The effects of government intervention efforts on violence: How business, public sector, and civil society coalitions dictate the social development agenda: Cases of Medellin, Colombia & Juarez, Mexico
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Introduction

Through the study of cases of urban intervention programs in Medellin, Colombia and Juarez, Mexico, similarities and differences in the development of these interventions and their effects violence will be highlighted. Interventions are defined as efforts to disrupt the violent situation that is the status quo of a city. These interventions are carried out through infrastructural and non-infrastructural aspects. The Medellin case study is an example of an intervention through infrastructure that adopts the built environment to decrease spatial segregation and measure how this in turn affects violence. Other manifestations of these interventions took the form of what is referred to as social infrastructures, which are the creations of local councils to work through neighborhood concerns and to come up with anti-crime strategies. These manifestations of interventions took the form of tables of security in Juarez as the remnants of a larger intervention that had both infrastructural and social infrastructural aspects, We are Juarez. After considering these specific interventions, my hypothesis is that urban interventions through infrastructural and social development can reduce violence, but only if supported by business and political coalitions invested in reducing violence through social development. This hypothesis is propelled by the theoretical mechanism that a business climate favorable to diversified economic development plus business and politician coalitions that will enhance interactions with civil society.

My interest in these two cities in particular comes from both of their experiences with exceedingly high homicide rates compared to the average for the rest of the country and the world. However, these rates have decreased over the past few years, specifically homicides. The natural question to ask oneself is what is the cause of these reductions and variations in violence statistics? One approach to this question is to think about external factors, one being urban infrastructures. To explore the relationship between urban intervention programs and violence, I
provide data about violence in Juarez and Medellin, and show how these statistics relate to their respective developments the cities. Looking at two programs specifically helps me analyze the progress or effort the city is making to reduce social and economic inequities, manifesting in the levels of violence in these cities. The interventions discussed for both cities are infrastructural and non-infrastructural in nature, and just one of the ways in which city governments attempt to address the problem, along with dozens of other areas such as through governance, law, and police enforcement reforms to name a few. Although urban infrastructure affects each of these in different ways, it also may be possible to measure its independent effect on violence. Urban infrastructure affects the way a city’s residents navigate it to achieve their education, health, or economic needs, and the risks they face in doing so. Urban infrastructure bridges the gaps that have persisted both in Medellin and Juarez throughout the history underdevelopment for the lower classes and the concentration of decision-making power in the middle and higher industrial classes.

Studying these cities’ histories of political and economic developments to see how the present is a product of these cities’ past development has helped inch towards further understanding of their changes over time. Historical texts detailing the evolution of the cities’ physical and economic structures will aid in further understanding the cities’ history of violence. Ciudad Juarez is a sister city to El Paso Texas, a border town in Mexico which is an economic engine to the state and country. It has a population of approximately 1,321,000. Medellin, Colombia’s the second largest city, is also an economic engine boasting a population of 3,600,000.

Furthermore, urban planning and infrastructure offices of the municipal governments of each city’s online resources have also furthered understanding of what local government
envisioned for city development in the interventions discussed. To view these plans with a critical lens, I have explored studies that study the marked effects of interventions on violence. The positive effect of the interventions on violence has been clearly shown through a groundbreaking public health study done in Medellin, Colombia that sought to isolate the effect of public urban infrastructure projects on crime in Colombia. In Juarez, studies show that urban intervention can reduce violence but that follow through has been weak and less of a priority for the state, further reinforcing business-political economic links, at the expense of links with civil society.

The effects of infrastructure projects in Medellin will be measured in terms of the effect of an development program, Urban Integration Projects (PUI) in comunas, or districts, 1, 2, and 13 (Northeast and 13th Communa) in Medellin Colombia. For Juarez the focus will be on We Are Juarez and determining whether that intervention was sustained long enough to measure its effects on violence. For these two cases, lessons will emerge to teach how urban changes in global southern cities in two different stages of economic development can respond after periods of extended violence perpetuated on their populations.

**Literature Review**

To describe the literature that helps explain the contemporary issues of urban infrastructure in violent cities, I explore literature on economic development in the global south and how it has influenced the thinking around urban development. Additionally, the focus is on the history of urban development and specifically on how the views of it up until post-industrialism were very functional as opposed to serving the purpose of solving issues of violence. Linking the 1950s and 1960s to more contemporary literature on the global urban south, details the problems currently occurring in developing cities, and how different models of
infrastructure, particularly highlighted by Teresa Caldeira in Sao Paulo, contrast the current approach to urban infrastructure in the chosen case studies.

**Literature of urban development in the global south from the 1950s and 1960s**

The idea of dependent urbanization advanced by ¹Andre Gunder Frank posited that the conquest by the Spanish and Portuguese created dependent relationships with this region’s countries and in so doing looped them into the world system. ²With the development of cities, it is important to note that since these countries and their cities had close relationships to the large powers, the elites within the cities benefitted from foreign domination and from the periphery’s underdevelopment. According to Alan Gilbert, another early scholar on urbanization, the issues of inequality and urbanization were not interrogated until the 1950s, since urbanization had accompanied industrial expansion in Europe and the United States, and overall, states’ leaders viewed this process favorably. Furthermore, urban development was viewed up until the 1950s as a stimulus to the modernization of society. ³Urbanization, much like democracy, was viewed as it leading to a more prosperous and happier society. ⁴During this time of increasing urbanization, the beneficial effects of urban growth on social and political attitude could not be ignored.

The 1950s and 1960s literature on urbanization spearheaded by Alan Gilbert makes a significant contribution to the field by being amongst the first to consider that the form of urbanization matters and to explore why. ⁵For example, “if the majority of the urban population becomes concentrated into giant metropolitan centers, it is possible that the process will be

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³ Gilbert, Latin American Development, 90

⁴ Gilbert, Latin American Development, 91

⁵ Gilbert, Latin American Development, 126
distorted” he thoughtfully observes. He also notes another influencing effect on the growth of cities is rooted in their attraction of people to the city center, because major economic players would like to be in these centers. This statement by Gilbert will be key to understanding how people to move to cities for economic opportunities, but may find that they encounter a lack of security or other access to social development, as will be highlighted especially in Juarez.

Contemporary literature linking theories of violence and urban development in the global south

Moving to more contemporary literature on urban development and violence in the global south, 6Teresa Calderia discusses the relationship between development and the social impacts that come with the relationship between public and private sector development in City of Walls. The concept Caldeira terms as ‘total security’ the idea of housing replete with mechanisms of separating and securing it from the dangerous urban outsiders. As urban development advances during a time of violence, the development tends to reflect divisive views split between the perceived victims and victimizers. 7Total security perpetuates a view that “distant, secluded, and secure” closed condominiums are supposed to be self-contained worlds.”

8Caldeira’s argument harks back to the ideas advanced by Diane Davis, a contemporary scholar, of class divisions guiding urban development while “the middle and upper classes create their dream of independence and freedom” by simultaneously excluding and using working class people. 9Brazilians in this case do not have to look farther than the Paulista regime, the elite of the 1990s, who embraced this mentality of separation from the poor of the city and looked for

7 Caldeira, City of Walls, 266.
8 Caldeira, City of Walls, 271.
9 Caldeira, City of Walls, 278.
these “fortified enclaves.” Therefore, people moving into the city trying to remain separate from the city is a symptom that has to be fought against through urban policy.

Caldeira’s work is crucial to the literature on urban development as it situates the current transformations of modern day public life in the history of cities under 19th century modernization. Take for instance, the fact that Paris, a developed city unlike the cities that will be studied in the rest of the paper, “itself demonstrates the perpetuation of inequality: the remodeling of the city …was in fact a transformation in the mode of spatial segregation and of the organization of class differences, as Engels (1872) noted early on.” Andre Frank detailed in his mid-20th century literature that the development of cities in the developed world did not occur too differently from those in the developing world. Herein lies the continuation of the problems of the modernizing 19th century, which consisted in the perpetuation of the “negative aspects of cities, from crime and violence, to the danger of the mob, anomie, excessive individualism, congestion, and disease.” However, Caldeira takes these examples from modernization history and contributes to it with the conclusion that “contestation is an inherent component of the modern city,” but that the perpetuation of certain structural characteristics in cities does not necessarily have to accompany this contestation.

To evoke the structural development aspect of the literature, Caldeira points to the ideas that “Modernist architecture and city planning arise from a criticism of industrial cities and societies.” However, throughout her work, she also continues to show the disjunction between the expectations of what architecture and city planning should do as well as progress in those developments. This disjunction show how the privatization of development and the continuation of the historical views of socioeconomic development inhibit a true remodeling of a city, the

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10 Caldeira, City of Walls, 300
11 Caldeira, City of Walls, 306.
exact enigma that Medellin and Juarez face today. Medellin has proven itself to be thinking more against the grain of enclave development Calderia describes, while Juarez seems stuck in the paradigm of industrial development.

Furthermore, Diane Davis contributes to the conversation about the history of urban development in Mexico City more specifically, where by the 1980s, the question of who should be in power to make decisions about the most critical urban issues under debate came about in Mexico. In Mexico City, it was the urban middle classes who mobilized for the movement of urban policy. She reveals that the predominance of the urban middle classes helped to steer urban development forward. Additionally, the criminal rates after the Revolution until the 1980s had apparently decreased, and the questions people ask themselves are how this could have been the case during war time. Pablo Piccato contributes that it has to do with problems with statistics 2) the inhabitants of the city and its urban communities maintained a degree of control over them (crime rates).” According to Piccato, these same citizens also chose which crimes they wanted to focus on addressing. In the case of the crimes seen today such as gang violence and violence against women and children, these were not crimes addressed earlier on and are now coming back to haunt Juarez. The literature of urban elites and violence to which Davis and Piccato contribute will also be complimented here through research on the interactions between the elites and the local government in response to violence.

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13 Davis, Urban Leviathan, 313.
14 Piccato, Pablo. A Historical Perspective on Crime in Twentieth Century Mexico City . (La Jolla, CA: Project on Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico , 2003), 2.
Literature on the importance of resiliency in urban interventions

This research will also speak to the subset of literature of urban resilience, also developed by Diane Davis. As defined by Davis, resilience is “the ways that actors and institutions at the level of the community actually cope with or adapt to chronic urban violence.” The resilience of cities literature also studies as the complex systems operating within cities and seeing if they are durable and sustainable enough at different nodes to survive waves of violence. The chosen cases speak to this literature more specifically in the outcomes of the interventions and pursue the question of whether a city was left more resilient after an intervention or not, and if not, then explaining why. Davis discusses positive, negative, and equilibrium resilience. By looking at the outcome of an intervention in the city, it is possible to gauge the different levels of resiliency, especially when complimented with a history of the city, including learning about the coping mechanisms that have emerged as strategies of resiliency. Urban resilience also engages the ideas brought up in Gilbert and Calderia about what development should look like by going a step beyond mere investment in streetlights, for example, and rather using foresight to create projects that imagine bringing an excluded population back into the population.

Davis distinguishes between projects that preserve and foster local interactions though infrastructure and public space improvements and those that don’t through the concepts of positive and negative resiliency. Interventions that promote positive resiliency will strengthen cooperation between different actors and fundamentally transform the urban space. This contribution to the literature to engage with an example of positive resiliency, Medellin, and

16 Davis, Urban Resilience Report, 37
17 Davis, Urban Resilience Report, 58
Juarez, which fits more of the definition of a negative or equilibrium resiliency. Including the histories of the cities is crucial to understanding the economic and political developments that brought the cities to where they are today. Studying the effects of these interventions on violence will be my major contribution to this field of urban development in the global south with the goal of marginally improving the understanding of intervention policies in two Latin American cities.

Data, Methods, and Findings: Interventions and Outcomes in Medellin and Juarez

The approach to the study of Medellin and Juarez studies two urban intervention programs agendas and their respective measured effects on violence. Infrastructural and non-infrastructural aspects of urban interventions will be examined. The Medellin initiative, Urban Integration Projects, and Juarez’s initiative, We are Juarez, are similar in their broad goals to respond to marginalized communities and the violence affecting them. They differed in their outcome, particularly in regard to the pace and branding of the developments occurring in each city. Finally, follow-through of these programs have differed significantly and have influenced their impact on urban resiliency in both cities.

Therefore, to re-emphasize the hypothesis, it is that urban interventions are not neutral but rather a political tool forged with businesses to address divisive issues about the causes of violence. Unlike in the era of industrialization, cities in the era of the services and tech economies are ultimately serving as a vehicle to answer uncertain questions about the road ahead to reducing violence. Politicians and businesses are doing this by finding innovative ways to link business goals to political ones to work towards solutions.
Juarez Violence and Subsequent Intervention

Figure 1.

Beltran, Pedro, Fragoso, Julia, Mendoza, Maria, Pinero, Rodolfo, Ramirez, Jose, Rodriguez, Alejandro, Salas, Rodolfo, Instituto Nacional de la Mujer. Diagnóstico geo-socioeconómico de Ciudad Juárez y su sociedad, 2005, 279.

Figure 2

Approximately the beginning of the drug war by the Juarez cartel

When We are Juarez commenced; also when drug war de-intensified
Figure 1’s data was compiled using information on total violent deaths for 100,000 people, as well as that divided by male homicides and female homicide rates. I then separated the numbers for male homicide and female homicide rates to view variations in ratios over time. To understand the violence situation of Juarez, it is important to study the situation of violence against women specifically in Juarez as well. Juarez has made women vulnerable to higher deaths, particularly when they have been employed by the maquila industry. Studying women as a subset of the population that is being affected by violence helps to gauge the interaction between the economy, infrastructure, and violence.

Figure 1 provides a look into the effect of the maquila industry on a sector of Juarez’s female population, and how specifically the lack of protection of women through their employment in maquilas or lack of employment whatsoever exposes them more to violence. One study finds that the women that work in the maquila industry actually do not compose the majority of the women being killed, but that they are actually unemployed. 20 One study suggests that women are being killed in Juarez because of a lack in economic opportunities given their unemployed, and thus vulnerable, status. However, this study does not attempt to unravel the larger narrative that maquila industry is dominating economic landscape in the region more generally and how this is dictating the intervention agenda. The existing dynamic in Juarez in turn affects the scope of the interventions that arise to address vulnerable women and the population at large. The women that have been slain fell in the young, single or married, and


unemployed demographic. Understanding this demographic gives us a peek into the larger subject of underdevelopment in Juarez, and how the political and business alliances for development may be harming rather than helping the situation of underdevelopment in Juarez.

Figure 2 is a continuation of the first graph, continuing to map the homicide rates in Juarez from 2005-2013. The purpose of this graph is to show how violence rises dramatically during this time, culminating in the “end” of the drug wars. The “end” of this intensely bloody period happens with the federal government responding at all levels of government with the We are Juarez Initiative. We are Juarez is the intervention under study here to see if it had the measurable outcomes it hoped to have or if it in fact contributed to the end of violence through a sustained long term effort.

*Medellin: Violence and Subsequent Intervention*

The data collected on Colombia will help me operationalize the effect of the intervention on violence. A study done in several marginalized neighborhoods in Medellin provided invaluable data collected through a natural experiment which measured the effects of the implementation of public integration projects on people perceived levels of violence viewed in tandem with actual changes in homicide rates.

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The project was led by a joint team from Columbia University and the University of Antioquia, which surveyed 466 residents in 25 barrios with PUI interventions and 23 barrios without to measure their effect on violence in the neighborhoods with the construction of infrastructure. 

Medellin also collected data on both the Human Development Index and the Quality of Life index at the comuna, or district level, during the time of the intervention. All of the original 2004-2007 PUI neighborhoods show an improvement in both indices. Nonetheless, HDI improved for all comunas from 2004-2011 whereas the Quality of Life Index (ICV) change from 2004-2012 is more varied. Among the lowest five ranked comunas in 2004, the three that showed the most improvement were the 3 that received PUI before 2007. Poverty, for a fact, decreased across the entire city, however, economic growth did not keep up with already wealthy neighborhoods.

These comparisons show the important connection between urban development in the physical space as well as economic development, and how both are intrinsically linked. What it

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also reveals is that economic and urban development are processes that need to be nurtured in sync to prevent their goals from diverging.

**Analysis of Data: History and Outcome of Juarez’s Intervention**

**A. History of the Juarez Intervention:**

Juarez emerged as a burgeoning economic border city through a series of events that occurred outside of it. The city had long been a magnet for migrants and trade crossing the border. The Bracero Program attracted workers to the United States, and many of them ended up in Juarez once the program ended in 1965. Forty years since then, the population and the assembly plants grew in tandem. 23 It was the influx of workers from the Bracero and maquiladora programs which contributed to the gradual process of social disorganization in Juarez given their chronic income vulnerability, with women highlighting this case.

24 The Strategic Plans of Juarez gathered an effort of a plural, multiparty group of citizens with the goal of creating a participatory comprehensive development plan for the city. The Plan released in 2007 was dedicated to creating the conditions necessary for a governable Juarez based on the concept of co-responsibility between the urban city planners and city residents of managing the city to improve the quality of life. Citizens were partaking, for example, in the tracking of high-level crimes and sharing them with the government through a hotline, which linked the public sector and civic society to collaborate over anti-crime campaigns.


However, as tensions heightened to a new peak, after an incident of a slaying of 15 teenagers in early 2010 in Villa de Salvarcar, a neighborhood of small, government subsidized cement blockhouses in southern Juarez built to house maquila workers. To add insult to injury, the Calderon government’s response to the crime was also horrific in that it wrongly assumed the teens were gang members. The aftermath of this event prompted the Calderon government to go to Juarez himself and launch the We are all Juarez initiative. One of the initiatives devised by a Security Roundtable with the people of Juarez which sought to tackle the problem of stealing cars in Juarez by encouraging people to register their cars, ultimately reducing the percentage of unidentified cars to 7%. However, a mayor that came in from 2010-2012, Murgia, took a narrow view of the role of the civic society in anti-crime strategy and re-tilted the balance of strength towards the police and the local government once more.  

Meanwhile, at the state level, the governor of the state where Juarez is located, Chihuahua, was continuing to encourage citizen participation in the State Council for Public Security. Businessmen at the state level decided on a five percent tax on companies’ payroll to raise funds to support crime-fighting actions. Therefore, the lessons gleaned from the Juarez intervention is that crime cannot be fought only from a military perspective.

Although the Salvarcar Massacre was not the first time cartel-related gunmen had fired indiscriminately, this time around, there was a marked turning point in the reaction of the community and the government in response to civil action. An integrated, social intervention approach was soon demanded of the Calderon government at the local level, and he responded with the hopes of expanding it to other localities. Even though the end of the turf war between the Juarez and Sinaloa cartels is widely viewed as the cause for the decline of the homicide rates, arguably is not what explains the resiliency of Juarez against future violence. In Juarez, the

Tables for Security are widely recognized as the most enduring and successful aspect of the We are Juarez intervention. The recipe for success of the collaboration with government by business associations and civil society organizations is rooted in three conditions, including acceptance by authorities of average citizen participation, respect for the rule of law, and establishing strong institutions by transcending the individual mayors and governors. However, glaring problems still persist in Juarez, given the social problems that have accumulated from the political and economic predominance of the maquila industry. Similar to thinking of the case Medellin during times of intense violence, plans for improved public spaces, rapidly appeared on the development agenda of the city to achieve urban resiliency.

**B. Outcome of Juarez’s Intervention**

Overall, several strategies composed the larger We are Juarez intervention. The Strategic Plan of Juarez sought participatory planning by calling for security reform, a police career reform, citizens’ council, and access to crime statistics. Juarez Residents for Peace also emerged as a business and professional association in 2009 combining activism from the business community with policy advocacy. The Association of Maquiladoras and the Autonomous University of Juarez also created an observatory which was funded with a 5% agreed upon by the business community of Juarez.

The outcome of this intervention is mixed when it comes to urban resiliency and is left vulnerable by the entrenched maquila industry that has made Juarez more vulnerable to violence. To illustrate the

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responses of people in Juarez to the We are Juarez initiatives, a poll of 65 opinion leaders and journalists in early 2014 found that nearly 3/4ths of people in Juarez believed the city was “on the right track”; while 4/5ths said security had improved over the past year. In contrast, a citywide survey by the same pollsters found that 6/10ths thought Juarez was “on the wrong track”, though about the same said security had improved.” These statistics provide a mixed array of views regarding the results. The last set of poll opinions reveal the view that people have noticed crime decreasing, but they are not convinced that the interventions at work today are helping to steer the changes in the violence statistics. Government officials’ views are that government did not reduce violence by just targeting the Sinaloa cartel’s opponents. Instead, they think that the government learned to do its job of protecting its citizens better by working with business and civil society.

The resiliency of the We are All Juarez initiative is concerning, given that it ended with the Calderon presidency. Although We are Juarez was a large intervention, it was too short-lived to impact cultural change, and the reliance on the maquiladoras for funding and economic growth leaves the population vulnerable to what findings show are threatening institutions with or without cartel violence. However, through the civic activism, the security agenda and rhetoric changed from only military responses to considerations of social preventative measures. However, the effect is still yet to be more accurately measured. What remains a challenge in Juarez in the aftermath of drug war violence and We are Juarez is ensuring that local level initiatives include civic engagement and not only discretionary government spending.

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29 Back from the Brink: Saving Ciudad Juarez.” International Crisis Group, 22.
Analysis of Data: History and Outcome of Medellin’s Intervention

A. History of the Medellin Intervention:

As levels of lethal violence climbed, President Gaviria established the “Consejeria Presidencial para Medellin y su Area Metropolitana” (Presidential Council for Medellin and is Metropolitan Area) to serve as the national government’s direct representative in Medellin on issues of violence, citizen security, and local development. The task of the council was to break the cartel’s links to marginalized youth by coordinating national government investment to increase access to education in the city’s peripheral neighborhoods. With the linking between the cities’ economic elites and civil society, a new emphasis was placed on socioeconomic investment within peripheral neighborhoods. Economic development efforts included tax breaks for new firms, labor skills training for community members, microloan for small businesses, training for at-risk youth on how to start their own businesses, and several programs to help micro-entrepreneurs to link their businesses with Medellin’s efforts to increase its exports to foreign markets. The project demanded the establishment of several new participatory institutions, including four dozen citizen councils at the neighborhood level that would enable residents to discuss and debate local development needs and challenges.

To see how these are affected, it is crucial to look to the political economy of the city and how historically the ruling classes promoted disengaged relations with the periphery. After the 1950s, the gradual weakening of the traditional party system and the rise of new political forces led to a thinning of local government-business linkages. On the economic development front, in 1976, 13 of the top 20 firms in Antioquia were in the manufacturing sector whereas during the 1990s, that number dropped to six as financial services firms claimed nine of the top then spots.

The business landscape itself also began to change with the industrial elite diversifying their investments and joining with leaders of other economic sectors to facilitate cross-sectoral collaboration through an economic group known as the “Grupo Empresarial Antioqueno” (Entrepreneurial Group of Antioquia). The private sector, thus envisioned shifting economic conditions from the export of manufactured goods to drive local growth to becoming more of a knowledge-based economy. Violence in Medellin at the time was characterized by competing armed actors with generally high levels of coercive capacity and low coordination in criminal leadership over illicit markets in Medellin’s neighborhoods.

The first participatory intervention project which attempted to fight violence failed in the early 1990s because of the tension of whether to allow civil society to participate in local commissions in which decisions pertaining to anti-violence strategy took place. Later on, however, the second participatory intervention project (which includes the urban integration projects considered specifically here) brought on by Sergio Fajardo in the mid-2000s sought to control violence via different strategic objectives which would prevent violence, including a focus on urban infrastructure. Some of these included providing economic and infrastructural resources to communities receiving demobilized paramilitaries,” “establishing greater equity in the citywide distribution of public space,” and “foster formal entrepreneurial activity and knowledge among at-risk populations.” The “Proyectos Urbanos Integrales,” otherwise referred to as the urban integration projects, specifically sought to penetrate the presence of the state at the local level, both to challenge the entrenched armed actors, but also to reduce violence by attempting to bridge social and economic inequalities.


32 Moncada, Cities, Business, and the Politics of Urban Violence in Latin America, 73.
B. Outcome of Medellín’s Intervention

In Medellín, the small and medium-scale approach of urban integration projects (PUI) involves strategic physical, social, and institutional interventions within the most vulnerable neighborhoods to stimulate equitable development.” Linking this shift in the development of cities away from the centralization of economic development associated with industrial development, reveals how large public projects have historically been tied to state power but are increasingly coming about through public-private partnerships. In contrast to major urban projects of the mid-to-late twentieth century that were driven by the state, projects today, highlighted by the two case studies, are often initiated by the public sector and influenced or aided by private development.

These shifts show a break with past development through an initiative at the local level to address local socioeconomic issues. These incentives also illustrate a coalescing of business and civic society’s goals. What can be gauged from this case, is that unlike in Juarez, where the government is heavily influenced by the demands of the maquiladora associations wishing to conduct investment in the city (such as the construction of industrial parks) funds have been allocated to social development and not exclusively business interests in mind.

Unlike Juarez, where I have not come across any efforts (yet) by the municipal government to open collaboration with other city governments and potential funders except other city agencies, Medellín has increased the scale of their projects by receiving international sources of funding. For instance, the Integrated Slum Upgrading Program of Medellín, or PRIMED was an ambitious program with partial funding from the German Ministry of Economic

Cooperation based on the premise that physical upgrading and regularizing informal settlements could liberate residents to improve their economic situation, reducing poverty and subsequently, violence.” The mandate to implement PRIMED, was similar to the mandate made by We are Juarez because both served as a holistic strategy to address violence. However, in the case of Juarez, it linked four main actors: local civil society, the federal government, the Chihuahua state government, and Ciudad Juarez’s municipal government.” On the other hand, Fajardo’s mandate rested on his promise to transform the city physically, socially, and institutionally, a commitment embodied by the urban integration projects.” Much like the focus on security through infrastructure in Juarez through the pavement of roads, PRIMED increased the amount of pedestrian infrastructure by 50 percent in its intervention zones. Similarly, in Juarez, the pavement of streets increased from 50% to 69% in 2007, and that number has continually increased.

In the mid-2000s, violence in Comunas 1 and 2 in the northeastern part of the city had remained high despite the citywide decrease, with a homicide rate of 202/100,000. The Center-West Zone, which covers 700 hectares of Comuna 13, another district with high levels of crime and poverty, and was intended to benefit 140,000 people. The neighborhood of Moravia in the near north of the city was already in the midst of a program of intervention around the greening of a former city dump and skills training for local residents, so it is often grouped in with PUI. Through the works that have been done in that area, including bridges, sidewalks, and the relocation of vulnerable homes, there was an improvement in quality of life in the neighborhood.

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34 Calvin, Small Scale/Global Ambition: Strategies of Architectural Production and Global Urban Competitiveness in Medellín, 22.
of Juan Bobo. For instance, the quality and quantity of housing for residents, increase legal tenancy from 6% to 85%, and legal access to water, electricity, and sewage to all those within the site. Previously, only half had legal access to water, two thirds to electricity, and none had sewage services. Public space per person was multiplied by a factor of 6, from just 0.5 square meters per person to more than three. These all show how progress on social development goals is measured in terms of the resilience of urban development that takes place. Studies have also taken place to link the urban development improvements with reductions in violence and crimes.

Comparative Systematic Study of Medellin and Juarez

According to a study conducted by professors, students, and local experts in Juarez in 2015, development in Juarez still followed a timeline that focused heavily on maquila development and the business interests of the maquila industry. The industry has caused changes in the urban development of Juarez as well as has led to the impoverishment of its people. The lack of focus on the people of Juarez up until this century has been partially at fault for the vulnerability its citizens continue to experience today in the drug war. It was only as early as the 2000s that efforts have emerged to include the people of Juarez in civil society and to encourage them to participate in different organs of the government.

Economic and political developments confirm the history of exclusion in Juarez for the past forty years. Urban planning was institutionalized in 1965, whereby municipalities were forced to formalize their initiatives for territorial planning. In 1983, municipalities, as per the constitution, became responsible for providing basic services to the population and giving them

control over land appropriation. These developments at the local level opened a space for private interests to be channeled into urban growth in Juarez as well. Meanwhile, the maquila industry was peaking, creating a paradox of growth in Juarez and ultimately leading to low-grade and low-income wages and demand for economic and industrial infrastructure (such as industrial parks, roads, transport, and services). The maquila industry also contributes to job insecurity and the formation of vulnerable working masses in a migratory state, nurturing the slums developed that still persist. 40Furthermore, in 2003, a local political leader in Juarez introduced a plan that divided the city into six zones and subsequent subzones. These developments led to the isolation of Juarez as a hub of economic development across the border and a place where local violence could manifest itself. Therefore, the vulnerability of local communities was heightened given that they had not been secured against violence with built and social infrastructures.

The negative interactions between the maquila industry and politicians can be gleaned from the experience of the migratory working masses in Juarez confronted with a 41restrictive and exclusionary land market. The nature of this market forces families to look for alternatives outside the formal market, placing them in severely decrepit and vulnerable homes, perpetuating poverty. Without many other options in the urban land markets or the rental markets, the majority of people living at or below the minimum living standards are relegated to the informal markets, benefitting the maquila owners who stand to gain from the construction of industrial


parks in plots of land they can buy for themselves. The reason this dynamic occurs in Juarez is because the mechanisms of strong business and political ties emerged from the close relationship between landowners, industrial park promoters, and politicians. The hopes of these politicians incentivizes them to rely upon policies encouraging urban expansion that leads to land speculation, furthering spatial segregation in the city. Overall, the maquiladora industry spearheaded urban development in Juarez and led to a competition of advancing interests between the public sector, civil society, and business. In the case of Juarez, civil society has not been as privileged yet in the conversation with the latter two, and thus room remain for improvement and follow through in the arena of civil society by the state and business.

To establish a type of city branding, unlike Medellin who looked to foreign governments to evaluate their progress, Juarez started “an industrial development board with an office in El Paso, its membership composed of businessmen, bankers, lawyers, educators, and officials.” The associations of maquilas use these boards to raise money for the Juarez city council for infrastructure projects. However, these monies have not been applied with the same speed and efficiency as they have in Medellin. Given the deficiencies in the infrastructure and social services have remained a live issue, the branding of Juarez have proven to be less for the improvement of the city as a whole but branding for industrial elites’ investment opportunities.

Medellin has always characterized itself as an industrial/financial center of Colombia. During the import substitution development model of the 1950s and 1960s, Medellin participated


in industry specialized in the production of consumer and intermediate goods for the national market, especially in the textile and garment industries. Due to its economic activity, it heavily attracted migrants. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the ongoing process of de-industrialization and the general worldwide economic transition to a new, flexible accumulation model led to an accelerated process of social decay (used as a general theory for the causes of violence). Due to the movement of large-scale grassroots groups in the peripheral city in Medellin, improvements emerged in public services such as higher education, health care, and public transport, a movement that has not characterized Juarez until recently. These new forces making demands on the government called for integration in the changing urban labor market and political participation.

When violence peaked in Medellin during the rise of cartels and drug economy, the Colombian government reacted, arguably because of the pressures being placed on them by the skyrocketing violence statistic of 7376 assassinations in 1991. The Colombian government took action by creating a consejeria, a council, which would be in charge of diverting national funds and international cooperation into social projects in grassroots communities which would help address the high levels of violence present there. Additionally, they also instituted PRIMED (Program for the Improvement of Substandard Neighborhoods) to deal with high risk places in the city. The main aims of this program included setting new standards for urbanization of the city by the poor in the peripheries by 1) mitigating geological risks by micro zonal planning and interventions to stabilize slopes, 2) improve, the built environment adapting houses, infrastructure, and public buildings to local environmental conditions, 3) Provide secure land tenure by individual land titling for all family members, 4) Promote educational projects that

attempted to change the attitude of people towards their natural environment and strengthen civic participation and the emergence of an urban culture of law and respect for others.

Limitations of Paper /Areas for Future Research

Conducting research on data and findings was challenging on both the qualitative and quantitative fronts. One of the most difficult parts of conducting this type of case study research that is focused on a specific initiative is the lack of raw data and ethnographic studies available. To assuage these limitations, an interdisciplinary health study that studied the differences in violence in intervention and non-intervention neighborhoods in Medellin was heavily cited. Additionally, I also had the privilege to be on the ground in Medellin and gather first hand accounts in the city. However, eight months ago I did not have the analytical mechanisms developed today, leaving a remaining challenge of placing these accounts into the analytical framework presented. Where the areas of raw data and ethnography suffered much more were in the Juarez case study. One of the major challenges in data collection consisted in not having access to online databases, such as an observatory of violence which mapped violence geographically. Moreover, it proved challenging to find first-hand accounts of the impacts of We are Juarez that did not originate in the city’s government itself. Due to the federal level origins of these intervention programs, it is difficult to find reports that hone in on specific regions of Juarez and their measured impact. An additional and much more significant challenge gleaned from this lack is the lack of follow through and monitoring the government is engaging in with regard to these interventions. The Mexican National Institute for Women, however, did create an extensive geographical study mapping violence against women and urban development in the city, which I have heavily cited.
An inherent limitation of this paper is that I am correlating the interventions to reductions of violence. Since I do not look at other changes in governance, the police, unions, and the work of specific grassroots organizations, I do not try to assess what the measurable effects of those other interventions may be on violence. The reasoning behind this decision comes from wanting to take a micro-level approach to these studies and assess more quantitatively how these interventions have impacted their specific intended populations. The theoretical mechanism of business-political-civil society dynamics which propels my hypothesis stems from the nature of the cities studied, which have historically been economic engines of their countries, and have played roles in the development of the city’s’ fight against violence. A further area of research which would complement my own could be a macro-level approach that ventures to attribute levels of effect to different types of interventions on the reduction of violence. Using this piece as a starting point can be helpful given that the two interventions studied occur during the same time period, originate at the federal level, and have a political-business-civic society dynamic at play. It is undisputable that these interventions influenced each other and attempt to replicate a model of achieving urban development in their respective cities of the global south.

**Conclusion**

Mostly preliminary conclusions can be drawn about these two cases on the effects of urban infrastructure on violence. Thus far, it has been possible to trace a connection through the literature of the 1950s until today about the way urban developers have thought of the role of cities. From the literature, it can gauged that cities were viewed as vessels through which to take advantage of vast economies of scale and to grow their businesses; meanwhile, those seeking to
find a new place to live initially sought jobs and even considered building their own abodes outside of the city limits to access social and economic opportunities of the city. Today, the landscape of development in cities is affected by major increases in violence in both of these cities, making them crucial spaces to consider development and how to improve the quality of life of the people by solving social problems such as violence.

What the findings for the cities of Juarez and Medellin begin to show is that, for one, there are still abundant corners of underdevelopment within these industrialized, economically viable, and international cities. The effect of economic development of these cities at play with spatial segregation and an absence of mechanisms of social infrastructure divides citizens and their politicians and businesses leaders. Urban Integration Projects in Medellin have focused heavily on including and developing pockets of the city that are least developed, and then surveying people there in addition to monitoring reductions in violence. Measurable differences across the way people began to act upon this newfound sense of security in relation to different aspects of collective efficacy emerged in the existing research. However, the significance of these results is yet to be measured.

Nevertheless, there is a concerted effort between politicians and business people in both cities, but civil society also plays a crucial role in the implementation and assessments of these interventions for which Medellin and Juarez find themselves at different stages. In Juarez, the spikes and drops in violence generally, and violence against women specifically, have yet to be measured over time along with sustained attempts to address urban interventions in the areas that are least developed, like Medellin is doing. In Juarez thinking that civil society can be pushed aside whenever discretionary government funds run out or when violence is increasing once more and military action takes over the scene is misguided. This approach has proven short-
sighted and thus left observers of Juarez, and Mexico more generally, concerned with the more inherent problems that remain largely unresolved.

Until now, Medellin’s Urban Integration Projects have proven a success in terms of reducing violence and helping the people in lower-strata communities move out of poverty but the rate of economic growth of these areas is still lower than higher strata communities in the city. However, businesses and politicians still remain heavily interested in funding and promoting the application of these interventions to continue to address issues of urban development in a rising city of the global south. On the other hand, Juarez has partially succeeded, in terms of bringing together people into local community meetings on security and in bringing the private sector to fundraise for crime-prevention initiatives. However, long-term persistent problems such as infrastructure as well as a lack of economic opportunities remain present. As per the research into the Juarez case, I remain unconvinced that the economy can continue to function as a maquila-centered one and advance the interests of the people they are impoverishing. However, the work of politicians and businesses working together to invest into built and social infrastructure interventions play a large role in beginning to reverse the spatial segregations and concentrated urban land markets, among other ills, of Juarez’s’ political economy.


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_Todos Juarez._