition, an alliance between the center-right Liberal and National Parties, which has been in government since 2013. (Chang 2019) Some policy issues that this group of voters values the most are related to racism and gay rights.

#### ***D. Research Question and Hypotheses***

Although research on Chinese immigrants' voting patterns is becoming increasingly popular, no publication to date has studied whether these individuals' political behaviors are influenced by their political affiliation in China. This leads to the central research question: What is the relationship between Chinese immigrants' attitudes toward the Chinese Communist Party and their Western partisan preferences?

The CCP has no established counterpart in the United States, France, or Australia; none of the main party platforms mirror that of the CCP. Therefore, my first hypothesis is as follows:

*H1) There will be no strong correlation between attitudes toward the Chinese Communist Party and Western partisan affiliation.*

Looking more closely at the CCP's platform however, it is evident that they are more economically liberal and socially conservative. This leads me to two additional hypotheses:

*H2) With regard to social issues, positive attitudes toward the Chinese Communist Party will positively correlate with Western liberal party agreeability.*

*H3) With regard to economic issues, positive attitudes toward the Chinese Communist Party will negatively correlate with Western liberal party agreeability.*

As was established in a previous section, the CCP has evolved significantly since the founding of the People's Republic of China. After the reforms of 1978, the Party has advocated for an increasingly capitalistic society. My final hypothesis is:

*H4) With regard to economic issues, the more recently an individual emigrated from China, the stronger the negative correlation between Chinese Communist Party agreeability and Western liberal party agreeability.*

I tested these hypotheses through a series of semi-structured interviews. The following section takes a closer look at the sample selection and research methods.

### III. Research Design

#### *A. Sample Selection Method*

30 individuals were interviewed in total. The student researcher knew many of them personally, either from the Columbia University community or her hometown. Others were recruited through snowball sampling when participants recommended their acquaintances. Whenever someone voiced interest in being interviewed, they were sent a brief description of the research procedure and line of questioning. They were also assured that no personal identifiers such as names or birthdays were collected; there was no way to know who answered what. Additionally, their image and voices were not recorded. This anonymity was promised to ensure interviewees could speak as truthfully as possible.

#### *B. Semi-Structured Interviews*

Each subject participated in a 30-minute semi-structured interview consisting of 30 questions, either in person or through Zoom. The first three questions asked about basic background information:

1. Where in [your current country of residence] do you currently reside?
2. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
3. Please describe your past and current professional experiences.

The following few questions gathered information about the respondent's immigration story, including when and why they emigrated, and their feelings about the United States at the time:

4. Where in China were you born?
5. Which of your family members are still in China?
6. Have you lived in any other countries besides China and [your current country of residence]?

If so, which ones?

7. In what year did you move to the [your current country of residence]? Which state did you first move to, and have you lived in any others since?
8. What is your current immigration status?
9. Why did you emigrate? Please list any push or pull factors, including political and/or economic ones.
10. At the time of your move, how did you feel about the political, economic, and cultural environment in [your current country of residence]?
11. At the time of your move, how long did you expect to stay for? Did you/do you hope to become a citizen of [your current country of residence]?

These provided valuable information about whether the individual emigrated willingly or not, and what they think about their receiving country relative to China. The seventh question in particular, which asks for year of immigration, is necessary to test the fourth hypothesis. Before diving into attitudes towards the Chinese Communist Party and policy preferences, several questions were posed to gauge each respondent's level of political engagement:

12. (For citizens only) Are you registered to vote? If so, how many times have you voted?
13. How often do you and your peers or family members discuss politics? *More than once a week; once a week; once a month; less than once a month?*
14. Where do you obtain most of your political information?
15. Do you read Western news media? If so, which ones?
16. Do you read Chinese news media? If so, which ones?
17. Do you read news stories on social media? If so, on which platforms?
18. Do you post news stories and share political information on social media? If so, how often?
19. Have you ever signed a petition? If so, on which issues?



20. Have you ever electioneered for a campaign? If so, for which ones?
21. Have you ever attended a government meeting? If so, which ones?
22. Have you ever attended a political protest? If so, which ones?
23. Have you joined any interest groups? If so, which ones?
24. Have you run for office? If so, which ones? Do you intend to do so (again) in the future?

The responses to questions 19 through 24 were used to create a political engagement score. Each “yes” answer gave the respondent one point; political engagement scores therefore ranged from 0 to 6.

### ***C. Independent Variable***

In this study, the independent variable is Chinese Communist Party agreeability. Several parts of the interview are combined to measure this. First, each respondent was asked whether they were members of the Party when living in China. If not, they were questioned about their experience within the Youth League in secondary school. As described in the previous chapter, most students in China join the CCP’s student arm. But for many, the Youth League is comparable to an honor society in American high schools—students often ignore its political connotation. During the interviews, follow-up questions were posed to establish the extent to which each individual was involved in their Youth League chapter.

Next, the interviewees were asked whether they strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, or feel neutrally about the four following statements:

- a. Relative to other political systems, the one in China is preferable for Chinese people.
- b. My political and policy preferences align with those of the Chinese Communist Party.
- c. The Chinese Communist Party is representative of the general political and policy preferences of the Chinese people.

d. I feel uneasy responding to questions regarding my stance on the Chinese Communist Party.

The first statement gauges how adequate the respondent believes China's single-party system is for its citizens, while the third one seeks to establish how they think the Chinese Communist Party specifically is serving the Chinese people. The second statement is more personal and determines how strongly respondents believe their own policy preferences match those of the Party. The fourth statement measures how intrusive interviewees believe these questions are; if a respondent strongly agrees with this statement, their truthfulness in evaluating the previous three statements may have to be questioned.

A Chinese Communist Party agreeability score is created with the statements (a), (b), and (c). Each "strongly disagree" is worth 1 point, "disagree" 2 points, "neutral" 3 points, "agree" 4 points, and "strongly agree" 5 points. Chinese Communist Party agreeability scores therefore range from 5 to 15 points.

#### *D. Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable is American partisan preference. Respondents were directly asked, "Which political party would you say your policy views are most closely aligned with? How has this evolved since you first immigrated to [your current country of residence]?" Then, those who are naturalized and registered to vote were asked which presidential candidates they have voted for since becoming citizens. Although these two questions alone could provide valuable insight to test the first hypothesis, the other three hypotheses needed further information by policy area. Furthermore, some respondents had trouble pinpointing which party they agreed with the most, or said their allegiance varied election to election. Respondents were again asked to answer with either "strongly disagree," "disagree," "neutral," "agree," or "strongly agree" to the following eleven statements:

- a. The best way to ensure peace is through military strength
- b. It is best for the future of our country to be involved in world affairs
- c. The government should do more to help people in need, even if this means going deeper into debt
- d. The obstacles that once made it harder for women than men to get ahead are now largely gone
- e. Our country has not gone far enough in giving black people equal rights with white people
- f. Affirmative action in college admissions is necessary to overcome racial discrimination
- g. Immigrants today make our country stronger because of their work and talents
- h. Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they are willing to work hard
- i. Homosexuality should be accepted by society
- j. Business corporations make too much profit
- k. Environmental regulations on businesses are worth the economic costs

These phrases were inspired by the Pew Research Center's Political Typology Quiz. (Pew Research Center 2021) Statements (a), (b), (h), (j), and (k) are classified as economic policy issues, while (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) are classified as social policy issues. For every statement but (a) and (h), the responses were coded in the same way as for the independent variable; each "strongly disagree" is worth 1 point, "disagree" 2 points, "neutral" 3 points, "agree" 4 points, and "strongly agree" 5 points. Agreeing with these nine statements indicates a rather liberal outlook in those policy areas. For the two remaining statements, "strongly disagree" is worth 5 points, "disagree" 4 points, "neutral" 3 points, "agree" 2 points, and "strongly agree" 1 point, because agreeing with those indicates a rather conservative outlook. Three scores were created: that of all eleven responses combined, that of the subset of statements regarding economic policy issues, and that of

the subset of statements regarding social policy issues. The score range for all 11 policy statements is 5 to 55, economic scores range from 5 to 25, and social scores range from 6 to 30.

### *E. Additional Questions*


In addition to providing their personal viewpoints on the eleven policy statements, each individual was asked to say how they believe the Chinese Communist Party would respond to each statement, as well as how their political party of choice, Democratic or Republican, would respond to the statements. This information helps determine how each individual positions themselves relative to the CPP and their American party of choice. It also gauges the extent to which each respondent is familiar with the party platforms.

The thirtieth and final question asks interviewees to rate three Chinese leaders and three American leaders: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Xi Jinping, George W. Bush Jr., Barack Obama, and Donald J. Trump. Each leader is given a score from 1 to 10, 10 being the best. The interviewees are told to incorporate the leader's policies and leadership skills in their analysis but that the ranking should reflect the interviewee's gut feeling toward the leader. This information was then used to find correlations between how individuals evaluated the three Chinese leaders as compared to the three local ones.

## IV. Introducing the Sample


### A. General Information

Of the 30 subjects interviewed, 20 of them are currently in the United States. 11 of them reside on the East Coast and 9 of them in California. Of the 10 remaining, 7 interviewees live in Australia and 3 in France.



*Figure 2: Interviewee Current City of Residence*

Of all of them, 13 are currently students, pursuing either an undergraduate or graduate education full-time. Of the 17 others currently in the workforce, most of them work in either medicine, tech, finance, or as Chinese language educators. A much higher share of this sample has graduate degrees than of the general first-generation Chinese immigrant population—18 of the individuals interviewed have obtained a master’s degree, some of which are pursuing PhDs. 4 others have already completed their PhDs. The lowest level of education completed is high school; 4 of the 5 of those interviewees are current bachelor’s students, while the remaining one has no intention of returning to school.



*Figure 3: Interviewee Highest Level of Education Obtained*

### ***B. Immigration-Related Information***

Below is a map of all the cities in China in which the interviewees were born. Most of them are from the mainland, but several were born in Taiwan or the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macao.




*Figure 4: Interviewee Birthplace*

All individuals emigrated from China between 1970 and 2019, and 14 of them lived in other countries before arriving to their current country of residence. These countries are Australia, the United States, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Singapore. Similarly, 13 of them have lived in multiple cities within their country of residence.

When asked why they left China, 15 of them said the primary reason was to pursue a better education. Many described Chinese schooling as too strict, criticizing China's National College Entrance Exam, known as the *gaokao*. 3 interviewees expressed that their parents believed basing an entire future off of one exam was too stressful, and therefore encouraged the interviewee to

move to the United States for high school. 4 students emigrated to pursue their bachelor's, and the remaining 8 for their masters or PhDs. 8 additional interviewees followed their family members and 6 others left for professional reasons. Only 1 individual left for political reasons, specifying that the handover of Hong Kong from the British to the Chinese incited them to leave.



*Figure 5: Reason for Emigrating from China*

Upon arrival, 10 of the 30 interviewees never intended to move back to China, 12 expected to only live abroad for a few years, and 8 had no idea whether or not they would return. Interestingly, when asked if at the time of their move they expected to become citizens of their current country of residence, the same number of interviewees, 12, responded with a simple “yes” or “no.” Of the 6 remaining, 3 hoped to obtain a Green Card or permanent residence status and 3 others were unsure. Of the ones who said no, they either did not want to abandon their Chinese citizenship or were planning to return to China in the near future. Only 5 individuals had no immediate family left in China; the 28 others still had siblings or parents living there.

This sample of Chinese immigrants have similar opinions about their current country of residence, whether it be the United States, Australia, or France. As touched upon in the



introduction, the three most mentioned comments are that the receiving country is culturally diverse, economically rich, and politically free. However, 5 individuals mentioned anti-Asian racism, 1 of which lives in Australia and 4 in the United States. 6 individuals stated that their country of residence is either politically inefficient or economically in decline.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the sample consists of individuals of various immigration statuses. 14 of those interviewed are citizens of their country of residence, 9 have student visas, 4 have work visas, and 3 have a Green Card or permanent residence. There are 12 different years of citizenship, ranging from 1975 to 2020.




Figure 6: Interviewee Immigration Status

## C. Political Behaviors and Participation Scores

### 1. Receiving and Sharing of Political Information

This sample of Chinese immigrants obtains their political information from a variety of sources. 16 of them mentioned that they read online news sites, 12 listed TV news channels, and a few listen to radio stations and podcasts. Of all 30 interviewees, only 8 stated that they do not read news stories on social media at all. Of the 22 who do, the majority of them, or 16 to be exact,

use WeChat as a source of political information. 6 individuals mentioned each of the following: Weibo, Twitter, and Facebook. Other platforms that were mentioned once or twice are TikTok/Duoyin, RED, Instagram, and Reddit. Interestingly enough, only 8 of the 22 individuals who read news articles on social media also share political posts on those platforms. 3 of them do so more than once a month, 2 on a monthly basis, and 5 of them less frequently than that.

Two interview questions asked respondents to specify which Western and Chinese news sources they read, watch, or listen to the most. While only 4 individuals stated that they do not obtain political information from any Western outlets, 8 had that same response for Chinese ones. This means that over 25% of the sample does not read Chinese news stories.

The question that perhaps indicates best the degree of political interest among the 30 individuals asks how often they discuss politics. The graph below shows this distribution—more than half of the interviewees responded with “daily” or “weekly,” indicating a rather politically engaged sample.




Figure 7: Political Discussion Frequency

### 1. *Political Participation Scores*

As mentioned in the previous chapter, a series of yes-no questions were asked to determine the level of political engagement of each interviewee. Figure 8 below shows how the sample responded to them.




Figure 8: Interviewee Participation Scores

From the graph above, we see that 8 of the respondents had never done any of the following: signed a petition, worked on a campaign, attended a government meeting or a political protest, joined an interest group, or run for an elected position. 3 individuals did 4 of them, earning them the highest participation scores. The average score was between 1 and 2.

### 2. *Voter Turnout for Citizens*

Of the 14 individuals that are citizens of their country of residence, all of them are registered to vote. 2 of them are in Australia, where voting is mandatory, and the remaining 12 are in the United States or France. Of those 12, 2 vote in every single election, 2 vote on an annual basis, 6 only vote during presidential elections, and 2 vote less frequently than that.

V. Results and Analysis

A. Mapping the Chinese Communist Party on Western Political Spectrums

In an unprecedented attempt to map the Chinese Communist Party relative to Western political parties, we used the left-right scores assigned by the respondents to judge how they situate the CCP relative to their home parties. As described in the “Additional Questions” section of Chapter 2, we asked each respondent to put themselves in the shoes of the CCP and their local political party of choice to answer the 11 policy statements. We then averaged all of their responses to create the graphs below:




Figure 9: Political Party Map

On the x-axis are the economic left-right scores and on the y-axis the social ones. As a reminder, the economic scores range from 5 to 25, and social scores from 5 to 30—the ranges on this graph’s axes have been adjusted for clarity. The higher the score, the more liberal. According to the 30 respondents, the Chinese Communist Party is both economically and socially more conservative than all Western parties, with the exception of the Republican Party. This might come as a shock; the word “communist” in its name and its motto of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” may invoke the idea that the Chinese Communist Party is very economically left leaning. In fact, as many first-generation Chinese immigrants are aware, the CCP has become more capitalistic. Many of the policies enacted during the Reforms and Opening Up period occurred during the 1980s, when Ronald Raegan was U.S. president. Perhaps some of the initiatives were inspired by Raegan’s policies, in which case the CCP’s closeness to the Republican party makes more sense.

Socially, the Chinese government and society at large remains influenced by traditional Confucian ideology. (Cohen 2012) Among other things, Confucianism has taught to admire and follow elders regardless of their flaws, and emphasizes the importance of continuity in change. This may explain why it is difficult for the Chinese Communist Party to adopt more left-leaning social policies, and why they are viewed as socially conservative more generally. Furthermore, in recent years, the CCP under Xi has embraced nationalistic principles. This is ironic considering the CCP’s founding as a party that countered the Kuomintang, or Chinese Nationalist Party, in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. In the last decade, Xi Jinping has consolidated his own power, increased censorship, expanded Chinese influence abroad, and been reprimanded by the international community for his treatment of non-Han Chinese minority groups. (Zheng 2021)




Figure 10: Political Party Map with US Individuals

Figure 10 above focuses on the respondents that live in the United States. In addition to the party economic and social scores, this graph plots those of individuals as well. As demonstrated by the legends, party affiliation is shown by the shape of the point—triangles represent individuals that said they align more closely with the Democratic party and squares represent those who said they align more closely with the Republican party. Grey lines connect the “official” party to its affiliates for clarity. As we can see, people do not always agree most with their party of choice. One flagrant observation is how much more liberal people describe the Democratic party to be as compared to their own personal policy preferences. In fact, many Democratic party adherents are more socially conservative than the Republican Party. This reveals an important piece of

information that we will see later with the sample's social scores—the Chinese immigrants interviewed have lower social liberal scores than economic ones.

In addition, this graph shows CCP agreeability by the color of the points—the redder the point, the more the individual agrees with the Party's policies. Evidently, those who have the highest CCP agreeability are more economically liberal and socially conservative, a trend we'll discuss in further detail later in this chapter.

### ***B. Chinese Communist Party Membership and Agreeability***

Of the 30 Chinese immigrants we interviewed, 2 were party members when they lived in China, 1 was a college student in the United States but had submitted an application for when he returns to China, and 2 others said they would apply to be members if they returned. Those last 2 individuals stated that being a member of the CCP is imperative to becoming a successful politician or businessperson. This leaves 25 individuals of 30 that were not members of the Party and do not intend to become one. As mentioned in a previous chapter, approximately 7% of the Chinese population is a member of the CCP. If the sample of 30 individuals were representative of the general Chinese population in this regard, we would expect 2 of them to be party members, which is what we found.

In addition to Party membership, individuals were asked to describe their experience within the Youth League. 17 of the 30 interviewees said they were part of the organization, and an additional 3 said they were members of the Young Pioneers group. The 10 remaining were members of neither group. For the 6 individuals that were born in Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Macao, no such organization existed in their schools. The 4 remaining individuals did not want to elaborate as to why they did not participate.

Before looking at the CCP agreeability score, we would like to look at how people responded to the statement, “I feel uneasy responding to questions regarding my stance on the Chinese Communist Party.” The majority of interviewees did not feel uneasy—8 responded with “strongly disagree” and 14 responded with “disagree.” Multiple of them voiced that this was because of the nature of the interview; the fact that the answers were anonymous and that the interviewer is not of Chinese descent reassured them. An additional 4 individuals replied with “neutral,” 2 with “agree,” and 2 with “strongly agree.” Interestingly enough, the 2 who strongly agreed with the statement live in Australia; one of them explained that they have family members that work for the government. The high proportion of respondents that disagreed with this statement reassures us that their answers to the other three statements regarding the CCP can be trusted.




Figure 11: Uneasiness Responding to Questions about the CCP

Figure 11 displays how interviewees responded to the statement regarding uneasiness towards questions about the CCP, while Figure 12 shows the distribution of *CCP.Agree* scores. We observe that 2 individuals strongly disagreed with all three statements, earning them the minimum score of 3, and 2 strongly agreed with all three statements, earning them the maximum score of 15.






Figure 12: Interviewee CCP Agreement Scores

### ***C. Local Political Party Affiliation and Left-Right Score***

Before determining their “liberal-ness” through the series of 11 policy statements, each individual was asked which political party they were most aligned with. One of the respondents had recently moved to Australia but had lived in the United States for numerous years, and therefore preferred providing their American political party of choice. This means that 21 respondents provided American party names, 5 provided Australian ones, and 3 provided French ones.

Taking into consideration all respondents across the 3 countries, 16 affiliated themselves with left-leaning parties, 8 with right-leaning ones, 1 deemed themselves an independent, and 5 were unsure. The following plots provide a visual description of left-right party alignment across all respondents, then of the American sub-sample specifically.




Figure 13: Party Allegiance Overall




Figure 14: American Party Allegiance

The next bar plot shows the distribution of the interviewee’s liberal scores.




Figure 15: Liberal Scores

The lowest score possible was 11, and the highest possible was 55. All respondents fall in the 30 to 46 range—indicating a rather liberal group of respondents. Below are the distributions of the economic and social policy scores.





Figure 16: Economic Liberal Scores




*Figure 17: Social Liberal Scores*

As a reminder, economic scores ranged from 5 to 25 and social scores from 6 to 30. The two plots above demonstrate that the sample is more liberal on economic policy issues than on social ones; economic scores range from 13 to 25 and social scores from 13 to 22.

#### *D. Relationship between CCP and Left-Right Scores*

Having looked at each individual's responses, we ran a simple correlation test on R to see if there is a relationship between *CCP.Agree* and *LiberalScore*. The correlation value came out to be -0.039, with a graph that looks like this:



*Figure 18: Relationship Between CCP.Agree and Liberal Score*

Within this sample, there seems to be no relationship between the two variables. This information supports the first hypothesis, that a Chinese immigrant's agreeability with the CCP does not indicate an allegiance to a specific party in their receiving country.

Testing hypotheses 2 and 3 reveals more interesting trends. As mentioned in chapter 2, we classified 5 of the 11 statements as economic policy issues and the remaining 6 as social policy ones. Running correlation tests with those scores provided the following graphs:




Figure 19: Relationship Between CCP.Agree and Econ.Score




Figure 20: Relationship Between CCP.Agree and Social.Score

The variables EconScore and CCP.Agree have a correlation of +0.358, while the variables LiberalScore and CCP.Agree have a correlation of -0.563. The p-values are 0.051 and 0.001, respectively. These findings support hypotheses 2 and 3. Indeed, the higher the interviewee's agreeability with the CCP, the more liberal they are economically and the more conservative they are socially.

In an attempt to test the fourth hypothesis, we ran a correlation test between year of emigration and economic left-right score. If the data were to support the hypothesis, the more recently an individual emigrated, the more conservative they would be economically, so the lower their economic left-right score. Instead, the correlation between the individuals is close to zero. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is not supported by the data.

This last theory casts doubts on the extent to which we can explain the results of these analyses by the changes Chinese society has undergone in recent decades. It should follow that people who lived longer or more recently in a system of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" are more heavily influenced by their policies, and therefore lean even more economically conservative and socially liberal. It seems that other factors, including age, education, or current location, play a role in determining the political views of Chinese immigrants.

### ***E. Are Individuals Closer to the CCP or to their Local Party of Choice?***

#### ***1. Closeness to CCP across the 11 Policy Statements***

The next part of our analysis looks at the difference between individuals' personal responses to the eleven policy statements and how they thought the CCP would respond to them. After converting statement responses into numerical values as explained in chapter 2, we took the absolute value of the difference between their personal responses and how they expected the CCP to respond, then took the mean across all 11 statements. We named this new variable

*Mean.Diff.Personal.CCP*. The greater the value of this variable, the more their personal opinion differed from what they believed to be the CCP's opinion. We then ran correlation tests between this variable and the *CCP.Agree* score. We should expect a strong negative correlation between *CCP.Agree* and *Mean.Diff.Personal.CCP* because my definition, high agreeability with the CCP should mean that individuals' personal responses to the statements are similar to what they believe the CCP would respond. After running a test on R, we found that the correlation was of -0.390 with a graph that looks like the one below.




Figure 21: Relationship Between *CCP.Agree* and *Mean.Diff.Personal.CCP*

Indeed, respondents who do not agree that the CCP is good for China tend to say that their own policy preferences differ quite a lot from those of the CCP.

## 2. Comparing Closeness to CCP and Closeness to Political Party of Choice

Next, we ran similar tests with the data from individuals' personal responses to the eleven policy statements and the responses they claimed their personal party of choice would provide. The resulting variable is called *Mean.Diff.Personal.LocalParty*. Taking the difference between the



two new variables yields a third one, *Diff.CCP.LocalParty*. The table below shows the scores of all respondents for whom we obtained this data, ordered by CCP agreeability score.

In total, 6 individuals did not provide a response on behalf of the CCP and/or on behalf of their political party of choice. Positive values in the last column indicate that the individual identified themselves more closely with their party of choice than with the CCP. According to the data, 16 of the 24 individuals have positive scores, 1 has a score of 0, and the remaining 7 have negative scores (shown in red font), indicating that their responses to the policy statements matched more closely with what they said the CCP would have responded.

CCP Agreeability Score	Difference between Personal Response and CCP	Difference between Personal Response and Local Political Party	Difference between the Last Two Columns
3	1.36	0.45	0.91
3	1.18	0.81	0.37
5	1.18	0.72	0.46
6	1.55	1.28	0.27
7	1.73	0.55	1.18
7	0.73	0.64	0.09
8	0.91	1.00	-0.09
9	1.00	1.27	-0.27
9	1.30	0.36	0.94
9	1.09	0.73	0.36
10	0.70	1.20	-0.50
10	0.73	0.27	0.46
10	1.20	0.36	0.84
10	0.73	0.64	0.09
10	0.73	0.45	0.27
11	0.00	0.60	-0.60
11	1.18	0.64	0.54
11	1.09	1.09	0.00
11	1.09	0.81	0.27
11	1.64	0.55	1.09
12	0.45	1.82	-1.37
12	1.73	0.55	1.18
14	0.45	2.00	-1.55
15	0.73	1.00	-0.27

Figure 22: Table of Personal, CCP, and Local Party Policy Distances

We expected that *CCP.Agree* (the first column of the table) and *Diff.CCP.LocalParty* (the last column of the table) to have a negative correlation. In other words, the more someone agrees with the CCP, the more closely aligned they should have been with the CCP, and the more in the negative their *Diff.CCP.LocalParty* score should have been. Indeed, when we ran a correlation test, we found a correlation of -0.415 with a graph that looks like this:




Figure 23: Relationship Between *CCP.Agree* and *Diff.CCP.LocalParty*

### ***F. Correlations between Chinese and Local Leaders***

After running a few correlation tests between CCP agreement scores and the three Chinese leaders Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Xi Jinping, we found that the strongest positive correlation was with Xi, with a correlation coefficient of +0.762. We therefore took this leader and observed the relationship between their ranking and that of the three former U.S. Presidents George

Bush Jr., Barack Obama, and Donald Trump. We found that the correlation coefficients were of +0.221, +0.165, and +0.415 respectively. Although this indicates that the strongest positive correlation is with Trump, none of the p-values were greater than 0.05, so the results are not too significant.




Figure 24: Relationship Between CCP.Agree and Rating of Xi

## VI. Conclusion

### *A. Summary of our Findings*

Two core discoveries emerge from our research. First and foremost, we managed to place the Chinese Communist Party on a left-right spectrum alongside 6 Western political parties: the American Democratic and Republican Parties, the Australian Labor and Liberal Parties, and the French Parti Socialiste and Les Républicains. Interviewees were asked to evaluate 11 policy statements—5 economic and 6 social—on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party and their local political party of choice. From these evaluations we found that Chinese immigrants consider the CCP more conservative, both economically and socially, than all Western parties, with the exception of the Republican party. In addition to the graph with all seven political parties, we created one with the US Democratic Party, US Republican Party, and CCP alongside the liberal scores of individuals living in the United States. This one shows the extent to which the interviewees' policy preferences are dissimilar to those of their stated party of choice. We found that both Republican and Democratic adherers are more moderate than the party themselves—their liberal scores often lie between that of the two parties. Some individuals, especially those who said they lean Democrat, actually have policy preferences more similar to Republicans. Lastly, these graphs show individual Chinese Communist Party agreeability, providing a visual representation of our second core discovery—the relationship between attitudes toward the CCP and Western partisan preferences.

Using individuals' personal evaluations of the 11 policy statements, we created a liberal score that ranged from 11 to 55 possible points. Similarly, from a series of 3 statements regarding the CCP, we created a CCP agreeability score that ranged from 3 to 15 possible points. After running a correlation test between the two variables and creating a scatter plot, we found no

relationship between CCP agreeability and liberalness. Thinking this may be hiding some more interesting trends, we divided the liberal score into economic and social ones. This time, we found that CCP agreeability had a positive correlation with leftist economic policy preferences, while it had a negative correlation with leftist social policy preferences. We conclude that individuals who tend to agree with the policies of the CCP are attracted to its supposed “socialist” economic policies. In recent decades, China has transformed its ideology to that of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which has led to the adoption of more capitalistic principles. This may be why Chinese immigrants consider the CCP to the right economically as well; although in principle they embrace socialist, leftist ideals, in practice they have become increasingly conservative. In terms of their social ideology, the Chinese Communist Party remains influenced by Confucian thought—one that preaches rather traditional ideals. This could help explain why CCP agreeability correlates with more conservative social policy preferences.

### ***B. Policy Implications***

These findings are unprecedented and very consequential. Although the word “communist” in its name suggests a left-leaning ideology, the Chinese Communist Party is in fact viewed as quite conservative by Chinese people abroad, both economically and socially. This shows how emigrants see Chinese national politics and society at large, which may serve as a determining factor to whether individuals choose to return or not.

Furthermore, the mapping of the current state of the CCP alongside Western parties gives us insight on how to think of the 1978 Reforms and Opening Up. In October 2017, when Xi was re-selected as General Secretary for a second five-year term, he gave a three and a half hour-long speech with the phrase “China has stood up, grown rich, become strong, and is moving toward center stage.” (Sterling 2018) Xi was referring to the three revolutions—the first led by Mao in the

1940s, the second led by Deng in the 1970s and 80s, and the last led by Xi himself. Indeed, Deng is known as the leader who helped China grow wealthy. On average, our sample of Chinese emigrants gave significantly higher ratings to Deng than to Mao and Xi, citing his reforms as the primary driver to his better score. We established that this shift to embrace “socialism with Chinese Characteristics” was a shift to more economically right leaning, capitalistic policies. Therefore, it follows that the CCP and Chinese emigrants alike attribute China’s current success to a move away from traditionally communist policies.

Understanding how Chinese immigrants position the CCP relative to their receiving country’s political parties is important to determine how CCP agreeability will impact their political decisions abroad. Given where we placed the Party on the left-right social and economic spectrums, it could be expected that those who agree most with the Party’s ideologies would lean conservative in the West. Instead, we found that many are aligned with liberal parties in the US, Australia, and France, and tend to be more economically liberal. These findings suggest that Chinese immigrants who agree with the party may be focused on the reputation of the Party more than its actual practices.

This leads us to the discussion of how foreign media and governments portray the Chinese Communist Party. In the United States, Democrats and Republicans have continuously attacked each other’s stances toward China. Both parties criticize their government’s infringement on civil liberties and growing authoritarianism. (Carpenter 2020) As mentioned in Chapter 2, members of the Republican party tend to be more vocal against China than Democrats—a trend that persisted throughout the Covid-19 pandemic when American conservatives were particularly against strict government regulations implemented to curve the spread of the virus. Today, Republicans claim that Biden’s administration does not penalize China enough. However, some affluent Republicans

have voiced support for CCP policies. In September 2021, a Fox News show host, Tucker Carlson, who averages over 3 million viewers nightly, (Joyella 2022) complimented the Chinese government for passing laws aimed at limiting the number of hours children spend playing video games on weekends. (Loh 2021) Carlson proceeded to condemn American leaders for ignoring videogame addiction among children in the United States. Ironically, this recent videogame policy is emblematic of Xi's growing totalitarian rule. (Buckley 2021) As per some journalists, Democrats are hesitant to criticize China and its government for fear of increasing anti-Asian racism in the U.S., an issue that has worsened with the pandemic. (Axios 2020)

According to the "Sinophone Borderlands Europe Survey" conducted out of Palacky University Olomouc in the Czech Republic, French people are united against China's human rights infringements and mass surveillance schemes. (Julienne 2020) Overall, 64% of Macron voters and 63% of Le Pen had negative perceptions of China, showing transpartisan agreement. These sentiments are reflective of China's portrayal in French media. Similarly, in Australia, the media's portrayal of China has grown increasingly negative, including with regards to the Belt and Road Initiative. (Hu 2020) This coverage undoubtedly plays a role in Chinese immigrants' attitudes toward the CCP.

Finally, understanding the complex relationship between these very different political spectrums helps explain how immigrants can impact the political climate of their receiving countries. Although here we gave insight on what first-generation Chinese immigrants think about American, Australian, and French politics, the experiment can be repeated with immigrants to other countries as well. One particular comparison that should be made is with immigrants coming from other so-called communist nations, such as Russia, and how their immigrants vote in capitalistic and democratic countries.



### *C. Caveats and Further Research*

This research should undoubtedly be repeated with a larger sample; we had hoped to interview a few more individuals. Specifically, our sample only includes 7 individuals living in Australia and 3 living in France. Our findings could be generalized with more certainty had these numbers been larger. The American sample, though consisting of 20 individuals, only includes immigrants living on the West and East coasts. These regions were chosen out of convenience, but also because the greatest number of Chinese immigrants live there. If the research were to be repeated, the sample should come from other states as well. The home states of those interviewed lean Democrat, which might influence the data. In the same breath, the majority of interviewees identified with left-leaning parties. Although further questioning showed that they are in fact more conservative than their parties of choice, it would be helpful to include more right-leaning party affiliates. As was established previously, the sample has more years of schooling on average than does the general population. This may affect the extent to which the sample is aware of the CCP's policies.

Although the conversations were very insightful and allowed for follow-up questions, perhaps this data can be collected in the form of a survey to reach more individuals in the same timeframe. It would be very interesting to see whether the results are the same when thousands of Chinese emigrants across the world are asked the same questions. With a larger sample, testing the question of whether there is a relationship between emigration year and partisan affiliation or CCP agreeability could yield some important information.

Lastly, and as mentioned several times throughout the thesis, this research should be repeated with many different sets of countries, to see whether we can map all of the world's political parties onto a single spectrum. With increasing mobility across national borders, those

results would be important to help us grasp the nature of political systems that seem too complex and different from our own to really be understood.

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## **VIII. Appendix: Interviewee Responses**

Individual	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Current Location	NYC	NYC	NYC	NYC	Los Angeles	Los Angeles	San Francisco	San Francisco
Highest Education	Masters	Masters	PhD	Masters	Masters	Masters	PhD	PhD
Professional Field	Current Student	Engineering	Education	Current Student	Engineering	Engineering	Medicine	Medicine
Immigration Status	Student Visa	Citizen	Citizen	Student Visa	Work Visa	Work Visa	Citizen	Green Card Holder
Year of Citizenship	N/A	1995	2017	N/A	N/A	N/A	2008	N/A
Birth Place	Wuhan	Hong Kong	Shandong	Harbin	Shangxi	Shangxi	Pingtung	Nanjing
Reason for Emigrating	Followed Family	Education	Work	Education	Work	Work	Education	Education
Other Countries	None	None	None	None	Canada	Canada	Japan	Japan
Year of Emigration	2005	1989	2005	2019	2002	2002	1992	1992
Year of Immigration to Current Country	2005	1989	2005	2019	2013	2014	1992	1999
Other Cities within Current Country	Lubbock	No	No	Washington DC	No	No	Nashville	No
Expected Duration of Stay	Few Years	Forever	Few Years	Few Years	Was Unsure	Was Unsure	Forever	Was Unsure
Expected to Become Citizen	Unsure	Yes	Unsure	No	Expected Green Card but not Citizenship	Unsure	Yes	No
Family Members in China	All	No Immediate Family	All but immediate family	All	All but immediate family	All but immediate family	All but immediate family	All but immediate family
Voter Registration	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A
Voting Frequency	N/A	Every presidential election	Every presidential election	N/A	N/A	N/A	Every presidential election	N/A
Politics Discussion Frequency	Daily	Daily	Daily	Never	Rarely	Rarely	Daily	Monthly



Primary Source for Political Info	Online News	Online News, Radio, TV	TV, Podcasts	Online News	Youtube	Youtube, Radio	Online News	TV
Local News Media	NYT, FP, FA, The Wire	NPR, Fox	CNN, BBC, NPR, NYT	None	CNN on Youtube	KPBS	CNN, BBC, Google News	CNN, ABC
Chinese News Media	Caixin, South China Morning Post	WeChat	Wanyi Xinwen, Red	WeChat	WeChat	None	Youtube	Baidu
Reads Political Information on Social Media	Weibo, Twitter	WeChat	No	WeChat	WeChat	No	No	No
Posts Political Information on Social Media	Monthly	Rarely	No	Rarely	No	No	No	No
Signed a Petition	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Worked on a Campaign	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Attended a Government Meeting	Yes, in China	Yes, local	No	No	No	No	No	No
Attended a Political Protest	Yes, in Hong Kong	Yes, against homeless encampments	No	No	No	No	No	No
Is Member of Interest Group(s)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Plans to Run for Office	No	No	No	Maybe in China	No	No	No	No
Member of the CCP	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Youth League or Young Pioneers	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
CCP-A	D	D	D	SA	A	A	SD	A
CCP-B	D	D	D	SD	N	N	SD	N
CCP-C	SA	A	D	SD	A	N	SD	A

CCP-D	D	D	D	SD	N	D	SD	D
Local Political Party	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat	Unsure	Unsure	Democrat	Democrat	Republican
Local Presidential Candidates	N/A	1996=Clinton, 2000=Gore, 2008=Obama, 2012=Obama, 2016=Trump, 2020=Trump	2020 = Biden	N/A	N/A	N/A	2008=Obama, 2012=Obama, 2016=Clinton, 2020=Biden	N/A
A-Personal	D	D	SD	SA	D	A	SA	D
A-CCP	A	D	SA	SA	D	A	SA	D
A-Local Party	A	D	SA			D	A	
B-Personal	A	SA	SA	SA	D	D	SA	A
B-CCP	A	N	SA	SA	D	A	A	
B-Local Party	A	A	SA			A	SA	D
C-Personal	N	D	SA	SD	N	D	A	A
C-CCP	N	D	A	SD	A	D	SA	
C-Local Party	SA	A	A			A	N	D
D-Personal	A	A	D	SA	D	N	D	N
D-CCP	SA	SA	A	SA	N	A	N	
D-Local Party	D	A	D			D	D	D
E-Personal	A	A	N	SA	A	N	SA	A
E-CCP	A	SA	SD	SD	N	D	N	
E-Local Party	SA	A	A			A	A	A
F-Personal	D	SD	A	D	A	D	A	A
F-CCP	A	N	D	SA	A	N	A	
F-Local Party	SA	A	SA			A	A	A
G-Personal	SA	SA	SA	SD	A	SA	SA	SA
G-CCP	A	N	N	N	N	N	D	
G-Local Party	SA	A	A			A	SA	A
H-Personal	A	SA	A	SD	D	A	A	A
H-CCP	A	SA	A	SA	A	A	D	
H-Local Party	D	A	A			A	A	A
I-Personal	SA	A	SA	A	A	D	SA	A

I-CCP	D	A	N	SD	D		D	
I-Local Party	SA	D	SD				A	A
J-Personal	N	N	D	D	A	A	N	A
J-CCP	A	A	A	N	D	A	D	
J-Local Party	A	A	A			A	D	A
K-Personal	SA	A	A	D	A	A	A	A
K-CCP	A	SA	A	N	A	A	N	
K-Local Party	A	A	A			SA	A	A
Mao	5	7	7	10		7	5	7
Deng	9	9	8	10	8	8	7	8
Xi	5	4	4	8		9	3	7
Local Leader 1	5	4	5			7	4	6
Local Leader 2	7	4	8			8	6	7
Local Leader 3	3	3	1	5	5	6	4	5

Individual	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Current Location	San Francisco	Princeton	Hobogan	NYC	San Francisco	NYC	NYC	San Francisco
Highest Education	Masters	Masters	Masters	High School	PhD	High School	High School	Bachelors
Professional Field	Finance	Education	Education	Current Student	Medicine	Current Student	Current Student	Education
Immigration Status	Citizen	Work Visa	Work Visa	Student Visa	Citizen	Student Visa	Citizen	Citizen
Year of Citizenship	2005	N/A	N/A	N/A	2000	N/A	2020	1996
Birth Place	Shanghai	Liaoning	Beijing	Suzhou	Guangzhou	Lianzhou	Taipei	Meizhou
Reason for Emigrating	Education	Followed Family	Work	Education	Followed Family	Education	Followed Family	Followed Family
Other Countries	Japan	None	None	None	Canada	Singapore	France	None
Year of Emigration	1993	2018	2014	2018	1991	2010	2011	1990
Year of Immigration to Current Country	1993	2018	2014	2018	1994	2020	2011	1990
Other Cities within Current Country	Missouri, North Carolina	Indianapolis, NYC	Cambridge, Princeton, NYC	Pittsburg	Houston	No	Los Angeles	No

Expected Duration of Stay	Was Unsure	Was Unsure	Was Unsure	Few Years	Forever	Few Years	Few Years	Forever
Expected to Become Citizen	No	Expected Green Card but not Citizenship	Expected Green Card but not Citizenship	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Family Members in China	All but immediate family	All but immediate family	All but immediate family	All	All but immediate family	All but immediate family	All but immediate family	All but immediate family
Voter Registration	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes
Voting Frequency	Every presidential election	N/A	N/A	N/A	Once	N/A	Every election	Every year
Politics Discussion Frequency	Rarely	Weekly	Never	Daily	Monthly	Daily	Weekly	Weekly
Primary Source for Political Info	Online News	Social Media	Social Media	Online News	Online News	Social Media, Online News	Online News	TV
Local News Media	WSJ, Atlantic, CBS, ABC, NBC	None	None	NYT, WSJ, FP, Council on Foreign Relations	Google News, CNN, NY Times, WaPo, MSN	NYT, WaPo, Politico, Atlantic, Fox, ThinkTanks	NYT, FinTimes, Politico	CBS, Fox
Chinese News Media	None	WeChat, Weibo, Douyin, People's Daily	WeChat, Weibo	Xinhua, WeChat, DW News, Caixin, Xuexiqiangguo, People's Daily	None	Guan Media, Xinhua, People's Daily	TVBS, STE, PTI	26News
Reads Political Information on Social Media	No	WeChat, Weibo, Douyin	WeChat, Weibo, Twitter, FB	WeChat, Telegram	No	WeChat, RSS	Weibo, Reddit, Twitter	WeChat
Posts Political Information on Social Media	No	No	No	Often	No	Quarterly	Around Elections	No
Signed a Petition	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Worked on a Campaign	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes, Congressional	No
Attended a Government Meeting	No	No	No	Yes, in China	No	No	Yes, local	No

Attended a Political Protest	Yes, 1989 Tiananmen Protest	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Is Member of Interest Group(s)	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Plans to Run for Office	No	No	No	No	No	Maybe in China	No	No
Member of the CCP	No	No	Yes	Application in Process	No	Would Apply	No	No
Youth League or Young Pioneers	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
CCP-A	D	SA	A	SA	A	SA	A	A
CCP-B	SD	A	N	SA	N	A	D	A
CCP-C	D	A	A	SA	A	SA	A	A
CCP-D	SD	A	A	D	D	SD	SD	D
Local Political Party	Independent	Unsure	Democrat	Democrat	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Local Presidential Candidates	2008=Obama, 2012=Obama, 2016=Clinton, 2020=Biden	N/A	N/A	N/A	2008 = Obama	N/A	2020 = Biden	1996=Clinton, 2000=Bush, 2004=Bush, 2008=Obama, 2012=Obama, 2016=Trump, 2020=Biden
A-Personal	SA	A	SD	N	D	D	A	SD
A-CCP	A	SA	A	N	A	D	A	SD
A-Local Party	N		A	N	A	A	A	SA
B-Personal	SA	A	SA	SA	A	SA	A	SD
B-CCP	SA	A	SA	A	A	SA	A	SD
B-Local Party	SA		SA	SA	A	A	A	SA
C-Personal	N	N	A	A	A	A	A	D
C-CCP	SA	N	A	A	A	A	A	D
C-Local Party	SA		A	SA	A	D	A	D
D-Personal	D	SD	SD	D	D	N	D	A
D-CCP	SD	N	A	A	A	A	D	A
D-Local Party	D		N	N	A	SA	D	D
E-Personal	A	D	A	A	N	D	A	A
E-CCP	D	SD	D	D	D	SD	D	A
E-Local Party	A		A	N	D	SD	A	D

F-Personal	A	N	SA	A	D	A	D	D
F-CCP	A	D	A	A	A	A	A	A
F-Local Party	SA		A	A	A	SD	A	D
G-Personal	SA	A	SA	N	SA	A	A	SA
G-CCP	D	D	N	N	A	N	D	SA
G-Local Party	SA		SA	SA	A	D	A	D
H-Personal	A	N	A	SA	D	D	N	SA
H-CCP	A	A	A	A	D	D	A	A
H-Local Party	A		A	N	D	A	D	A
I-Personal	SA	A	A	D	A	SA	A	A
I-CCP	D	D	D	SD	A	N	N	D
I-Local Party	SA		A	SA	SA	N	A	D
J-Personal	N	A	SA	N	N	SA	A	A
J-CCP	A	A	SA	A	SA	SA	A	A
J-Local Party	SA		A	A	SA	SD	A	D
K-Personal	A	A	A	A	SA	A	A	D
K-CCP	A	N	A	A	N	A	A	D
K-Local Party	SA		A	A	A	N	A	D
Mao	5	8	9	8	7	9	3	6
Deng	8	7	9	10	10	8	8	8
Xi	1	7	8	10	8	8	6.5	7
Local Leader 1	5	3	8	7	6	3	5	6
Local Leader 2	7	5	9	8	7	5	8	7
Local Leader 3	3	3	0	6	6	4	4	5

Individual	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Current Location	Oakland	NYC	San Francisco	Washington DC	Sydney	Sydney	Sydney	Sydney
Highest Education	Bachelors	High School	Masters	Masters	Masters	Masters	Masters	Masters
Professional Field	Education	Current Student	Education	Architecture	Current Student	Current Student	Current Student	Current Student
Immigration Status	Citizen	Student Visa	Citizen	Citizen	Student Visa	Student Visa	Student Visa	Student Visa
Year of Citizenship	1987	N/A	1975	2006	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Birth Place	Zhuhai	Beijing	Hong Kong	Beijing	Wuhan	Baotou	Liaoning	Macao
Reason for Emigrating	Followed Family	Education	Followed Family	Political	Education	Education	Education	Education

Other Countries	None	France, North Korea, Hong Kong, UK	None	None	USA	None	None	South Korea
Year of Emigration	1981	2012	1971	1994	2009	2009	2018	2013
Year of Immigration to Current Country	1981	2021	1971	1994	2019	2009	2018	2013
Other Cities within Current Country	No	No	No	NYC	No	No	No	Brisbain
Expected Duration of Stay	Forever	Few Years	Forever	Forever	Few Years	Was Unsure	Few Years	Few Years
Expected to Become Citizen	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Family Members in China	All but immediate family	All	All but immediate family	All but immediate family	All	All but immediate family	All	All
Voter Registration	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Voting Frequency	Every year	N/A	Every election	Every presidential election	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Politics Discussion Frequency	Rarely	Rarely	Daily	Weekly	Weekly	Daily	Daily	Never
Primary Source for Political Info	Online News, Radio	Online News	Online News, TV	Online News	Online News	Online News	Social Media	TV
Local News Media	NPR, Yahoo News, NYT	CFR, Carter Center	NYT, NPR	WSJ	ABC, The Guardian	All major ones	9 News	Facebook
Chinese News Media	None	WeChat	South China Morning Post	None	None	SBS, BBC in Chinese	Weibo	Ticktock, Wechat
Reads Political Information on Social Media	Twitter	WeChat	No	No	LinkedIn	FB, Twitter, WeChat	Twitter, Weibo, FB, WeChat	FB, Ticktock, WeChat, Instagram

Posts Political Information on Social Media	No	No	No	No	No	Rarely	Often	Monthly
Signed a Petition	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Worked on a Campaign	No	Yes, in HK	No	No	Yes, univeristy organization	Yes, univeristy organization	Yes, univeristy organization	Yes, univeristy organization
Attended a Government Meeting	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Attended a Political Protest	Yes, climate	No	Yes, MeToo	No	No	No	No	No
Is Member of Interest Group(s)	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Plans to Run for Office	No	Maybe in China	No	No	No	No	No	No
Member of the CCP	No	Would Apply	No	No	No	No	No	No
Youth League or Young Pioneets	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
CCP-A	A	A	SA	SD	A	A	A	A
CCP-B	D	D	SD	SD	N	N	N	SD
CCP-C	A	N	N	SD	A	N	A	A
CCP-D	N	D	D	SD	D	SA	SA, family is in party	D
Local Political Party	Democrat	Unsure	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Labor	Labor	Unsure
Local Presidential Candidates	2000=Bush, 2004=Bush, 2008=Obama, 2012=Obama, 2016=Clinton, 2020=Biden	N/A	1988=Dukakis, 1992=Clinton, 1996=Clinton, 2000=Al Gore, 2004=Kerry, 2008=Obama, 2012=Obama, 2016=Clinton, 2020=Biden	2008=McCain, 2012=Romney, 2016=Trump, 2020=Trump	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
A-Personal	SD	D	D	SA	D	A	D	SD
A-CCP	A	D	A	SA	N	SA	SA	A
A-Local Party	D		D	A	D	A	N	



B-Personal	A	A	A	A	A	SA	A	A
B-CCP	A	A	A	SA	A	SA	D	A
B-Local Party	A		A	A	SA	SA	A	
C-Personal	N	D	N	D	A	A	A	A
C-CCP	D	A		SD	A	A	D	SA
C-Local Party	A		A	N	A	A	N	
D-Personal	D	D	A	N	SD	D	SD	N
D-CCP	D	D	A	A	A	A	A	A
D-Local Party	D		A	A	D	D	N	
E-Personal	A	A	A	N	N	SA	A	A
E-CCP	D	A	D	SA	A	SA	A	D
E-Local Party	A		A	A	D	D	A	
F-Personal	A	A	A	A	A	D	A	A
F-CCP	N	A	A	N	A	A	N	SA
F-Local Party	A		A	N	A	A	A	
G-Personal	SA	A	SA	SA	A	A	A	A
G-CCP	N	N	A	A	D	N	D	D
G-Local Party	A		A	A	N	A	SA	
H-Personal	A	N	N	SA	A	A	A	A
H-CCP	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
H-Local Party	A		N	A	D	A	A	
I-Personal	A	A	SA	SA	SA	SA	SA	A
I-CCP	D	D	D	D	SD	A	SD	D
I-Local Party	A		SA	N	A	SA	SA	
J-Personal	SA	A	SA	D	A	N	N	N
J-CCP	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	SA
J-Local Party	A		A	D	A	A	A	
K-Personal	A	A	SA	N	A	N	A	A
K-CCP		N	D	N	N	N	A	D
K-Local Party	A		A	N	D	A	A	
Mao	4	6	5	1	8	6	6	7
Deng	10	7	7	7	8	8	8	7
Xi	8	7	2	3	7	3	5	8
Local Leader 1	5	5	5	8	8	6	7	5
Local Leader 2	8	6	8	7	6	3	4	3
Local Leader 3	4	6	1	6	5	2	2	4

Individual	25	26	27	28	29	30
Current Location	Sydney	Sydney	Sydney	Ferran	Paris	Paris
Highest Education	Masters	Bachelors	Masters	Masters	High School	Masters
Professional Field	Current Student	Current Student	Current Student	Education	Hospitality	Education
Immigration Status	Citizen	Citizen	Permanent Resident	Citizen	Permanent Resident	Citizen
Year of Citizenship	2014	2012	N/A	2014	N/A	2005
Birth Place	Taiyuan	Hong Kong	Shenzhen	Zhejiang	Yantai	Hangzhou
Reason for Emigrating	Followed Family	Education	Education	Education	Work	Work
Other Countries	Germany	None	None	USA	None	USA, Australia
Year of Emigration	2008	2008	2014	2008	2001	1993
Year of Immigration to Current Country	2008	2008	2014	2008	2001	1993
Other Cities within Current Country	No	No	No	Toulouse	No	Rouen
Expected Duration of Stay	Was Unsure	Forever	Forever	Few Years	Forever	Few Years
Expected to Become Citizen	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Family Members in China	All but immediate family	All but immediate family	All but immediate family	All	All	No Immediate Family
Voter Registration	Obligatory	Obligatory	N/A	Yes	N/A	Yes
Voting Frequency	Obligatory	Obligatory	N/A	Occasionally	N/A	Every presidential election
Politics Discussion Frequency	Weekly	Monthly	Monthly	Daily	Monthly	Daily
Primary Source for Political Info	TV	Online News, Social Media	Social Media	Online News, TV, Radio	TV	Online News, TV, Radio

Local News Media	The Guardian	7 News, 9 News, ABC, Sydney Morning Herald	None	Figaro, BFMTV, France Info	BFMTV	Radio France, BFMTV, LCI, BBC
Chinese News Media	None	The Stand, South China Morning Post	None	WeChat	WeChat	Tencent, Xina
Reads Political Information on Social Media	WeChat	Instagram, FB, Weibo	WeChat, Weibo, RED	WeChat	WeChat	WeChat, FB
Posts Political Information on Social Media	No	Often	No	No	No	No
Signed a Petition	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Worked on a Campaign	Yes, univeristy organization	Yes, univeristy organization	Yes, univeristy organization	No	No	No
Attended a Government Meeting	Yes, local	No	No	No	No	No
Attended a Political Protest	No	No	No	No	No	No
Is Member of Interest Group(s)	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Plans to Run for Office	No	No	No	No	No	No
Member of the CCP	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Youth League or Young Pioneets	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
CCP-A	A	A	SA	D	SA	SA
CCP-B	N	SD	D	D	SA	N
CCP-C	N	D	D	N	SA	A
CCP-D	D	N	N	SD	SD	D
Local Political Party	Liberal	Labor	Liberal	Les Republicains	Rassemblement National	Parti socialiste

Local Presidential Candidates	2016=Labor, 2019=Liberal	2013=Labor, 2016=Labor, 2019=Labor	N/A	2017=Fillon in primary	N/A	2005=Holland, 2012=Royal, 2017=Macron, 2022=Macron
A-Personal	A	D	A	A	A	SD
A-CCP	A	SA	SA	A		SA
A-Local Party	A	D	N	N		SD
B-Personal	SA	A	N	SA	A	D
B-CCP	SA	N	D	SA		SA
B-Local Party	SA	SA	N	A		D
C-Personal	A	N	D	D	N	A
C-CCP	A	D	SD	A		A
C-Local Party	N	A	N	A		SA
D-Personal	D	D	SA	A	D	D
D-CCP	N	N	N	A		A
D-Local Party	D	D	A	A		D
E-Personal	SA	A	A	A	N	A
E-CCP	N	D	N	A		D
E-Local Party	N	A	SA	A		D
F-Personal	A	N	D	A	D	SA
F-CCP	D	D	N	A		SA
F-Local Party	A	A	A	A		SA
G-Personal	SA	A	SA	A	D	A
G-CCP	SA	D	N	D		A
G-Local Party	SA	SA	SA	N		A
H-Personal	A	A	SA	A	A	A
H-CCP	A	A	SA	N		A
H-Local Party	A	A	SA	A		A
I-Personal	A	SA	SA	A	A	SA
I-CCP	D	SD	N	A		D
I-Local Party	A	A	SA	D		A
J-Personal	N	D	SA	N	N	D
J-CCP	N	A	SA	A		A
J-Local Party	D	N	A	N		A
K-Personal	SA	A	SA	A	A	SA
K-CCP	A	D	A	D		D
K-Local Party	A	A	A	A		SA
Mao		5	5	1	10	7
Deng		6	10	5	9	9

Xi	6	4	7	1	10	8
Local Leader 1		8	7	5	8	6
Local Leader 2		7	6	5	5	7
Local Leader 3	3	7	3	5	8	7