

Running Head: PILOTING PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING

Piloting Participatory Budgeting:  
an Examination of Social Capital, Well-Being, and Public Good Provision in New York City  
Allison Blythe Hurlbut  
Columbia University in the City of New York

Allison Blythe Hurlbut, "Piloting Participatory Budgeting: an Examination of Social Capital, Well-Being, and Public Good Provision in New York City." Submitted May 2012. Advisor: Jeffrey S. Lowe.

### **Abstract**

Participatory budgeting places the citizen in the role of the planner in an effort to improve public good provision and quality of life when resources are scarce. The process was instituted in New York City during a time when American citizens experienced increased inequality and a desire for more transparency in government. This case study is an examination of the pilot participatory budgeting process that was implemented in four New York City council districts from 2011 to 2012. An analysis of neighborhood assembly survey, nonparticipant observation, and project idea data suggest: 1. participatory budgeting can increase social capital; 2. it is unclear how much participatory budgeting affects the health and well-being of the community when such a small number of each community participated; 3. in general the participants already had a higher level of social capital entering the process; 4. inequality in social capital is evident when considering the public goods the residents are requesting; and 5. participatory budgeting risks maintaining or worsening inequality by empowering the powerful and not the disadvantaged. While social capital can work through public good provision to improve health and well-being, the unequal distribution of it may not help the people who need it the most. Ultimately, we must commit to being a just city by creating and implementing an overall equitable view, reconsidering the public goods and amenities allocation process, and focusing on social inclusion within our communities.

*Keywords: participatory budgeting, social capital, health, well-being, public good provision, equity, social inclusion*

## Table of Contents

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Background</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Social Capital Literature Review</b>	<b>8</b>
Theoretical Development of Social Capital	9
Shared Characteristics and the Advancement of Social Capital Indicators	11
Gaps in Social Capital Research: Inequality	12
Health, Well-Being, and Social Capital	14
Public Goods and Health Achievement	15
<b>Research Design</b>	<b>16</b>
Description of Research Tools	17
Limitations	18
<b>Neighborhood Assembly Data Analysis</b>	<b>19</b>
Citywide	19
District 8	22
District 32	25
District 39	27
District 45	29
<b>Discussion</b>	<b>31</b>
Notable Trends	33
Social Capital Indicators	35
Inequality in Social Capital and Public Good Provision	38
<b>Conclusion and Recommendations</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Appendices</b>	<b>49</b>

## List of Tables and Maps

### Tables

Table 1: Contemporary Definitions of Social Capital	9
Table 2: Differences in Contemporary Social Capital Theory	10
Table 3: Number of Neighborhood Assemblies and Participants by District	20
Table 4: Five Most Popular Project Idea Categories by District	25
Table 5: Education and Income Differences between Participants (PB) and District Whole	32
Table 6: Most Common Outreach Methods by District	34
Table 7: Location of Neighborhood Assemblies by District	35
Table 8: Working with Others (Internalized Norms) by District	36

### Maps

Map 1: New York City Council Districts Using Participatory Budgeting	22
--	----

### Appendix Tables

A: 2010 Demographic Data by City Council District	49
B: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Gender by District	50
C: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Race and/or Ethnicity by District	51
D: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Language by District	52
E: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Education by District	53
F: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Household Income by District	54
G: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Household Size by District	55
H: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Age by District	56
I: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Outreach by District	57
J: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Neighborhood Longevity by District	58
K: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Voting by District	59
L: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, System of Democracy by District	60
M: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Trust in Government by District	61
N: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Contact Public Official by District	62
O: Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Work with Community by District	63
P: GSS Regional Comparative Data	64
Q: Coded Participatory Budgeting Project Ideas by District	66

In 2011, for the first time, residents and workers in four New York City council districts began a process to decide how to spend a portion of the discretionary funds within their communities. This process is called participatory budgeting, and it is to date the largest effort of its kind in the United States. Traditionally, city council members decide how to spend discretionary funds; however, New York City's initial endeavor in participatory budgeting allots over 6 million dollars for citizens in four city council districts to allocate capital projects within their neighborhoods.

New York City's participatory budgeting process began when the nonprofit organization, the Participatory Budgeting Project, offered to assist all 51 city council members with piloting the process in their communities. In response, four city council members agreed to participate in the initial effort. Two other local nonprofit organizations, Community Voices Heard and the Urban Justice Center, joined with the Participatory Budgeting Project to form Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC) and assisted the city council members with the process.

Past participatory budgeting procedures in other countries have been implemented with the goal of increasing social equity through citizen participation and public good provision. Countries in Latin America and Europe that feature differing government structures have used the framework with varying degrees of success. The purpose of this paper is to present the initial New York City participatory budgeting process as a nested case study by examining citywide data as well as district-level data. Furthermore, by analyzing who participates and the capital projects they propose, the paper will examine how through public good provision, social capital can increase and positively affect health and well-being within the participating districts of New York City.

Various theories exist regarding the concept of social capital. Many of these theories measure social capital through norms, trust, or social networks. More recent theories have indicated that social capital affects health and well-being, sometimes through public good provision. The central thesis of this paper is that the participatory budgeting process will increase social capital through public good provision and positively affect health and well-being within the four piloted communities of New York City. This paper is relevant to the field of urban planning because the process of participatory budgeting puts the citizen in the role of the urban planner by giving him or her the power to allocate public goods in a time when resources are scarce. In addition, because participatory budgeting is a new community planning process for New York City and the rest of the nation, this paper will contribute to the minimal amount of research in the field.

This paper will first consider factors of the history and background of participatory budgeting that led to the establishment of a pilot process in New York City. It will then provide a literature review of social capital, in which the main theories are explored and then connected to health, well-being, and public good provision. The research design will be presented, as will a full analysis of the

participatory budgeting process in the four piloted districts of New York City. Finally, following a discussion, recommendations for the participatory budgeting process and the city will be provided.

### **Background**

The participatory budgeting process can increase social capital through public good provision and positively affect health and well-being. Such an approach is a recent phenomenon. In 1989, Porto Alegre, Brazil was the first area to initiate participatory budgeting, a process in which citizens negotiate distribution of scarce resources and determine public policy priorities (Wampler, 2000). This signaled a remarkable political shift within Brazil. Before participatory budgeting, the area featured a storied tradition of political authoritarianism and vast social inequities that marginalized the many poor residents there (de Sousa Santos, 1998). However, many factors contributed to an environment that supported the eventual democratization of Brazil and the creation of participatory budgeting.

Once democratization and rights of citizenship were featured at the center of the political agenda, Brazil's 1988 constitution emerged and solidified individual rights and limited the state's ability to restrict freedoms (de Sousa Santos, 1998). In addition, after two decades of dictatorship, the Workers' Party in Porto Alegre gained control of the mayorship (Wampler, 2000). At that time, Leftist forces organized and had the opportunity to experiment with new participatory forms of municipal government (de Sousa Santos, 1998). They decided to use participatory budgeting to advance their goals of democratic participation and equity in spending and resource allocation (Wampler, 2000).

Since 1989, the participatory budgeting structure grew within Porto Alegre, as well as spread to other parts of Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, Canada, and the United Kingdom (Cabannes, 2004; Chavez & Braathen, 2006; Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011; Shah, 2007). As participatory budgeting spread, the form changed to fit within the political, social, and economic context of each new place. In addition to adapting to the context of the place, Wampler (2000) stated that variation in budget amounts also contributed to the process working differently across the world.

Even though the participatory budgeting form may vary across the world, many places use discretionary funding to vote on public works projects. Alternatively, select places without discretionary funds use the participatory budgeting framework to negotiate policy initiatives (Wampler, 2000). Overall, within participatory budgeting, citizens engage with projects and policies on various levels ranging from direct to representative. While people's participation generally has an impact, some public administrators only use participatory budgeting to placate the citizens and do not give them actual power in the process (Wampler, 2000).

Overall, participatory budgeting usually emerges from coalitions of governments, social movements, unions, and non-governmental organizations because people demanded transparency and increased participation in government (Wampler, 2000). However, mayors often initiate the process, which at times might be interpreted as an intrusion on the boundaries of city council

members since they control discretionary funding (Cabannes, 1998). According to Wampler (2000), once a structure is in place, the level of success increases with the level of social support. When participatory budgeting is successful it allows citizens to have more control over development and resources as well as lessens corruption.

Twenty years after its beginning in Porto Alegre, participatory budgeting appeared in the United States. In 2009, Chicago's 49<sup>th</sup> Ward became the first area in the nation to use over 1 million dollars of discretionary funds through participatory budgeting (Ward 49, 2011). There, Alderman Joe Moore led the effort because he controls the discretionary funding, or "menu money," of the ward (Ward 49, 2011). Two years after Chicago's initial effort, four city council members in New York City volunteered to pilot participatory budgeting within their districts. At least 6 million dollars in discretionary funds will be allocated to the process, and it will be the largest participatory budget in the United States to date (The Participatory Budgeting Project, 2011).

Citizens do not usually directly participate in budgeting decisions and public good provision in New York City. Instead, the 51 city council districts and their members mostly manage city service and resource budgets (Kivelson, 2001). According to the New York City Council (2011b), the annual city budget consists of three components: expense, capital, and revenue budgets. The expense budget funds the daily operating costs of the city, such as salaries of public servants, supplies, and equipment. The capital budget funds physical projects such as infrastructure, parks, and facilities. Finally, the revenue budget consists of revenues from local taxes and user fees (New York City Council, 2011b).

Traditionally, the city council works with the mayor to establish priorities, allocate resources, and set the policy agenda for the year. The mayor annually proposes an overall city budget and then city council members review city agencies, policies, and programs, as well as hold public hearings before submitting their response. After additional review from the mayor and city council, the annual budget is finalized without direct citizen participation (New York City Council, 2011a).

In addition, all 51 city council members share about 500 million dollars a year in capital and expense discretionary funds from the annual budget, although it is unclear how that is distributed across city council districts (PBNYC, 2011). Like the annual expense budget funds, the expense discretionary funds are allocated towards the daily operating costs of the city (PBNYC, 2011). And like annual city budget capital funds, the capital discretionary funds cover physical projects, such as buildings, parks, and infrastructure (PBNYC, 2011). In general, budgets are indicative of a city's priorities so the engagement in participatory budgeting signals a shift for those council members who chose to involve the citizens in the budget.

In 2011, the nonprofit organization called The Participatory Budgeting Project met with the New York City Council in order to initiate participatory budgeting in the city. Along with the Urban Justice Center and Community Voices Heard, they formed Participatory Budgeting in New York City

(PBNYC). The new PBNYC organization established a steering committee of 40 organizations who together designed and planned the process to be used in New York City (The Participatory Budgeting Project, 2011). The New York City process included the creation of a district committee in each participating city council district that consisted of area leaders who would work with PBNYC representatives to facilitate the first round of neighborhood assemblies (The Participatory Budgeting Project, 2011).

In New York City, participatory budgeting occurred over the course of seven months from 2011 to 2012. In the first stage of the process, each city council member invited citizens from their districts to a six-week series of neighborhood assemblies facilitated by the corresponding district committee and PBNYC. At the neighborhood assemblies, the district committee first explained the participatory budgeting process to citizens. There, citizens learned that the process was built on the core values of *transparency, equality, and inclusion* (PBNYC, 2011b). Next they were told that they would be using capital discretionary funds, which were to be allocated towards “bricks and mortar” projects, as opposed to programs and services that use expense funds. After the presentation, citizens worked in groups to identify potential capital projects. All ideas were recorded by the district committee, but the top three from each group were presented at each assembly (PBNYC, 2011b).

During the next phase of meetings, volunteer “budget delegates” worked in committees to create project proposals using the ideas from the neighborhood assemblies. Budget delegates attended orientations and then worked in issue committees, such as transportation and parks and recreation (PBNYC, 2011b). Over the course of two months, the budget delegates worked on final proposals before they were presented to each district during February and March. The last phase of participatory budgeting in March consisted of each community voting on the final proposals (PBNYC, 2011b). Next, the following section will present a literature review with regard to social capital.

### **Social Capital Literature Review**

The central thesis of this paper is that participatory budgeting will increase social capital through public good provision and positively affect health and well-being. This section will explore social capital, the connections to health, well-being, and public good provision, as well as gaps in the research. While participatory budgeting and the popularization of social capital are recent events, the idea of social capital has existed for over one hundred years. Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim allude to social capital before it was articulated, labeled, and established as a concept or theory (Portes, 1998).

Once social capital manifested in contemporary theory, various definitions emerged. However, even though there are multiple definitions, social capital generally entails value or benefits gained from relationships or connections. Social capital is often measured by trust or social networks, and is sometimes manifested through civic participation. Many fields including sociology, political science, economics, and public health incorporate social capital theory. The range of disciplines and



perspectives result in multiple definitions and schools of thought regarding the concept and its mechanisms.

According to Alejandro Portes (1998), Karl Marx alluded to social capital in his theories. Social capital can be seen in Marx’s class theories as a difference between fragmented groups of individuals (atomized class in-itself), and a collective that can mobilize for change (effective mobilized class for-itself). Groups that can effectively mobilize have a quality, in this case the unlabeled *social capital*, that differentiates them from the fragmented class and enables mobilization (Portes, 1998).

After Karl Marx, social scientist Emile Durkheim addressed the idea in his classical research. Portes (1998) states that Durkheim alluded to the concept of social capital in his studies on group life as a counter to anomie and self-destruction. The term *social capital* could be applied to the quality of group life that saved people from normlessness and isolation (Portes, 1998). Decades later, many consider contemporary theory to have started with economist Glen Loury (Portes, 1998). While Loury did not yet label social capital, he considered the aspect of social connections that engendered differential access to opportunities for White youth and youth of color (Loury, 1977).

**Theoretical Development of Social Capital**

Social capital ideas or theories experienced significant changes as they developed. For example, the original concept apparent in Marxist theory was class-based, a feature or quality of an entire class (Lin, 2000). In contrast, years later the contemporary theorists broadly transitioned the concept of social capital from a class-based to an actor-based perspective, which made it a feature or quality of individuals in a group (Lin, 2000). While contemporary theorists mostly agree that social capital is an individual quality, they differ regarding the mechanisms and levels through which social capital reaches them. The differences begin to be articulated in their definitions of social capital that follow below.

**Table 1: Contemporary Definitions of Social Capital**

Author	Definition of Social Capital
Bourdieu (1986)	<i>the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, membership in a group which provides each of its members with the backing of collectively-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word (p. 51).</i>
Coleman (1988)	<i>is a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors---whether persons or corporate actors---within the structure (p. S98).</i>
Putnam (1995)	<i>features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (p. 67).</i>

Contemporary theorists articulated social capital definitions within theories that mainly differed with regard to two aspects: how social capital is accessed and where social capital exists. These differences affect how social capital is measured in research (see Table 2). The first way in which the contemporary theories differ is in how the value of social capital is accessed. The main contemporary theorists either see it as an external resource to gain (Bourdieu, 1986) or as an internal resource that is embedded within structural relations (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995).

Bourdieu’s (1986) framework establishes social capital as an external resource that is available to individuals in homogeneous groups or networks, or institutional relationships such as families. According to this theory, the amount of social capital a person has is dependent on the size of their network; therefore, individuals construct and join homogeneous networks in order to establish solidarity and profit from them (Bourdieu, 1986). To Bourdieu, social capital consists of social relationships and the amount and quality of resources (Portes, 1998).

Coleman and Putnam depart from Bourdieu’s framework of access by theorizing that social capital is embedded within structural relationships. Coleman (1988) considers social capital to consist of social structures and the actions of actors. He frames social capital as more of a productive social resource that exists inside the group network, between or among the actors, as opposed to an external resource to access (Coleman, 1988). Furthermore, social capital provides information that facilitates action on behalf of the actors within the group (Coleman, 1988).

In addition, Coleman expands upon Bourdieu’s concept of social capital with the introduction of norms and trust. Coleman (1988) argues that because social capital exists in the structure of relations, social organization allows for value to come from social capital. Social organization can also facilitate network closure, which Coleman believes is important for the creation of norms and trustworthiness. When there is network closure, the group is tightly-knit and dependent on each other for resources (Coleman, 1988).

**Table 2: Differences in Contemporary Social Capital Theory**

	<b>How Social Capital is Accessed</b>	<b>Where Social Capital Exists</b>	<b>How Social Capital is Measured</b>
Bourdieu	External source to gain	Available to individuals in (homogeneous) networks	Size of network
Coleman	Internal resource embedded within structural relations	Exists between actors	Norms and trust
Putnam	Internal resource embedded within structural relations	Macro level in communities, nations	Trust, civic engagement

Norms are internalized or supported through external rewards, and trustworthiness allows the proliferation of obligations and expectations (Coleman, 1988). In this way, those in power dictate social capital because they establish norms and act as agents of social control. Coleman (1988) stated that areas with a high degree of social disorganization and low social capital have low levels of trust and lack norms. Thus, Coleman believes social capital is a public good that may greatly affect their ability to act and their perceived quality of life.

Putnam uses trust measures in his social capital theories. One way in which Putnam departs from Coleman is in his application of social capital. Putnam (1995) applied the concept of social capital on a macro level to the United States as a whole, and to communities within the United States, whereas Bourdieu and Coleman applied social capital on a micro level to individuals within groups. By using social capital theory, Putnam (1995) found that different kinds of successful outcomes occur in civically engaged communities.

As a result, Putnam (1995) theorized that social capital is manifest through civic engagement. He measured the level of social capital through activities and events such as: voter turnout, public meeting attendance, town halls, political rallies, committee work, and political party participation. Putnam also measured group attendance of church, school service, and sports groups, as well as labor unions. Putnam (1995) believes the networks that come from these types of civic engagement facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved. As a result, he proposes that areas with higher levels of civic engagement have more social capital (Putnam, 1995).

### **Shared Characteristics and the Advancement of Social Capital Indicators**

Even though multiple authors and definitions exist in contemporary social capital theory, similarities can be identified in order to advance social capital indicators to use for measurement in research. In order to advance social capital indicators, Portes (1998) stated that a unified social capital concept must distinguish among the source of social capital. As a result, Portes (1998) used the contemporary theories to identify four specific sources of social capital, all of which identify it as a resource that comes from other people. These four sources of social capital will be used as indicators, and they are: internalized norms, reciprocity exchanges, bounded solidarity, and enforceable trust. The indicators will be detailed in the following paragraphs and used for data analysis later in the paper.

These four sources of social capital not only come from Bourdieu, Coleman, and Loury's theoretical frameworks, but also are observed in subsequent social capital theories. With regard to the first indicator, internalized norms consist of behaviors that a person considers to be obligatory. Others in the community can then use this obligation as a resource (Portes, 1998). Portes (1998) sites a loan

without fear of nonpayment as an example of internalized norms and their benefits. Therefore, internalized norms can provide a sense of security.

In the second source, social capital comes from the norm of reciprocity. Amassing intangible obligations from others without a schedule of repayment is the foundation of the norm of reciprocity (Portes, 1998). For example, a donor or donors provide access to resources with the expectation that they will be repaid in the future, perhaps at an unspecified time. With regard to the third indicator, bounded solidarity occurs when people are motivated by identifying with others that share the same fate (Portes, 1998). This concept is similar to Marx’s analysis of emergent class consciousness in the industrial proletariat (Portes, 1998). Furthermore, bounded solidarity has spatial limitations and is confined to a community. So those within the community can access this source of social capital, and its presence as a community feature can protect free-riders.

Social Capital Indicators (as per Portes and *Putnam)
Internalized norms
Norm of reciprocity
Bounded solidarity
Enforceable trust
*Civic engagement

Finally, the fourth indicator of social capital is enforceable trust. It is the power of the community that enforces reciprocity and builds trust. As enforceable trust manifests, people’s expectations are embedded in the common social structure (Portes, 1998). This allows donors and recipients to benefit from enforceable trust and social capital by facilitating access to resources on one hand and then giving approval and ensuring against wrongdoing on the other. An example of enforceable trust is if one person extends a favor to another while expecting guaranteed repayment or group approval.

While Portes did not directly include Putnam’s contributions in the four sources of social capital, it is worthwhile to address his methods in this paper since he popularized the concept and it is relevant to the topic. Putnam (1995b) stated that citizen engagement in community affairs is a powerful influence on the performance of government and other social institutions. Because of that, Putnam began his studies on social capital; however, he was ultimately interested in social capital that served civic ends (Putnam, 1995b). So while to Putnam social capital was networks, norms, and trust, it was also manifest in civic engagement. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, citizen engagement in community affairs should be a fifth source, or indicator, to consider.

**Gaps in Social Capital Research: Inequality**

Early social capital theory did not explicitly detail inequality. Recent theorists have increasingly addressed inequality; however, more research needs to be conducted. The more recent theorists to address inequality use social capital definitions that are similar to the founders of contemporary theory. For example, Lin (2000) defines social capital as *investment and use of embedded resources in*

*social relations for expected returns*. He proposed that inequality in social capital contributes to inequality involving socioeconomic achievements and quality of life (Lin, 2000).

According to Lin (2000), two interconnected processes cause social groups to experience inequality in social capital, or differential capital deficits and/or return deficits. A capital deficit is a differential investment or opportunities that cause some groups to receive less than another overall (Lin, 2000). A differential return deficit generates differential returns or outcomes for members of different groups (Lin, 2000). Lin (2000) stated that the first process to cause inequality in social capital is the historical and institutional processes that have led to structural inequalities that provide unequal opportunities (Lin, 2000). Thus, the theoretical evolution of social capital is apparent when considering that Coleman believed that social capital consists of social structures. It follows that if social structures are unequal, then so is social capital.

The second way in which people experience inequality in social capital is through homophily. The principle of homophily suggests that network formation tends to be based on the element of sameness (Lin, 2000). As noted above, Bourdieu was the first to mention that social capital varies based on the size of homogeneous groups. While structural inequalities and homophily limit cross-group ties, the manifestation of ties can facilitate access to better resources and outcomes for the disadvantaged group (Lin, 2000). Evidence of these concepts also exist in the bonding and bridging theoretical aspects of social capital. Bonding social capital exists in homophilous relationships while bridging social capital manifests through connections that cross class, race, ethnicity, and other boundaries of social identity (Kawachi, Subramanian, & Kim, 2008).

One way in which unequal social capital can be observed is through gender. Moody (1983) observed that males not only have larger networks, but also experience additional benefits from engaging in gender homogeneous networks due to their higher positions in the hierarchical structure. Furthermore, men's networks have more connections to financial entities while women's networks have more connections to community entities (Lin, 2000). Like men, females have gender homogeneous networks, but they are disadvantaged because females occupy lower hierarchical positions. Furthermore, female networks tend to be smaller, less diverse, and include more family than men's networks (Lin, 2000).

Inequality in social capital also manifests through race. Mardsen (1988) observed that Whites have the largest networks while people of color have the smallest networks and less gender diversity. However, cohesion was often found among upper or middle class people of color in churches or social or civic clubs (Drake, 1965). In addition, those with a lower socioeconomic status tend to use local ties, strong ties, and family and kin ties, and the homogeneity nature of the ties reinforces poor social capital (Lin, 2000). Overall, more research needs to be conducted to realize the ties within the disadvantaged race and gender groups (Lin, 2000).

Shortly after Lin's research on inequality in social capital, DeFilippis (2001) argued that the Putnam-influenced concept of social capital is problematic because he separated social capital from economics. According to DeFilippis (2001), in order for social capital to have any meaning, it must remain connected to the production and reproduction of capital in society. Furthermore, because this is a capitalist society, social capital must also be premised on the ability of certain people to realize it at the expense of others. DeFilippis therefore demonstrates that not only is the quality of social capital unequal but the allocation also is unequal. Ultimately, DeFilippis argues against Putnam's use of social capital because it removes power from the concept and argues for the return to Loury and Bourdieu's framework in order to empower disadvantaged communities.

### **Health, Well-Being, and Social Capital**

Lin (2000) stated that the concept of social capital is used to understand the mechanisms that affect life chances of individuals and the well-being of communities. In this way, social capital exists at the nexus of urban planning and public health. One way in which individual or community outcomes can be enhanced is through investment and mobilization of capital (Lin, 2000). In general, social capital will enhance the likelihood of instrumental returns (jobs, earnings) and expressive returns (health). Therefore an increase in social capital can improve well-being in a community by increasing instrumental and expressive returns. Furthermore, the predominance of social capital thought in public health has led to two main schools of thought: social cohesion and network theory.

**The social cohesion school of thought.** Kawachi, Subramanian, and Kim (2008) wrote about the increasing prevalence of social capital in public health research and found that there are two schools of thought: the *social cohesion school* of social capital and the *network theory* of social capital. In the social cohesion school, social capital is the resources such as trust, norms, and sanctions that are accessible to social groups such as a residential community or voluntary organization (Kawachi et al., 2008). In this case, social capital is a group attribute that offers contextual influences and protects individuals in the group (Kawachi & Berkman, 2000). As a result, this situation allows for free riders, or individuals whose health may be protected regardless of their participation in the community. However, because people are under the influence of others in the network, health regulation can have both positive and negative effects depending on the behaviors of the influencers.

Research has shown that different levels of social cohesion exist across geographical areas; furthermore, these variations are strongly correlated with the degree of income inequality across the same areas (Kawachi et al., 1997; Putnam, 2000). Multiple researchers have theorized that social cohesion is the mechanism through which income inequality negatively affects population health. When income inequality increases, social cohesion decreases, and population health suffers (Kawachi et al., 1997; Kawachi & Kennedy, 2002). Furthermore, Kawachi and Kennedy (2002) found that states

that have high income inequality and low social cohesion have less provision of public goods, which may also explain the lower levels of health achievement.

**The network theory.** Unlike the social cohesion school, the network theory of social capital concentrates on resources such as social support, information channels, and social credentials that are embedded within individual's social networks (Lin, 1999). Network analysts conceptualize and measure social capital as both an individual attribute and a property of the collective. As a result, people can improve their well-being with material and symbolic resources from multiple domains in life such as work or groups (Kawachi et al., 2008).

In the network theory, the mechanisms involved in the production of health include social influence, social engagement, and the exchange of social support (Kawachi et al., 2008). Network influence can enable positive health behaviors, while social support can enhance well-being through buffering stress (Cohen, Underwood, & Gottlieb, 2000; Kawachi & Berkman, 2001). While the mechanisms included in the network theory work well for measuring individual health benefits from social capital, mechanisms involved in the social cohesion school work well for measuring community level health benefits (Kawachi et al., 2008).

Some theorists debate the role of trust on an individual level in social capital. According to Kawachi et al. (2008), aggregating trust measures to the group level shows that it's a collective property possessed by the group, a resource that facilitates collective action, and therefore, a valid measure of social cohesion. Otherwise, social capital, or social cohesion, can positively affect health through processes such as collective socialization, informal social control, and collective efficacy (Kawachi et al., 2008).

Collective socialization and social control are used by adults in a community to control and regulate the behavior, development, and health of area children. Informal social control is used by residents to achieve order for the public good (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). According to multiple theorists, neighborhood collective efficacy may be used to influence health outcomes not only by informal control over behaviors but also by providing the ability for residents to collectively engage in action that manages physical hazards. For example, collective efficacy can be used to block locations of toxic waste sites (Browning & Cagney, 2002; Kawachi & Berkman, 2000).

### **Public Goods and Health Achievement**

Along with social capital (or social cohesion), public good provision is another mechanism that can affect health outcomes. Anderson, Mellor, and Milyo (2003) write in their first paper that inequality is a determinant of social cohesion. The authors found that inequality undermines the ability of groups to cooperate and therefore affects social cohesion. Anderson, Mellor, and Milyo's (2004) second study builds on the first by suggesting that social capital influences well-being through its effect on public

goods provision. An increase in social capital can increase public good provision and enhance well-being. This is a new area of study that deserves much more research.

As previously stated, social capital generally entails value or benefits gained from relationships or connections. Social capital indicators such as internalized norms, norm of reciprocity, bounded solidarity, enforceable trust, and civic participation can be used to explore and measure the concept. While connections have been made between social capital and health and well-being, the mediating factor of public good provision is a recent suggestion in research. Furthermore, while research exists on participatory budgeting processes elsewhere in the world, it is lacking with regard to the New York City process because it is so new. This paper aims to support existing social capital theory while adding new research relating to public good provision and the first participatory budgeting process in New York City. The following section will detail the research design used to explore social capital, public good provision, and health and well-being within the context of New York's initial participatory budgeting process.

### **Research Design**

Income inequality is one measure of social conditions, and since 1981, it has steadily increased in the United States (Weinberg, 2011). Within the same time period, cities have been struggling with funding, partially due to the decrease of federal support. As a result, cities have had to be creative with regard to the funding of programs and initiatives, and particularly those that involve social welfare. Meanwhile, citizens have demanded more transparency in government, which was remarkably evident during the 2008 general election (Schulman, 2010).

Participatory budgeting is a process that is fairly new to the United States and is currently underway in New York City. Its stated goal is to increase transparency, equality, and inclusion, and since it uses funds already allocated to districts, it could be an efficient way to improve the quality of life in these difficult economic times. The purpose of this research study is to explore the initial participatory budgeting effort in New York City to determine how, through public good provision, it increases social capital and positively affects health and well-being for individuals in communities. The research question being put forth is as follows: How might participatory budgeting and its public good provision affect social capital and therefore health and well-being in the four piloted districts of New York City?

In pursuit of the research objective, this study will utilize the case study method. According to Yin (2009), case studies are the preferred research method when "how" questions are posed, the investigator has little control over events, and the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context. Indeed, this paper seeks to contribute to the urban planning literature by studying the complex social phenomena involved in the first participatory budgeting effort in New York City. It attempts to make connections with social capital theory in an effort to improve health and well-being



through public good provision for individuals in the piloted New York City communities. The study will document and analyze the event as it is happening, and in a manner in which relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated.

Four sites exist for this study, lending itself to a multiple-case study design. The site selections for this case study include New York City Council District 8 (Manhattan/Bronx), New York City Council District 32 (Queens), New York City Council District 39 (Brooklyn), and New York City Council District 45 (Brooklyn). These sites were chosen because they are the only city council districts that agreed to pilot the participatory budgeting process, which began in October 2011 and ended in March 2012. Stakeholders in the process include district residents, budgeting participants, and city council members from the four districts.

In addition, this study will utilize a mixed-mode approach within the multiple-case embedded study framework in order to analyze a variety of evidence. Most will be secondary data from surveys, interviews, and nonparticipant observation conducted at each neighborhood assembly by the research team at Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). In addition, data consisting of the project ideas proposed at the assemblies will be coded and analyzed for the purpose of public good provision. The author assisted PBNYC with data collection, and will be using it with permission from the organization. The demographic data will be compared with baseline data from the United States Census and the civic engagement data will be compared to identical items from the General Social Survey (GSS).

### **Description of Research Tools**

From October through half of November 2011, 27 neighborhood assemblies among the four city council districts took place during the first phase of participatory budgeting. A team of PBNYC researchers, including the author, conducted nonparticipant observation, as well as surveys and interviews with the participants at each assembly. Nonparticipant observation recorded assembly details and evaluation. The neighborhood assembly survey instrument included items regarding an evaluation of the assembly, intention to vote, outreach efforts, civic participation, and demographic data. The survey was administered to all participants and had an overall response rate of 76 percent. Finally, the interview instrument included questions regarding motivation for attendance, information learned, and further evaluation of the assembly as well as participatory budgeting in general. This will be used as secondary data in an effort to explain who is participating and why. Relevant items from the survey will be used in an effort to explore the concept of social capital.

In addition, the purpose of the neighborhood assemblies was to explain the participatory budgeting process and then have citizens brainstorm project ideas. The citizens spent the majority of each assembly working in groups to identify project ideas that met the requirements for the participatory budgeting process--capital expenditures under 1 million dollars. While in many cases

multiple ideas were proposed during the brainstorming sessions, each group of citizens voted on their three favorite ideas and explained them to the entire assembly. However, the district committee and city council office noted and saved all project ideas. These ideas were held by the respective city council offices, and then shared with PBNYC. The project ideas are used in this paper with permission to code and then analyze public good provision across the districts.

This study will compare the PBNYC survey data to baseline district-level data for demographic analysis and national sample data for the social capital items. Baseline data will consist of demographic data from the United States Census for the participating city council districts. This data is collected on the Census tract level and aggregated for each district. The civic participation items on the PBNYC surveys are from the General Social Survey (GSS), so the national GSS data will be used as a baseline for those items. It is not possible to disaggregate GSS data to the city or district level; however, it is available for regions and cities of a certain size. This paper will use regional city GSS data to provide a comparison and fuller description of the statistics that result from the research.

In conclusion, demographic data from the 27 neighborhood assemblies will provide a clear indication of who is participating from each district, and this data will be compared with demographic data from the district level to determine the level of representative population, as well as other shared characteristics. Civic engagement items from surveys will be used to explore the concept of social capital within the four participating city council districts. Those data will be compared with their GSS counterparts at the regional level. This exploration will be judged successful if the data show who is participating in this process and why, as well as an idea of the level of social capital in each of the four communities.

### **Limitations**

Numerous limitations exist for this study. All survey data from the neighborhood assembly participants are self-reported, so they cannot be independently verified. Because the data comes from PBNYC, many people were involved with the survey construction, and the author was not able to capture the concept of social capital as well as desired. In the future, social capital items should be developed using the analysis from this paper. In addition, this study would benefit from a longitudinal approach so the differences in social capital of participating population can be measured. Interviews with neighborhood assembly participants are few because they were structured to be conducted after the assemblies, when spaces were closing and people were trying to get home. In the future, interviews should be conducted independently of the assemblies. In addition, nonparticipant observation possibly carries with it the risk of bias on behalf of the observer. Furthermore, data from nonparticipants is not included. The topic of this study would be advanced by an understanding of the nonparticipant population, and a comparison between that population and the participants. Time is a significant limitation in that further exploration would have been more possible with more time.

### **Neighborhood Assembly Data Analysis**

This section will present survey, nonparticipant observation, and project idea data from the neighborhood assemblies in order to address social capital and public good provision in the participatory budgeting process. It will begin with aggregated data from all participating districts, then present district-level data to show differences across the districts. The district-level data will compare the demographic data from neighborhood assembly surveys with 2010 Census data to analyze who attended the assemblies from each district. Furthermore, it will explore social capital issues through the indicators from the literature review, and use General Social Survey (GSS) items from the surveys while comparing them with regional city GSS data. Finally it will explore the resources that participants requested at each meeting in each district to gain a sense of public good provision. This will be followed by a section discussing trends from the data.

#### **Citywide**

The initial New York City participatory budgeting effort included 27 neighborhood assemblies across the four participating city council districts during October and half of November, 2011 (See Table 1). Leaders from Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC) and the district committees held assemblies at community and civic centers, churches, organizations, and schools. Neighborhood assemblies were held during the week as well as weekends and at various times of the day and night. Child care, translation services, and food were made available at some of the meetings depending on the expected attendance. Furthermore, special assemblies were offered for senior and youth populations in some areas.

During the six-week period, District 45 (Williams, Brooklyn) held the most assemblies, while District 8 (Mark-Viverito, Manhattan and Bronx) held seven, and both District 39 (Lander, Brooklyn) and District 32 (Ulrich, Queens) each held five. Through observation, researchers from PBNYC recorded the amount of participants at the assemblies and corroborated the counts with other researchers and sign-in sheets when available. While conducting the least amount of assemblies, District 39 had the most observed participants, as their assemblies tended to be larger. District 8 had the second most assemblies and participants, while District 45 had the most assemblies and third most participants. Finally, District 32 had the least amount of assemblies and participants. Strikingly, the same percent of the population participated in the process for three out of four districts. Only District 32 had a higher percent of population that participated, and in that district the city council member chose a segment of the population to participate.

**Table 3: Number of Neighborhood Assemblies and Participants by District**

District	Total Number of Neighborhood Assemblies	Total Number of Observed Participants	Percent of District Population that Participated
8 (Mark-Viverito, Manhattan and Bronx)	7	375	0.2%
32 (Ulrich, Queens)	5	124	0.4%
39 (Lander, Brooklyn)	5	440	0.2%
45 (Williams, Brooklyn)	10	324	0.2%
TOTAL	27	1,263	--

*Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC)*

Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC) conducted surveys at each neighborhood assembly. Surveys were available in English, Bengali, and Spanish, which were determined in advance by the districts to be the most popular languages. Out of the observed 1,263 total participants, 963 completed surveys, which provides a response rate of 76 percent. The survey response rate varied across assemblies, potentially due to the method used in administering the survey. However, the process became smoother over the course of the six weeks.

Across the four districts, most people heard about the assemblies through general word of mouth, or from people they knew, schools, community groups, and council members (Appendix I). At the neighborhood assemblies, the vast majority of participants appeared engaged and excited about the process. Overall, respondents stated that they planned on returning to the process by voting for the final proposals in March. District 8 was the least likely to plan on voting for the final proposals. There, almost 87 percent of respondents intended to vote while in the other districts 95-99 percent intended to vote (Appendix K).

**Population characteristics.** Gender and language similarities were evident across the four districts. Over 60 percent of the respondents were female (Appendix B). Language was also similar, as the majority of respondents felt most comfortable using English. The second most preferred language was Spanish, and about 5 percent were most comfortable with a language other than English, Spanish, Bengali, Haitian Creole, Polish, or Yiddish, which were languages indicated in the survey (Appendix D).

More diversity existed in racial composition when considering the city as a whole. Most respondents were White or Black or African American, with half as many respondents identifying as Hispanic. Even smaller percentages of participants were Asian, American Indian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander or another race or ethnicity not indicated in the survey (Appendix C). While the race

and ethnicity of respondents were more evenly distributed across the four districts, spatial segregation is reflected in the district-level data.

Neighborhood assembly participants also tended to be more educated and have higher incomes in general. Over three-quarters of respondents had achieved a level of education beyond high school. Achievement is uneven in the district-level data but still remains high throughout (Appendix E). As with education, income was spread more evenly overall with notable differences appearing in the district-level data. While District 8 had the highest percentage in the lowest income bracket, the others featured more representation in higher income brackets (Appendix F). Household size had similar patterns across the four districts, as all districts featured a majority of households between 1 and 4 persons (Appendix G).

Overall, respondents tended to be older in age and long-term residents of their districts. At least 60 percent of respondents were at least 45 years old (Appendix H). However, differences emerge in the district breakdowns as some districts had younger participants. Participants also tended to have neighborhood longevity, as the majority of respondents across the districts had lived there for at least 8 years. Furthermore, the highest percentage of attendants living in the neighborhood for more than 15 years (Appendix J).


**Social capital indicators.** The social capital indicators are predominantly assessed by items from the General Social Survey (GSS) that were on the neighborhood assembly surveys. Three of the five social capital indicators are considered in this section: internalized norms, norm of reciprocity, and bounded solidarity. Given the limitations of the research, the fourth, enforceable trust, is not measured but is discussed in the following section. Furthermore, the fifth indicator, civic participation, is not measured in this section because the participatory budgeting process itself is civic participation. However, this is also considered in the following Discussion section.

First, the internalized norm social capital indicator is assessed by the GSS item asking if the person ever worked in the community to try to solve community problems. In response, neighborhood assembly participants in each district indicated they were more likely to have ever worked in the community to try to solve community problems compared to other residents of regional cities (Appendix O).

Next, the norm of reciprocity social capital indicator is assessed by the GSS item asking if the person ever contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express their views. In response, neighborhood assembly participants across the districts indicated that most have done it in the past year, while the next most popular response was that they have not done it but might do it, or they have done it in the more distant past (Appendix N). Neighborhood assembly participants contacted politicians or civil servants at double or triple the rate of residents in regional cities (Appendix P).

The final social capital indicator assessed in this section is bounded solidarity. The concept of bounded solidarity is assessed through the neighborhood assembly survey item asking how long the person has lived in the neighborhood. Across all districts, the majority of respondents have lived in their neighborhoods for at least eight years. The highest percent in each district reflected people who have lived in their neighborhoods for more than 15 years (Appendix J).

**Map 1: New York City Council Districts Using Participatory Budgeting**



*Map created by author using ArcGIS and data from the New York City Council*

**District 8 (Mark-Viverito, Manhattan)**

New York City Council District 8 consists of East Harlem and Manhattan Valley in Manhattan, and parts of Mott Haven in the Bronx. Democrat Melissa Mark-Viverito has been the city council member for the district since 2006 (The New York City Council, n.d.c.). District 8 is one of the largest participating districts with a population of 174,027 (Appendix A).

**Population characteristics.** Out of all the areas, District 8 had the highest proportion of female respondents (68%) and a higher female population in general (Appendix A, B). Hispanic and Black or African-American persons were the majority of respondents (nearly 41% and 37% respectively), while White, Asian, and American Indian were the minority. While the percentage of Hispanic respondents mirrors the actual composition of the district, the other race and ethnic groups contrast with the actual composition of the district. District 8 comprises a much higher percentage of White population than was reflected in the neighborhood assembly turnout. Furthermore, the proportion of Black or African American neighborhood assembly participants is 10 percent higher than the actual percentage of the district (Appendix A, C). As with other districts, survey respondents felt most comfortable with English; however, this district had the lowest percentage of those with an English preference. Almost 12 percent felt most comfortable with Spanish, and 10 percent most comfortable with a language other than one offered on the survey (Appendix D).

When compared to the other areas, the participants in District 8 have achieved lower levels of education, with over 40 percent reaching some high school or high school diploma as the highest level. The remaining population is spread evenly across levels of college and graduate work. This differs from the education levels reflected in Census data for the entire district, in which residents have achieved higher levels of education. However, since analysis was conducted at the Census tract level, it was apparent that higher education was concentrated in certain areas of the district (Appendix A, E).

As with education, District 8 showed the highest percentage of neighborhood assembly participants in the lowest income bracket (less than \$10,000). Remaining respondents were spread fairly evenly across the \$10,000 to \$74,999 range before dropping off. In general, District 8 has a lower income population when compared to the other districts, but the low-income population was represented in a higher proportion at the neighborhood assemblies than what actually exists (Appendix A, F). District 8 also had the highest proportion of single households out of the four districts, with over a quarter of respondents living in a single household. A household size of 2 persons was the next most commonly reported size, with 3 and 4 rounding out the rest of the majority. District 8 was also most likely to have a larger household size on the other end as compared to the other three districts (Appendix G).

In District 8, more younger people and fewer older people participated in the neighborhood assemblies compared to the population of the entire district and the population of the neighborhood assemblies overall. There, over a quarter of respondents were 19 or younger, which is remarkably different from the other districts. In addition, District 8 had the smallest proportion of people at least 55 years of age as participants. Both age patterns contrast with the entire district population. Census data shows that District 8 has the second highest population of those 65 and older compared to the

other districts. However, District 8 also has the lowest percentage of those 19 and under, showing a high involvement of young people in the participatory budgeting process (Appendix A, H).

Much like the rest of the districts, three-quarters of respondents lived in District 8 for at least 8 years, with the remainder spread evenly under 8 years. However, District 8 also featured the highest proportion of respondents that lived in their neighborhood for less than a year (Appendix J). In District 8, most assembly participants heard about the meetings from a community group, word of mouth, or their Council Member Melissa Mark-Viverito (either newsletter or in person). This suggests the possible effort on behalf of community organizations and that certain networks were activated (Appendix I).

**Social capital indicators.** With regard to the internalized norm social capital indicator, 64 percent of District 8 neighborhood assembly attendees stated that they have worked with others in that community to try to solve some community problems (Appendix O). Compared to the other districts, it was the second lowest percent; however, it is still more than double the percent of residents in regional cities that work with others to solve community problems (Appendix P).

Next, with regard to the norm of reciprocity social capital indicator, District 8 had the fewest respondents (44%) across the city indicate that they contacted a politician or civil servant to express their views within the past year. Furthermore, District 8 also had the highest percentage of people indicate that they have not done it and would never do it. However, the amount of District 8 participants that have contacted a politician within the past year was still nearly double the percent of residents in regional cities that have contacted a politician or civil servant in the past year (Appendix P). When considering the other responses, residents in District 8 are in all cases more politically active than those in regional cities. At least 20 percent of neighborhood assembly attendees indicated they have done it in the more distant past and 28 percent indicated they have not done it but they might do it (Appendix N).

Finally, with regard to the bounded solidarity social capital indicator, three-quarters of respondents lived in District 8 for at least 8 years, with the remainder spread evenly under 8 years. While this is mostly comparable to the other districts, District 8 also featured the highest proportion of respondents in New York City that lived in their neighborhood for less than a year (Appendix J).

**Resource requests (project ideas).** In total there were 580 ideas from the neighborhood assemblies in District 8. The largest percent (13.3%) of project ideas were in the form of park improvements. These included renovations of, or additions to, existing park or garden spaces. Multiple people requested improvements to community gardens, as well as the addition of BBQ areas and equipment or sports related improvements to specific parks. The second most popular project idea category was school improvements. Residents of District 8 wanted many different things for schools such as air conditioning, elevators, playgrounds and equipment, computers, and rooftop gardens. The third most popular idea was for an improvement to a NYCHA building. This category was created for



this study because there were so many requests, and at the same time, this was the only district to feature this category. Many people wanted repairs to roofs, elevators, and the grounds of specific buildings.

District 8 also stands out from the other districts because of their emphasis on community programs and services. The fourth most requested category in this district was a new center or program. Here, outside of soup kitchens, this usually manifested in programmatic requests such as GED programs, sex education, inmate transition, and language or law services. Finally, the fifth most requested item was security cameras. While NYCHA residents often requested security cameras, the item was coded independently because security cameras were also desired elsewhere. District residents wanted them in garbage dumping areas, subways, bus shelters, and on various streets.

It is worth noting that the remainder of the top ten project idea categories all involved existing community services or new ones for seniors or youth, except for the request for more street and outdoor lights. Another unique event in District 8 was that people who worked at certain nonprofits attended the meetings to advocate for additional funding for their established organization, which is also evident in the project ideas (Appendix Q).

**Table 4: Five Most Popular Project Idea Categories by District**

District 8	District 32	District 39	District 45
Park Improvements	Park Improvements	School Improvements	New Center or Program
School Improvements	Street Repair and Repaving	Additional Green Space	Street and Outdoor Lights
NYCHA Improvements	School Improvements	Park Improvements	Security Cameras
New Center or Program	Sewer or Drainage	Beautification	School Improvements
Security Cameras	Flood Prevention	Sidewalk and Pedestrian	Traffic Signs or Lights

*Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC)*

**District 32 (Ulrich, Queens)**

District 32 consists of the Queens neighborhoods of Belle Harbor, Breezy Point, Broad Channel, Hamilton Beach, Howard Beach, Rockaway Park, South Ozone Park, South Richmond Hill, and Woodhaven (The New York City Council, n.d.d.). District 32’s experience with participatory budgeting is unique because Council Member Eric Ulrich is the only republican involved. Also, not all areas of the district are participating in this process. Only the Rockaways and Broad Channel are utilizing the participatory budgeting process (PBNYC, n.d.c.). The population of the portion of the District 32 that is participating is 30,641 (Appendix A). Even though only a segment of the district is participating, for the purposes of discussion it will be referred to as District 32 in this paper.

**Population characteristics.** District 32 had the lowest proportion of female respondents (60.4%) compared to the other participating districts, but it is still a larger proportion of females than what is reflected in the entire district (Appendix A, B). The majority of survey respondents were White (89%), while the remainder were Hispanic, Black, or American Indian. The participants reflect a whiter population than what actually exists in this segment of the district. Census data reveals that nearly three-quarters of District 32 is White and one-fifth is Black or African American. However, only 5 percent of survey respondents identified as Black or African American. In addition, only 5 percent of respondents were Hispanic, which is a third of the district's actual Hispanic composition (Appendix A, C). With regard to language, the majority of participants felt most comfortable with English and 2 percent preferred a language other than one offered on the survey (Appendix D).

In District 32, over 80 percent of participants had at least some college experience. In the Census data for the actual district, over half of the residents have the same level of education, showing a more educated turnout at the assemblies (Appendix A, E). The majority of respondents claimed an income of \$50,000 or more, with lower percentages from \$15,000 to \$49,999 and nothing below. As with education and race, there is a difference between who attended the neighborhood assemblies and the district as a whole. While over half of District 32 claims an income of over \$50,000, nearly three-quarters of neighborhood assembly participants claim the same income (Appendix A, F). In District 32, almost half of the respondents lived in a household of two, with four being the next most reported size. Household size of 1 and 3 made up the remainder of the majority (Appendix G).

District 32 had the oldest respondents with almost 60 percent being at least 55 years of age, and very few young people. Only 1 percent of the neighborhood assembly participants were age 14 or under. Along with having the largest proportion of respondents aged 65 and over, the population aged 55 to 64 was double or nearly double the amount of other districts. This contrasts with actual district demographics. While the difference is slight, District 32 actually comprises more young people aged 19 and under than District 8 above. Furthermore, the proportion of the population aged 55 and over is actually half than the population that participated in the assemblies (Appendix A, H).

Similar to the other areas, neighborhood longevity was prevalent. In District 32, 82 percent of respondents lived in the neighborhood for at least 8 years, while the majority of the remainder was from 4 to 7 years (Appendix J). While the most popular method of outreach differed from District 8, they shared other methods in common. In District 32, most people heard about the assemblies from word of mouth, a community group, or a newspaper article (Appendix I). The predominance of the word of mouth method suggests that certain networks were activated.

**Social capital indicators.** With regard to the internalized norm social capital indicator, District 32 featured the highest percentage of respondents out of all districts that have worked with others in the community to try to solve some community problems (Appendix O). Nearly 80 percent of

residents have ever worked with others in their own community, which is up to a 17 percent difference from other New York City districts, and much higher than regional city levels.

Next, with regard to the norm of reciprocity social capital indicator, in District 32 just over half of the respondents said they they have contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express their views in the past year. When compared to the other districts, District 32 has the second highest percentage of residents who have contacted a politician or civil servant in the past year. The remainder of the district is still politically engaged as nearly 20 percent have done it in the more distant past and a quarter stated they have not done it but might do it (Appendix N).

Finally, to address the bounded solidarity social capital indicator, in District 32, 82 percent of respondents lived in their neighborhood for at least eight years, while the majority of the remainder was from four to seven years. Compared to the rest of the city, District 32 featured the highest percentage of respondents that lived in their neighborhood for at least eight years (Appendix J).

**Resource requests (project ideas).** District 32 offered a total of 232 ideas for projects, which was the lowest number of project ideas overall but also the smallest population using participatory budgeting. Parks improvements were the most suggested category, as many people requested maintenance or renovation for beach areas. People mostly wanted adjustments made to the boardwalk or boat house, and additions of showers and dog areas. The second most requested category was street repair and repaving. These ideas also included the addition of guard rails and medians. The third most requested category was school improvements, which came in the form of roof repairs, and technological and library upgrades.

Sewer or drainage issues made up the fourth most popular category of ideas that was proposed. Residents requested storm drains, adjustments to the sewer line, and pumps for water drainage. Closely related to sewer and drainage issues, flood prevention items were the fifth most requested group of ideas in the district. Flood prevention ideas included seawall repair, tidal flood valves, and “flood prevention” in general. Given District 32’s location on the water, the requests for flood prevention are not surprising. Furthermore, at least one neighborhood assembly was conducted after an area meeting addressing flood prevention (Appendix Q).

### **District 39 (Lander, Brooklyn)**

District 39 comprises the Brooklyn neighborhoods of Cobble Hill, Carroll Gardens, Columbia Waterfront, Gowanus, Park Slope, Windsor Terrace, Kensington, and Boro Park. Democrat Brad Lander has been in the City Council since 2010 (The New York City Council, n.d.e.). District 39 is the largest district participating with a population of 195,171 (Appendix A).

**Population characteristics.** District 39 had the second highest proportion of female participants (64.7%), which like the other districts is more than the amount of females actually in the district (Appendix A, B). Like District 32, the majority of District 39 respondents were White (78%);

however, unlike District 32 the participants were only slightly more White than the composition of the entire district. Also, unlike District 32, while the percentage of Black or African American participants in District 39 is small (3.4%), it is more comparable to the actual percentage of Black or African American persons living in the entire district (5.9%). In addition, the percentage of Hispanic population in both Districts 32 and 39 are nearly identical and is the participating percentage. Furthermore, District 39 features the largest percentage of Asian population compared to the rest of the districts. While almost 17 percent of the district identifies as Asian, only 6.4 percent participated in the process (Appendix A, C). Again, the majority of participants felt most comfortable with English, with almost 2 percent preferring Bengali/Bangala, and a few percent preferring a language not offered in the survey.

District 39 is the most educated district, both in participants and in its entirety. While 60 percent of the entire district has at least some college education, over 90 percent of the neighborhood assembly participants have at least some college education. Over half of the respondents have a graduate degree alone (Appendix A, E). Not surprisingly, the income of respondents in District 39 is the highest, but just slightly more than than District 32. Over three-quarters of the respondents claim an income of \$50,000 or more, while 56 percent of the district claims an income of \$75,000 or more (Appendix F). In District 39, respondents most often lived in a household with one other person, reflecting many couples or roommates. A total household size of 3 and 4 made up over 40 percent of respondents, possibly reflecting families when considered with the age data. Single households rounded out the rest of the majority, and compared to the other districts it was tied for second (with 45) for the highest amount of single household respondents (Appendix G).

District 39 was distinct with the amount of middle-aged adults that participated in the neighborhood assemblies. Nearly 70 percent of respondents in District 39 were between ages 35 and 64. The next most reported age groups were those on either end--between 25 and 34 and then those aged 65 and over. This is somewhat reflective of who lives in District 39 as Census data shows more people between 25 and 44 in the community compared to the other districts (Appendix H).

In District 39, 68 percent of respondents lived in their neighborhoods for at least 8 years, with a large proportion of the remainder having lived in their neighborhoods for 4 to 7 years. So while longevity was a factor as in the other districts, it was slightly less so (Appendix J). In District 39 most people heard about the assemblies from their council member's newsletter, the internet, or word of mouth, suggesting that District 39 participants are engaged in the political process (Appendix I).

**Social capital indicators.** Again, the internalized norm social capital indicator is assessed by residents who have worked with others in the community to try to solve community problems. Compared to the rest of the city, District 39 had the lowest percentage (62%) of people that have worked with others in the community to solve some community problems (Appendix O). However, it is

still more than double the percentage of residents in other regional cities that have done the same (Appendix P).

Next, the norm of reciprocity social capital indicator is again assessed by the attempt to contact a politician or civil servant. The District 39 neighborhood assembly participants were most likely to have contacted or have attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express their views in the past year. The remainder either have done it in the more distant past or have not done it but might do it. This district had the smallest percentage claim they have not done it and would never do it (Appendix N).

Lastly, the bounded solidarity social capital indicator is assessed by neighborhood longevity. In District 39, 68 percent of respondents lived in their neighborhoods for at least 8 years, with a large proportion of the remainder having lived in their neighborhoods for 4 to 7 years. So while longevity was a factor as in the other districts, it was slightly less so when compared to the others (Appendix J).

**Resource requests (project ideas).** District 39 submitted 883 project ideas. Not only did they have the most meeting participants out of any district, but they also had a website through which people could submit ideas. The most requested idea category was school improvements. Residents requested many items for schools such as solar panels, physical education resources, extensions, air conditioning, and upgrades to technology and libraries. The second most requested category was additional green space, and this category only appears in the top five (or ten) for District 39. Additional green space represents the creation of a new green space such as community gardens and dog parks or runs, as opposed to modifications to existing space. The third most requested category was park improvements, which mostly involved either improvements for children's playgrounds or additions to Prospect Park such as bathrooms, fitness equipment or bocce courts.

Beautification was the fourth most proposed idea category, and only appeared in the top five categories for District 39. This category included items such as flower beds or planters, street trees, and other streetscaping. It also includes any maintenance to existing trees and streetscaping and few requests for maintenance. The fifth most proposed idea was included within the sidewalk and pedestrian category. Many residents requested repairs to specific segments of sidewalks, as well as the addition of new features such as pedestrian plazas, crossings, or bridges (Appendix Q).

### **District 45 (Williams, Brooklyn)**

District 45 consists of the Brooklyn neighborhoods of Flatbush, East Flatbush, Flatlands, and parts of Midwood and Canarsie. Democrat Jumaane Williams has represented the district since 2009 (The New York City Council, n.d.f.). District 45 is the third largest of the areas participating and has a population of 151,400 (Appendix A).

**Population characteristics.** District 45 had the second lowest proportion of female respondents (60.5%), which was still higher than the district as a whole (Appendix A, B). According to

Census data, District 45 is predominantly Black or African American. Three-quarters of the entire district population is Black or African American, and a higher proportion of the population participated in the neighborhood assemblies (82%). While the White, Hispanic, and Asian populations are not sizable in the district, even smaller proportions participated in the assemblies (Appendix A, C). As with the other districts, the majority of people felt most comfortable with English, with about 1 percent preferring Haitian Creole and 5 percent preferring a language other than one on the survey (Appendix D).

District 45 follows District 8 with regard to education and contains the second largest population with the lowest educational achievement levels. However, at the same time, participants in the neighborhood assemblies have achieved higher levels of education than the district. Over three-quarters of the participants have at least some college compared to just over half of the district at large (Appendix A, E). In District 45, over half of respondents have an income of at least \$50,000, while the remainder is spread fairly evenly. While it is the district with the second lowest income, the neighborhood assembly participants have a higher income than the district as a whole (Appendix A, F). As with all districts aside from District 8, the highest percentage of respondents lived in a household of two, while four-person and single person households were the next most reported sizes. (Appendix G).

In District 45, nearly 80 percent of respondents were at least 35 years old, but featured the second highest proportion of younger people (yet it was still half as much as District 8's youth turnout). The incorporation of a local college most likely contributed to the higher amount of young adult participants compared to other districts (Appendix A, H). Longevity again was key because in District 45, nearly 80 percent of respondents lived in the neighborhood for at least 8 years (Appendix J). In District 45, most people heard about the assemblies from word of mouth, their council member's newsletter, or a community group (Appendix I). This suggests that certain networks were activated and that many were politically engaged.

**Social capital indicators.** As in the other districts, the internalized norm social capital indicator is assessed by residents who have worked with others in the community to try to solve community problems. When compared to the rest of the city, District 45 had the second highest percentage of population (72%) to have worked with others in the community to try to solve some community problems (Appendix O).

Next the norm of reciprocity social capital indicator is assessed by the attempt to contact a politician or civil servant. Nearly half of the respondents in District 45 indicated that they contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express their views within the past year. Compared to the rest of the city, District 45 features the third highest percent of participants who have contacted

within the past year. About one-third of respondents stated they have not done it but might do it and 20 percent said they have done it in the more distant past (Appendix N).

Lastly, the bounded solidarity social capital indicator is assessed by neighborhood longevity. Much like the other districts, longevity was significant because in District 45, nearly 80 percent of respondents lived in the neighborhood for at least 8 years (Appendix J). Compared to the rest of the city, District 45 featured the second highest percentage of participants that lived in their neighborhood for at least eight years.

**Resource requests (project ideas).** District 45 submitted 272 ideas, and is the only district in which fewer ideas were collected than the number of participants. The most popular category of ideas in this district was a new center or program. Many residents wanted multicultural community centers, or new programs involving music, single mothers, immigrant services, and HIV/AIDS education. Closely behind new centers or programs in second place is the street/outdoor lights category. Many residents wanted additional street lights throughout the neighborhood or for specific parks and high schools. The third most proposed idea was security cameras. Residents wanted security cameras installed throughout the neighborhood and at parks and schools.

The fourth most proposed idea in District 45 was school improvements. Along with technological or library improvements, many residents requested school busses, improvements for the football field and tracks, musical equipment and obesity prevention programs. Finally, traffic signs and lights were the fifth most requested category. Residents requested stop signs, traffic lights in general, and turning lights for specific intersections (Appendix Q).

### Discussion

As previously stated in the background, the participatory budgeting movement began in Porto Alegre with the goal to advance democratic participation and facilitate equity in spending and resource allocation. In New York City, the participatory budgeting goals were stated as transparency, equality, and inclusion. Arnstein (1969) wrote in the "Ladder of Participation" that citizen participation is citizen power. She stated that *it is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future* (p. 216). Arnstein (1969) continued by stating that the way in which the have-nots join in to determine how information is shared, goals and policies are set, and tax resources are allocated, for example, determines the means by which they can induce significant social reform and share in the benefits of the affluent society.

While the purpose of participatory budgeting is to have citizens decide how to allocate tax resources, because the entire process has not finished yet it is unclear whether the target institutions will be completely responsive to citizens' views, aspirations, and needs in the end. In the initial New York City effort, citizens generate the project ideas, but then they are held by each city council

member’s office and citizens during the process are not necessarily aware of their peers ideas. While citizens work with the project ideas during the budget delegate phase, it is unknown if or how ideas get filtered by the council member’s office before the budget delegates work with them. This is mentioned primary because of the disparity in District 45 between the number of participants and project ideas. There were many more ideas than participants, possibly suggesting some were filtered (or many citizens did not suggest ideas). Furthermore, in the project idea coding process it was evident that some districts labeled each idea as eligible or not eligible and the method for doing so did not appear to be standard across districts.

In order for participatory budgeting to empower citizens, the leaders (city council members and district committees) must have transparent motives and their actions must be fueled by the desire to empower citizens. As importantly, those in power must be responsive and follow through the process by enacting whichever measures are fairly voted in by the citizens. Otherwise this process might be at risk for being a *consultation* or *placation* form of participation according to Arnstein (1969). Additionally, city agencies are involved in the process because the resources ultimately are going through them. Much of the success will depend on their ability to provide good service and innovative solutions. Reports published during this study suggest some agencies were much less helpful than others.

However, it is also important to consider who participated in the process to determine if they are representative of the community, as well as if they are the *have nots* as considered in Arnstein’s (1969) article. Interestingly, aside from District 32, the same percentage of population from each district participated in the neighborhood assemblies (see Table 3 above). As previously noted, District 32 was unique for having only a portion of their population participate in the process. Furthermore, all districts had two and nearly three population characteristics in common: education, neighborhood longevity, and income, indicating less diversity overall.

**Table 5: Education and Income Differences between Participants (PB) and District Whole**

	District 8		District 32		District 39		District 45	
	PB	Whole	PB	Whole	PB	Whole	PB	Whole
<b>At least some college</b>	56.5%	50.1%	81%	56.7%	90%	59.8%	77%	52%
<b>Income 50,000+</b>	24.5%	38.9%	73.8%	56.7%	77.3%	56.4%	52%	50.9%

Source: *Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC)*



### Notable Trends

All of the participating districts had two and nearly three population characteristics in common. The first was education. In each district, neighborhood assembly participants were more educated than the respective district as a whole. The second shared characteristic is neighborhood longevity. In each district, the majority of participants lived in the neighborhood for at least eight years, and many for over fifteen. The third nearly similar characteristic is income. Participants' income was higher in every district aside from District 8.

Even though the districts shared education, neighborhood longevity and (nearly) income characteristics, each district had its own story. When compared to the entirety of District 8, neighborhood assembly participants from this district were as Hispanic, more Black, less White, more female, less educated, and younger. It was the only district in which neighborhood assembly participants had a lower income than the district as a whole. However, even though participants in District 8 were younger and had less income than their neighbors who didn't participate, they were still more educated.

Perhaps some of the differences in District 8 can be attributed to the larger amount of younger participants and the many participants living in NYCHA buildings, as indicated by the number of project ideas regarding NYCHA repairs and people who identified as NYCHA residents at the assemblies. This was not necessarily surprising considering that District 8 has one of the largest amounts of NYCHA housing in the city and that NYCHA is experiencing funding cuts and a massive backlog of capital projects (Rhea, 2011). While not completely representative of the district, this is the one district in which the *have nots* are represented in the participatory budgeting process.

District 32 was different from the other areas because only a portion of the Queens district participated, as designated by the city council member. It was also the only district that, compared to the others, had a higher proportion of the (selected area of the) district participate. This aspect is certainly deserving of further study because it is possible that the city council member specifically chose areas that would be more inclined to participate. Regardless, the neighborhood assembly population in District 32 was more educated and had a higher income compared to the rest of the district. Furthermore, it was whiter, less Black and Hispanic, more female, and older than the district as a whole. The neighborhood assembly participants were not quite representative of the remainder of the district, and they did not consist of the *have nots*.

District 39 in Brooklyn featured the most educated participants with the highest incomes out of any district that participated. It had roughly the same proportion of White and Black participants as the district as a whole. However, neighborhood assembly participants were less Hispanic and Asian, more female and older than the rest of the district. The District 39 participants were not entirely representative, but perhaps more closely than District 32. The *have nots* were not represented.

District 45 featured the third highest level of education for neighborhood assembly participants, which was 25 percent higher than the district as a whole. It also had the third highest income, which was only 2 percent more than the rest of the district. While District 45 included some of the local college population, it does not seem to be enough to describe the dramatic difference between the high level of education achieved and the lower household income (See Table 5 above). Perhaps this is reflective of structural inequalities since the neighborhood assembly participants were more Black, less White and Hispanic, more female, and older than the rest of the district. The *have nots* may have more representation here than the much Whiter and wealthier districts 32 and 39, but it is not representative of have nots at the same level as District 8. District 45 showed much more of a middle class representation.

In order to better understand why certain populations were over or underrepresented, further study regarding the outreach methods used to recruit participants for the neighborhood assemblies should be conducted. The accessible survey data shows that in District 8, which had more representation of low-income citizens, most people heard about the meetings through a community group. This shows that local organizations are active in the area and effective in mobilizing participants. It could also show that social networks exist within NYCHA buildings that were effectively activated and mobilized, since many NYCHA residents participated.

Community groups are also evident in the project ideas as District 8 was the only district to receive project ideas based on the needs of specific local nonprofit organizations. Furthermore, it seems that the amount of NYCHA involvement is potentially partially due to where they held the meetings. At least two meetings were held in subsidized or public housing. Others in District 8 heard about the neighborhood assemblies through word of mouth, further suggesting the activation of social networks. The third most common method in the district was the council member newsletter, which suggests an already established level of civic participation among the participants.

**Table 6: Most Common Outreach Methods by District**

District 8	District 32	District 39	District 45
Community group	Word of mouth	Council member newsletter	Word of mouth
Word of mouth	Community group	Internet/online	Council member newsletter
Council member newsletter	Newspaper article	Word of mouth	Community group

*Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC)*

In District 32, the most common outreach method stated by participants was word of mouth, again suggesting social network activation. The second most common method there was community groups, which might be connected to the Knights of Columbus and VFW assembly locations. District 32 was the only one to show newspaper articles in the most common methods, which might suggest another form of engagement that was already established.

In District 39, the council member newsletter was most responsible for getting people to the meetings, which shows an audience with an already established level of civic engagement. This district was the only one to show the internet as one of the most common methods, which also suggests a level of engagement, and perhaps a more high-tech version than District 32's use of newspapers. Word of mouth also was prevalent in District 39, again showing social network activation.

In District 45, word of mouth was also most responsible for motivating people to attend assemblies, again suggesting a network presence. Most meetings were held at churches and there was a significant presence of church leaders during the process, suggesting that word of mouth was at least partially within church communities. Again the council member newsletter was a popular method showing that these participants are already civically engaged. Finally, while community group was the third most common method, it shows that there may be fewer community groups there or they did not participate or were not able to mobilize as effectively as others.

**Table 7: Location of Neighborhood Assemblies by District**

District 8	District 32	District 39	District 45
Community Center (2)	School (2)	School (3)	Church (5)
Community Center Public Housing	Community Center	Church	School (3)
Community Room in Subsidized Housing	Knights of Columbus	Child Care Center	Civic Center
Food Pantry	VFW Post		Community Center
Youth Hostel			
Senior Center			

*Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC)*

**Social Capital Indicators**

In the previous section, it was noted that various social networks were activated to mobilize participation in the neighborhood assemblies. This section will detail the sources, or indicators, of social capital that cause the transmission of the good through networks. As stated earlier in the paper,

Portes (1998) used theories from Bourdieu, Coleman, and Loury to devise four main sources of social capital: internalized norms, reciprocity exchanges, bounded solidarity, and enforceable trust. This paper predominantly uses the General Social Survey (GSS) items on the neighborhood assembly survey to explore how the participatory budgeting process affects social capital. This is important because social capital is linked to health and well-being through public good provision. If participatory budgeting can increase social capital through public good provision, it can increase health and well-being in each community.

**Internalized norms.** As Portes (1998) states, internalized norms are behaviors that use obligation as a resource for the community. The GSS item on the neighborhood assembly survey asking if people ever worked with others in their community to try to solve community problems can be used to explore internalized norms and social capital. This assumes that people must feel some sort of obligation to work with others for something that may be intangible. GSS data cannot be disaggregated to New York City alone, but can be shown at the level of regions and cities of a certain size.

Regional GSS data shows that in New England and Middle Atlantic cities over a population size of 250,000, only 25-29 percent of people have worked with others in the community to try to solve some community problems (Appendix P). At least double the amount of New York City neighborhood assembly participants have done the same (See Table 8 below). This suggests that neighborhood assembly participants already have higher levels of social capital since they have established internalized norms at a much higher rate than other regional city dwellers. Further research should be conducted to determine if social capital continues to increase during the participatory budgeting process over time, and to see if subsequent rounds of participatory budgeting feature the same participants and levels of social capital.

**Table 8: Working with Others (Internalized Norms) by District**

Question: Have you ever worked with others in this community to try to solve some community problems?				
	District 8	District 32	District 39	District 45
YES	64.3%	78.6%	61.6%	71.7%
NO	35.7%	21.4%	38.4%	28.3%

*Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC)*

**Norm of reciprocity.** A reciprocity exchange, or the norm of reciprocity, is amassing intangible obligations from others without a schedule of repayment (Portes, 1998). This could potentially be seen in the GSS item asking if the participant has ever contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil

servant to express their views. Neighborhood assembly participants have contacted or considered contacting at a higher rate than the population in local regional cities (Appendix P). This is another way in which we can see that participants have a higher level of social capital since they engage with politicians or civil servants at a higher rate than other regional city dwellers.

However, even though all New York City participants engaged at a higher level than regional cities, differences were evident among the districts. Over 71 percent of participants in District 39 contacted politicians or civil servants in the last year compared to 44 percent in District 8, 48 percent in District 45, and 52 percent on District 32 (Appendix N). While this might show that districts 39 and 32 have higher levels of social capital than Districts 8 and 45, it also suggests other differences that need further exploration<sup>1</sup>.

**Bounded solidarity.** The third source of social capital, bounded solidarity, manifests when people are motivated by identifying with others that share the same fate (Portes, 1998). This is an aspect that is confined to a community, and is therefore a good indicator for the participatory budgeting process since both the indicator and process are about a community with physical boundaries. The neighborhood longevity survey question might get at this concept. One of the only unifying characteristics across districts was that the majority of participants had lived in the neighborhood for at least eight years. Perhaps being around each other for that amount of time led to shared identification, which then led to bounded solidarity and social capital.

According to Portes (1998), one of the advantages of bounded solidarity is that it protects free riders. So that if social capital is manifest through bounded solidarity in a community, it can positively affect others who are not participating. This is particularly helpful with health, well-being, and public good provision. It is unknown exactly to what extent nonparticipants feel the positive effects, however. Though it can be argued that in the case of participatory budgeting, everyone in the community can benefit from the projects that are voted in whether or not they were a part of it.

**Enforceable trust.** Finally, enforceable trust is the fourth source of social capital. It is the power of the community that enforces reciprocity and builds trust (Portes, 1998). While this is not indicated in the survey, this is a concept that can be captured by the city agencies and city council leaders following through with the process and providing the resources that each district elects. During this process in which the leaders and citizens work together, it is essential that the leaders follow through on their end. If they do it will build trust and increase health and well being through increasing social capital and resources.

**Civic engagement.** In addition, even though Putnam's social capital concept was measured by networks, norms, and trust, it was manifest in civic engagement. Using Putnam's framework,

---

<sup>1</sup> Age might be one of multiple factors in District 8. There were many teenage participants that might not be calling their local politicians quite yet. However, this might also suggest inequality in social capital.

participatory budgeting most certainly provides social capital. The process itself is civic engagement, as citizens collaborate to propose and vote on ideas. Participatory budgeting could also increase social capital if residents are shown to participate in ways they have not yet, or if they attract new people to the process.

### **Inequality in Social Capital and Public Good Provision**

While it appears that residents entered the participatory budgeting process with a certain level of social capital, and that the process itself can increase social capital, inequality in social capital exists. The inequality in social capital is evident in the homophilous population of neighborhood assembly participants. In each district, it appears that networks were activated but they were largely networks of sameness, or homogeneity. Perhaps in this way they reflect structural inequalities, as potentially seen in the education and income differences between Districts 8/45 and Districts 32/39.

As previously stated in this paper, while structural inequalities and homophily limit cross-group ties, the manifestation of ties can facilitate access to better resources and outcomes for the disadvantaged group (Lin, 2000). In order for participatory budgeting to mitigate inequality in social capital it will have to increase heterogeneity in the participant population. This includes not only race and ethnicity, but also gender, as females predominantly participated and are considered to have different levels of social capital than men.

Social capital is increased through public good provision, and the inequality in social capital is evident in the disparate proposed project ideas from the neighborhood assemblies. While school improvements were an issue across all districts, and park improvements were an issue in three districts, differences were apparent in the remaining categories. In the district with the lowest-income participants (8), NYCHA repairs (mostly lighting and roofs), new centers or programs, and security cameras were the most popular ideas. District 45 shared the desire for new centers or programs, street and outdoor lights, security cameras, and traffic signs or lights. This shows that the basic public good and service needs are not being met in districts 8 and 45. Lights especially are a basic good to which everyone should have access. The need for lights combined with security cameras suggests that residents in these districts are seeking a sense of security as well.

Aside from park and school improvements, District 32's top requests were street repair, sewer or drainage, and flood prevention. District 39's were additional green space (mostly community gardens and dog runs), public space beautification, and sidewalk and pedestrian needs. Neither District 32 nor District 39 requested street and outdoor lights at all. Sewer repair and flood prevention make sense for District 32 because of their location, and does not necessarily suggest inequalities. Furthermore, the city has established waterfront programs that are working to address their needs (The New York City Department of City Planning, 2012). So while they might have problems with flooding due to their location, at least the city acknowledges them. District 39 wanted more places to

garden and take their dogs, as well as more flowers and sidewalk repairs. Without questioning the legitimacy of their requests, it appears these two districts have more of their basic needs met and can afford to request other projects or amenities as opposed to basic public goods.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

In 2011, four New York City council districts piloted a participatory budgeting process in which residents collaborated to identify projects and allocate a portion of their discretionary funding. This process historically aimed to increase democratic participation and equity in spending and resource allocation when it began in Porto Alegre. Similarly, the New York City participatory budgeting effort identified their goals as transparency, equity, and inclusion. As a result, this paper explored how participatory budgeting could affect social capital through public good provision and positively affect health and well-being in the four piloted New York City communities.

The findings from this study were numerous. First, this study shows that the participatory budgeting process can increase social capital through public good provision as well as the following social capital indicators: internalized norms, norm of reciprocity, bounded solidarity, and civic engagement. The participatory budgeting process fosters each of those sources of social capital devised by Portes and Putnam. In addition, participatory budgeting can continue to increase social capital through enforced trust if the politicians and city agencies follow through with the winning project ideas. As detailed in the literature review, since participatory budgeting can increase social capital, it can also positively affect health and well-being.

Second, even though social capital can positively affect health and well-being, only a small percentage of each community participated in the neighborhood assemblies. Therefore, it is unclear how much participatory budgeting affects the health and well-being of the community when such a small number of each community participated. Research established that a free rider effect is manifest through bounded solidarity, and that neighborhood assemblies can increase bounded solidarity and social capital through participatory budgeting. So that ultimately, district populations will benefit regardless of their own participation, but to what level is uncertain. This is also complicated by inequality in social capital since the benefits might not have the same impact. Further research needs to be conducted to determine the level of protection offered to free riders.

Third, in general, people who participated in the neighborhood assemblies already had a higher level of social capital. This study shows that certain social networks were activated for the neighborhood assembly turnout. Furthermore, the survey data showed that participants already had achieved a level of social capital through internalized norms, norm of reciprocity, and bounded solidarity. Neighborhood assembly participants were much more active in their communities, more politically engaged, and had lived in their neighborhoods for a long time.

Fourth, inequality in social capital is evident when considering the public goods the residents are requesting. In other words, structural inequities lead to inequity in social capital, which leads to inequity in public good provision. As shown in the data, participants in each district were more educated, as well as politically and civically involved, indicating a higher level of social capital. However, some districts were experiencing difficulties in achieving their basic public good needs. This was illustrated by districts 8 and 45, which were predominantly African American, and needed roof repairs, lighting, and security cameras.

In addition, participatory budgeting may not increase the amount of public good provision, but it increases social capital through public good provision and participation in the allocation of the goods. The budget used for the process was already in existence, and previously each council member decided how to spend the discretionary funds. Furthermore, the amount allocated for participatory budgeting is not even the entire amount of discretionary funding for each district. So residents are not receiving more goods, but they are helping to determine which goods they receive. Therefore, this does not adequately address inequality, particularly if the *haves* are the majority of participants.

A major implication for urban planning is that participatory budgeting affects how public goods and amenities are distributed. Ultimately even if districts experience an increase in social capital and quality of life, the process may not address equity issues. If participatory budgeting continues with the same patterns from this year it risks maintaining inequality, or even worsening inequality by giving more power to the powerful.

The goals of participatory budgeting are noble, but as Fainstein (2005) states, just having everyone's opinion be respectfully heard and no group privileged is important but not enough. Fainstein (2005) stated that she believes, along with Davidoff and Krumholz, that social inclusion should be the principal goal, instead of participatory or deliberative democracy. Inclusion provides access to the benefits of the city, and while it was one of the stated goals of Participatory Budgeting in New York City, the socially excluded and vulnerable were mostly not a part of the participatory budgeting process.

While participatory budgeting can increase social capital through public good provision, we must pay attention to what should be done in the context in which planning operates (Fainstein, 2005). New York City suffers from pervasive inequities in public good provision, and participatory budgeting as well as social capital are not enough if we examine planning's outcomes and compare them to a view of the just city. If we are to be a just city we need to engender and implement an equitable view to which others can connect. What makes a better city is not just an improvement of quality of life but equity.

That said, participatory budgeting experienced its pilot process with four city council districts, and might expand to many more districts next year. In response, the following are recommendations



that aim to improve the process with regard to the process's overall goals of transparency, equality, and inclusion.

### **Additional Research**

The participatory budgeting process generated many additional questions and opportunities for research. One further area of study should be the outreach methods used to engage people in the process, so it can be determined how to make the process more inclusionary in the future. This research should also include nonparticipants, as that has not yet been a focus of research. Another area of study should be the process of public good provision in New York City: how money is allocated to city council districts and how city agencies decide to allocate goods. This research should be conducted in an effort to make the process more equitable. An additional area of study should be the approved projects in an effort to determine how needed or desired they are by the rest of the community and not just the participants. Finally, this process should continue to be studied to determine if it is becoming more inclusionary and if there are positive effects from the process.

### **Areas for Strengthening Participatory Budgeting Institutions**

**Increase transparency in the participatory budgeting process.** In order to strengthen the citizens' trust, the participatory budgeting process should be more transparent. Since there are multiple neighborhood assemblies over a number of weeks, project ideas should be made available to the public during the process (by website and/or city council office for example). This way people can see what is being discussed at assemblies and track the ideas if they wish. Transparency can also be increased in the city council funding activities in general. It is not clear how much each city council member receives across the city and how it is allocated. Transparency may increase trust if people can see that their ideas are being accounted for and making it through the process, as well as where their tax dollars are going in the city. It is important to strengthen trust so that social capital and well-being improve, and people will be more willing to participate in the future.

**Create a permanent point person or committee within the districts that follows the participatory budgeting process all year.** Currently, nongovernmental organizations are working with city council offices to organize and facilitate the participatory budgeting process. The effort stops with the final vote. However, the winning project ideas will take some time to manifest depending on the project and the agencies or other resources involved. A point person or committee dedicated to the participatory budgeting process and projects could assist in the advancement of the project(s) and keep the public updated. The status information could keep the public engaged, increase trust in the process, and hold the officials accountable. Furthermore, the point person or committee can be regarded as delegated power.

**Make social inclusion a goal and address issues of representation at neighborhood assemblies.** Further research must be conducted into outreach methods for participatory budgeting, as it is out of the scope of this paper. However, it was clear from the data presented that disadvantaged communities were not well-represented in this process overall. The participants of every district were more educated than each district as a whole. Only one district had adequate representation of the have nots. It has been observed, however, that “word of mouth” was either the most or one of the most cited methods of outreach. This suggests that certain networks may have been activated but a full analysis of outreach methods should be conducted. Furthermore, research into why people did not attend outside of outreach methods should be conducted. Social inclusion must be a goal so that everyone has access to the benefits of the city. Without it, the system will remain unequal and participatory budgeting will not be an improvement upon our current system.

**Tap into attitudes about government to increase participation.** If participatory budgeting advocates wanted to bring more people into the process, they should tap into the unhappiness many people feel about government. The majority of people attending the neighborhood assemblies thought that the system of democracy in America needs to be completely changed or needs a lot of changes, according to survey data. Furthermore, fewer participants than others in regional cities trusted the government in Washington to do what is right. Perhaps lack of trust is motivating people to participate and can be used to recruit others for participatory budgeting efforts.

**Keep the project ideas not funded this year.** Thousands of ideas were presented at the neighborhood assemblies. Very few move forward because each district gets to spend just over a million dollars. These ideas should not be discarded, and perhaps a database can be created so they can be stored. People can even try to make ideas available to other local organizations in an effort to achieve them.

**Be concerned with outcomes, and not only with process in participatory budgeting.** Neighborhood assemblies should be about more than identifying specific projects to fund. This is an opportunity to engage citizens in ideas for what their city should be in the end. If we talk about vision, we can have something to connect policies to. Discussing vision can also promote solidarity, which will further increase social capital. Furthermore, people should discuss what outcomes they want to see so that deep causes of those outcomes can be identified and addressed. For example, as an outsider it appears there is an issue with safety in districts 8 and 45 since security cameras and lights were among the most requested items. However, if the assemblies also address this issue (safety) and not just this resource (security cameras), perhaps it could be more comprehensively addressed.

### **Areas for Strengthening City Institutions**

**Dedicate staff in city agencies to participatory budgeting.** The project ideas that manifest during the participatory budgeting process involve capital projects for goods within the communities. These projects are related to city agencies such as Parks and Recreation, Department of Transportation, and New York City Housing Authority. In the current participatory budgeting process, budget delegates have about two months to work with the hundreds of ideas and make them into projects with costs so that the community can vote. People working on the project proposals need costs and important information quickly. Therefore, workers at city agencies should be designated to the process in order to provide good quality service to the citizens. And if this process will continue, perhaps further adjustments will need to be made in order to foster a collaborative effort with regard to public good provision.

**Consider instituting a participatory budgeting process within New York City Housing Authority buildings.** District 8 had a large number of project ideas regarding New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) buildings. While they were certainly eligible for the District 8 capital funding, NYCHA should consider instituting this process within all its housing. Community housing in Toronto has successfully used participatory budgeting and could potentially be regarded as a model in this context (Lerner & Laudon, 2010). While NYCHA has experienced funding cuts, this could prioritize issues that residents find critical and better manage scarce funds within the agency. Clearly people are interested in their housing and are engaged, so this could provide a forum and solidarity with their neighbors. Furthermore, this could open up funding for areas within the district that are outside of NYCHA grounds so that improvement can be seen in multiple ways.

**Reconsider the process and outcome of public good provision in New York City.** Complete information regarding resource allocation in New York City was not available and is out of the scope of this paper. However, the system of resource allocation and the power structure involved must be further studied. For example, basic public goods such as street lights are considerably more requested in predominantly Black and Hispanic, lower-income communities. This suggests that these neighborhoods have fewer street lights since citizens were requesting installation of lights and not replacement bulbs. Furthermore, while these neighborhoods are requesting street lights, other Whiter and higher-income neighborhoods are requesting items such as solar-powered garbage receptacles to replace their existing garbage receptacles.

The city should seriously consider the existing inequity in resource allocation. Participatory budgeting does not increase equity if the wealthy are benefiting in the same amount, since they already started the process on an uneven level. Perhaps the city should consider investing more heavily in the areas that need at the very least, basic public goods such as street lights. As Norm Krumholz stated, equity requires that locally responsible government institutions give priority

attention to the goal of promoting a wider range of choices for those who have few if any choices (Krumholz & Forester, 1990).

**The city should make a commitment to equity.** City leaders in government should make a comprehensive commitment to equity that is manifest in all plans and policies. Equity is not even listed as a goal in the current city vision PlaNYC 2030, which is a plan to enhance the quality of life for all New Yorkers (The City of New York, 2012). Ultimately, certain communities in New York City rely on the mediation of the government to attain a decent quality of life. Thus, equity should be stated and practiced goal in government. Not only would it shape policies but could be used to politically mobilize people.

The data from this paper suggests that public goods are not allocated on an equitable basis. In addition, the drastic income inequality experienced in the city decreases social cohesion and causes health to suffer. Kawachi and Kennedy (2002) stated that less provision of public goods occurs with high income inequality and low social cohesion, which may be evident in this case. For a just city, Fainstein (2001) recommends to have more of an enabling state, more controlled growth, greater role for nonprofit sector, and that more benevolent social policy can accompany economic development.

## References

- Anderson, L.R., Mellor, J.M., Milyo, J. (2003). Inequality, group cohesion, and public good provision. Working paper. College of William and Mary.
- Anderson, L.R., Mellor, J.M., Milyo, J. (2004). Social capital and contributions in a public-goods experiment. *The American Economic Review*, 94(2), 373-376.
- Arnstein, S. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. *AIP Journal*. 216-224.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J.E. Richardson (ed.), *Handbook of theory of research for the sociology of education* (241-258). New York: Greenwood Press.
- Browning, C.R. & Cagney, K.A. (2002). Collective efficacy and health: neighborhood social capital and self-related physical functioning in an urban setting. *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 43, 383-399.
- Cabannes, Y. (2004). Participatory budgeting: a significant contribution to participatory democracy. *Environment & Urbanization*, 16(1), 27-46.
- Chavez, D. & Braathen, E. (2006). Participatory budgeting in Canada. *Progressive Cities*. Transnational Institute. [http://www.tni.org/archives/newpol-docs\\_pbcanada](http://www.tni.org/archives/newpol-docs_pbcanada)
- The City of New York. (2012). PlaNYC: the plan. Retrieved March 2012: <http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/html/theplan/the-plan.shtml>
- Cohen, S., Underwood, L.G., & Gottlieb, B.H. (2000). *Social support measurement and intervention: A guide for health and social scientists*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coleman, J. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 94, 95-121.
- DeFilippis, J. (2001). The myth of social capital in community development. *Housing Policy Debate*, 12 (4). 781-806.
- Department for Communities and Local Government. (2011). Communities in the driving seat: a study of participatory budgeting in England. 1-151.
- De Sousa Santos, B. (1998). Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre: toward a redistributive democracy. *Politics & Society*, 26(4), 461-510.
- Drake, St. Clair. (1965). The social and economic status of the negro in the United States. *Daedalus*, 94, 771-814.
- Fainstein, S.S. (2001). Competitiveness, cohesion, and governance: their implications for social justice. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 25(4), 884-888.
- Fainstein, S.S. (2005). Planning theory and the city. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 25, 121-130.

- Kawachi, I., Kennedy, B.P., Lochner, K. & Prothrow-Stith, D. (1997). Social capital, income inequality, and mortality. *American Journal of Public Health*, 87, 1491-1498.
- Kawachi, I. & Berkman, L.F. (2000). Social cohesion, social capital, and health. In L.F. Berkman & I. Kawachi (Eds.), *Social epidemiology* (174-190). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kawachi, I., & Berkman, L. F. (2001). Social ties and mental health. *Journal of Urban Health*, 78(3), 458–467.
- Kawachi, I. & Kennedy, B.P. (2002). *The health of nations*. New York: The New Press.
- Kawachi, I., Subramanian, S.V., & Kim, D. (2008). Social capital and health: a decade of progress and beyond. In I. Kawachi, S.V. Subramanian, & D. Kim (Eds.), *Social capital and health* (1-26). New York: Springer.
- Kivelson, A. (2001). *What makes New York City run? A citizen's guide to how city government works*. New York, NY: The League of Women Voters of the City of New York Education Fund.
- Krumholz, N. & Forester, J. (1990). *Making equity planning work: Leadership in the public sector*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Lerner, J. & Laudon, J.M. (2010). Participatory budgeting at Toronto community housing: 2010 evaluation report. 1-49.
- Lin, N. (1999). Building a network theory of social capital. *Connections*, 22(1), 28-51.
- Lin, N. (2000). Inequality in social capital. *Contemporary Sociology*, 29(6), 785-795.
- Loury, G. (1977). A dynamic theory of racial income differences. In P.A. Wallace & A.M. La Mond (Eds.), *Women, Minorities, and Employment Discrimination* (153-86). Lexington, MA: Heath.
- Marsden, P.V. (1988). Homogeneity in confiding relations. *Social Networks*, 10, 57-76.
- Moody, C.D., Sr. (1983). On becoming a superintendent: contest or sponsored mobility? *Journal of Negro Education*, 52(4), 383-97.
- The New York City Council. (n.d.a). *About the City Council*. Retrieved October 2011. Retrieved from <http://council.nyc.gov/html/about/about.shtml>
- The New York City Council. (n.d.b). *About the City Council: budget process and calendar*. Retrieved from <http://council.nyc.gov/html/about/budget.shtml>
- The New York City Council. (n.d.c.). Melissa Mark-Viverito: District 8, Council Member, Democrat. Retrieved from <http://council.nyc.gov/d8/html/members/home.shtml>
- The New York City Council. (n.d.d.). Eric Ulrich: District 32, Council Member, Republican. Retrieved from <http://council.nyc.gov/d32/html/members/home.shtml>

- The New York City Council. (n.d.e) Brad Lander: District 39, Council Member, Democrat. Retrieved from <http://council.nyc.gov/d39/html/members/home.shtml>
- The New York City Council. (n.d.f.). Jumaane D. Williams: District 45, Council Member, Democrat. Retrieved from <http://council.nyc.gov/d45/html/members/home.shtml>
- The New York City Department of City Planning. (2012). The waterfront revitalization program. Retrieved from <http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/wrp/wrp.shtml>
- Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). (n.d.a). *City budget 101: a guide to the NYC budget*. Retrieved from <http://pbnyc.org/sites/default/files/NYC%20Budget%20101%209.30.11.pdf>
- Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). (n.d.b). *About the New York City process*. Retrieved from <http://pbnyc.org/content/about-new-york-city-process>
- Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). (n.d.c.) Updates from District 32 in Queens. Retrieved from <http://pbnyc.org/d32>
- The Participatory Budgeting Project. (2011). *History of participatory budgeting*. Retrieved from <http://www.participatorybudgeting.org/>
- Portes, A. (1998). Social capital: its origins and applications in modern sociology. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 1-24.
- Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. *Journal of Democracy*, 6(1), 65-78.
- Putnam, R. (1995b). Tuning in, tuning out: the strange disappearance of social capital in America. *Political Science and Politics*. 28(4). 664-683.
- Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Rhea, J. "Poverty and Urban Policy." Columbia University School of International Public Affairs. Lecture. New York City. 11 October 2011.
- Sampson, R., Raudenbush, S.W., & Earls, F. (1997). Neighborhoods and violent crime: a multilevel study of collective efficacy. *Science*. 277. 918-924.
- Schulman, R. (2010). Government transparency and the Obama era. *Legislation and Policy Brief*. 2(1). Retrieved from <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/lpb/vol2/iss1/2>
- Shah, A. (ed.). (2007). *Participatory budgeting: public sector governance and accountability series*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Wampler, B. (2000). A guide to participatory budgeting. The International Budget Project. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
- Ward 49, City of Chicago. (2011). *Participatory budgeting*. Retrieved from <http://www.ward49.com/participatory-budgeting/>

Weinberg, D. (2011). U.S. neighborhood income inequality in the 2005-2009 period. *American Community Survey Reports*. 1-21.

Yin, R. (2009). *Case study research: design and methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Inc.



**Appendix A**

**2010 Demographic Data by City Council District**

	<b>2010 Demographic Data by City Council District</b>			
	<b>District 8</b>	<b>District 32</b>	<b>District 39</b>	<b>District 45</b>
<b>POPULATION</b>				
<b>Total</b>	174,027	30,641	195,171	151,400
<b>Female</b>	54.1%	53.2%	51.0%	54.7%
<b>Male</b>	45.9%	46.8%	48.9%	45.3%
<b>AGE</b>				
<b>14 and under</b>	16.2%	17.3%	22.5%	19.5%
<b>15-19</b>	6.4%	6.6%	5.6%	7.4%
<b>20-24</b>	8.5%	5.3%	6.3%	7.4%
<b>25-34</b>	17.3%	10.9%	19.6%	13.9%
<b>35-44</b>	13.5%	12.9%	15.4%	12.9%
<b>45-54</b>	13.1%	16.2%	11.5%	14.3%
<b>55-64</b>	10.9%	14.4%	9.5%	12.4%
<b>65 and older</b>	14.1%	16.4%	9.6%	12.2%
<b>RACE + ETHNICITY</b>				
<b>White</b>	44.2%	72.0%	72.7%	19.1%
<b>Black or African American</b>	27.7%	20.3%	5.9%	74.1%
<b>American Indian</b>	1.8%	0.9%	0.9%	0.7%
<b>Asian</b>	11.8%	3.2%	16.5%	4.5%
<b>Native Hawaiian</b>	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%
<b>Some other race</b>	19.6%	6.2%	74.1%	3.9%
<b>Hispanic or Latino (of any race)</b>	41.0%	15.0%	15.1%	7.8%
<b>EDUCATION*</b>				
<b>Some high school</b>	15.8%	9.5%	8.4%	9.7%
<b>High school diploma or GED</b>	20.8%	29.9%	21.9%	32.2%
<b>Associate or Vocational degree</b>	5.1%	4.5%	4.7%	8.9%
<b>Some college</b>	12.7%	19.9%	12.5%	19.5%
<b>Bachelor's degree</b>	17.2%	19.8%	24.6%	15.6%
<b>Graduate degree</b>	15.1%	12.5%	18.0%	8.0%
<b>INCOME*</b>				
<b>Less than \$10,000</b>	18.0%	8.0%	7.6%	8.9%
<b>\$10,000-\$14,999</b>	9.3%	4.9%	5.9%	4.9%
<b>\$15,000-\$24,999</b>	12.8%	8.1%	9.8%	10.6%
<b>\$25,000-\$34,999</b>	9.0%	9.5%	8.4%	11.1%
<b>\$35,000-\$49,999</b>	11.9%	12.8%	12.0%	13.7%
<b>\$50,000-\$74,999</b>	13.1%	16.5%	15.1%	18.8%
<b>\$75,000-\$99,999</b>	8.3%	14.5%	11.6%	12.2%
<b>\$100,000-\$149,000</b>	8.1%	16.2%	14.7%	12.9%
<b>\$150,000 or more</b>	9.4%	9.5%	15.0%	7.0%

*Source: 2010 Census, except for Education and Income which is from ACS 5 year estimates because the 2010 Census was not released at time of publication. All are Census tract level calculations, performed by author.*

**Appendix B**

**Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Gender by District**

		Question: What is your gender?			
		Other	Female	Male	
<b>District 8</b>	Count	3	169	77	
	% within Council member district	1.2%	67.9%	30.9%	
	% within What is your gender?	75.0%	30.6%	24.9%	
	% of Total	0.3%	19.5%	8.9%	
<b>District 32</b>	Count	0	64	42	
	% within Council member district	0.0%	60.4%	39.6%	
	% within What is your gender?	0.0%	11.6%	13.6%	
	% of Total	0.0%	7.4%	4.9%	
<b>District 39</b>	Count	0	163	89	
	% within Council member district	0.0%	64.7%	35.3%	
	% within What is your gender?	0.0%	29.5%	28.8%	
	% of Total	0.0%	18.8%	10.3%	
<b>District 45</b>	Count	1	156	101	
	% within Council member district	0.4%	60.5%	39.1%	
	% within What is your gender?	25.0%	28.3%	32.7%	
	% of Total	0.1%	18.0%	11.7%	
<b>TOTAL</b>	Count	4	552	309	
	% within Council member district	0.5%	63.8%	35.7%	
	% within What is your gender?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	0.5%	63.8%	35.7%	
<b>Cases</b>					
		<b>Valid</b>		<b>Missing</b>	
		<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>
		865	89.8%	98	10.2%
<b>Total</b>					
				<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>
				963	100.0%

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.

### Appendix C

#### Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Race and/or Ethnicity by District

		Question: How would you identify your race and/or ethnicity? Mark all that apply						
		American Indian or Alaska Native	Asian	Black or African American	Hispanic or Latino	Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	White	Other
<b>District 8</b>	Count	8	8	100	111	0	33	12
	% within Council member district	2.9%	2.9%	36.8%	40.8%	0.0%	12.1%	4.4%
	% within How would you identify your race and/or ethnicity? (mark all that apply)	66.7%	28.6%	30.3%	78.2%	0	9.5%	27.9%
	% of Total	66.7%	28.6%	30.3%	78.2%	0	9.5%	27.9%
<b>District 32</b>	Count	1	0	5	5	0	92	1
	% within Council member district	1.0%	0.0%	4.8%	4.8%	0.0%	88.5%	1.0%
	% within How would you identify your race and/or ethnicity? (mark all that apply)	8.3%	0	1.5%	3.5%	0	26.4%	2.3%
	% of Total	8.3%	0	1.5%	3.5%	0	26.4%	2.3%
<b>District 39</b>	Count	2	17	9	15	2	206	14
	% within Council member district	0.8%	6.4%	3.4%	5.7%	0.8%	77.7%	5.3%
	% within How would you identify your race and/or ethnicity? (mark all that apply)	16.7%	60.7%	2.7%	10.6%	100.0%	59.0%	32.6%
	% of Total	16.7%	60.7%	2.7%	10.6%	100.0%	59.0%	32.6%
<b>District 45</b>	Count	1	3	216	11	0	18	16
	% within Council member district	0.4%	1.1%	81.5%	4.2%	0.0%	6.8%	6.0%
	% within How would you identify your race and/or ethnicity? (mark all that apply)	8.3%	10.7%	65.5%	7.7%	0	5.2%	37.2%
	% of Total	8.3%	10.7%	65.5%	7.7%	0	5.2%	37.2%
<b>TOTAL</b>	Count	12	28	330	142	2	349	43
	% within Council member district	1.3%	3.1%	36.4%	15.7%	0.2%	38.5%	4.7%

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.

**Appendix D**

**Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Language by District**

		<b>Question: What language do you feel most comfortable using?</b>						
		<b>Bengali/ Bangala</b>	<b>English</b>	<b>Haitian Creole</b>	<b>Polish</b>	<b>Spanish</b>	<b>Yiddish</b>	<b>Other</b>
<b>District 8</b>	Count	0	193	0	0	29	0	24
	% within Council member district	0.0%	78.5%	0.0%	0.0%	11.8%	0.0%	9.8%
	% within What language do you feel most comfortable using?	0.0%	24.7%	0.0%	0.0%	93.5%	0.0%	60.0%
	% of Total	0.0%	22.4%	0.0%	0.0%	3.4%	0.0%	2.8%
<b>District 32</b>	Count	0	101	0	0	0	0	2
	% within Council member district	0.0%	98.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%
	% within What language do you feel most comfortable using?	0.0%	12.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.0%
	% of Total	0.0%	11.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
<b>District 39</b>	Count	4	240	0	1	1	1	2
	% within Council member district	1.6%	96.4%	0.0%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.8%
	% within What language do you feel most comfortable using?	100.0%	30.7%	0.0%	100.0%	3.2%	100.0%	5.0%
	% of Total	0.5%	27.9%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%
<b>District 45</b>	Count	0	247	3	0	1	0	12
	% within Council member district	0.0%	93.9%	1.1%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	4.6%
	% within What language do you feel most comfortable using?	0.0%	31.6%	100.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	30.0%
	% of Total	0.0%	28.7%	0.3%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	1.4%
<b>TOTAL</b>	Count	4	781	3	1	31	1	40
	% within Council member district	0.5%	90.7%	0.3%	0.1%	3.6%	0.1%	4.6%
	% within What language do you feel most comfortable using?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	0.5%	90.7%	0.3%	0.1%	3.6%	0.1%	4.6%
		0	193	0	0	29	0	24
<b>Cases</b>								
		<b>Valid</b>		<b>Missing</b>		<b>Total</b>		
		<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	
		861	89.4%	102	10.6%	963	100.0%	

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.

## Appendix E

### Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Education by District

		Question: What is the highest level of education you have?					
		Some high school	High school diploma or GED	Associate/Vocational degree	Some college	Bachelors degree	Graduate degree
<b>District 8</b>	Count	63	41	17	37	42	39
	% within Council member district	26.4%	17.2%	7.1%	15.5%	17.6%	16.3%
	% within What is the highest level of education you have?	62.4%	40.2%	35.4%	27.4%	19.3%	14.4%
	% of Total	7.2%	4.7%	1.9%	4.2%	4.8%	4.5%
<b>District 32</b>	Count	1	19	10	22	26	27
	% within Council member district	1.0%	18.1%	9.5%	21.0%	24.8%	25.7%
	% within What is the highest level of education you have?	1.0%	18.6%	20.8%	16.3%	11.9%	10.0%
	% of Total	0.1%	2.2%	1.1%	2.5%	3.0%	3.1%
<b>District 39</b>	Count	5	13	5	18	86	139
	% within Council member district	1.9%	4.9%	1.9%	6.8%	32.3%	52.3%
	% within What is the highest level of education you have?	5.0%	12.7%	10.4%	13.3%	39.4%	51.3%
	% of Total	0.6%	1.5%	0.6%	2.1%	9.8%	15.9%
<b>District 45</b>	Count	32	29	16	58	64	66
	% within Council member district	12.1%	10.9%	6.0%	21.9%	24.2%	24.9%
	% within What is the highest level of education you have?	31.7%	28.4%	33.3%	43.0%	29.4%	24.4%
	% of Total	3.7%	3.3%	1.8%	6.6%	7.3%	7.5%
<b>TOTAL</b>	Count	101	102	48	135	218	271
	% within Council member district	11.5%	11.7%	5.5%	15.4%	24.9%	31.0%
	% of Total	11.5%	11.7%	5.5%	15.4%	24.9%	31.0%
<b>Cases</b>							
		<b>Valid</b>		<b>Missing</b>		<b>Total</b>	
		<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>
		875	90.9%	88	9.1%	963	100.0%

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.

**Appendix F**

**Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Household Income by District**

		<b>Question: What is the estimated yearly income of your household?</b>								
		<b>Less than \$10,000</b>	<b>\$10,000 to \$14,999</b>	<b>\$15,000 to \$24,999</b>	<b>\$25,000 to \$34,999</b>	<b>\$35,000 to \$49,999</b>	<b>\$50,000 to \$74,999</b>	<b>\$75,000 to \$99,999</b>	<b>\$100,000 to 149,999</b>	<b>\$150,000 or more</b>
<b>District 8</b>	Count	45	28	25	25	25	23	14	6	5
	% within Council member district	23.0%	14.3%	12.8%	12.8%	12.8%	11.7%	7.1%	3.1%	2.6%
	% within What is the estimated yearly income of your household?	61.6%	68.3%	44.6%	38.5%	27.5%	17.3%	17.1%	5.3%	7.0%
	% of Total	6.2%	3.9%	3.4%	3.4%	3.4%	3.2%	1.9%	0.8%	0.7%
<b>District 32</b>	Count	0	0	11	2	9	17	12	19	14
	% within Council member district	0.0%	0.0%	13.1%	2.4%	10.7%	20.2%	14.3%	22.6%	16.7%
	% within What is the estimated yearly income of your household?	0.0%	0.0%	19.6%	3.1%	9.9%	12.8%	14.6%	16.7%	19.7%
	% of Total	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	0.3%	1.2%	2.3%	1.7%	2.6%	1.9%
<b>District 39</b>	Count	5	4	9	12	22	47	31	59	40
	% within Council member district	2.2%	1.7%	3.9%	5.2%	9.6%	20.5%	13.5%	25.8%	17.5%
	% within What is the estimated yearly income of your household?	6.8%	9.8%	16.1%	18.5%	24.2%	35.3%	37.8%	51.8%	56.3%
	% of Total	0.7%	0.6%	1.2%	1.7%	3.0%	6.5%	4.3%	8.1%	5.5%
<b>District 45</b>	Count	23	9	11	26	35	46	25	30	12
	% within Council member district	10.6%	4.1%	5.1%	12.0%	16.1%	21.2%	11.5%	13.8%	5.5%
	% within What is the estimated yearly income of your household?	31.5%	22.0%	19.6%	40.0%	38.5%	34.6%	30.5%	26.3%	16.9%
	% of Total	3.2%	1.2%	1.5%	3.6%	4.8%	6.3%	3.4%	4.1%	1.7%
<b>TOTAL</b>	Count	73	41	56	65	91	133	82	114	71
	% within Council member district	10.1%	5.6%	7.7%	9.0%	12.5%	18.3%	11.3%	15.7%	9.8%
	% within What is the estimated yearly income of your household?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	10.1%	5.6%	7.7%	9.0%	12.5%	18.3%	11.3%	15.7%	9.8%
<b>Cases</b>										
		<b>Valid</b>		<b>Missing</b>		<b>Total</b>				
		<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>			
		726	75.4%	237	24.6%	963	100.0%			

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.

## Appendix G

### Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Household Size by District

		Question: How many people live in your household?								
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	More than 8
<b>District 8</b>	Count	63	53	37	47	17	13	7	3	1
	% within Council member district	26.1%	22.0%	15.4%	19.5%	7.1%	5.4%	2.9%	1.2%	0.4%
	% within How many people live in your household?	39.1%	20.4%	26.1%	26.6%	30.9%	59.1%	63.6%	50.0%	14.3%
	% of Total	7.5%	6.3%	4.4%	5.6%	2.0%	1.5%	0.8%	0.4%	0.1%
<b>District 32</b>	Count	15	43	13	22	9	1	0	0	0
	% within Council member district	14.6%	41.7%	12.6%	21.4%	8.7%	1.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	% within How many people live in your household?	9.3%	16.5%	9.2%	12.4%	16.4%	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	% of Total	1.8%	5.1%	1.5%	2.6%	1.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
<b>District 39</b>	Count	42	92	52	52	7	1	1	2	3
	% within Council member district	16.7%	36.5%	20.6%	20.6%	2.8%	0.4%	0.4%	0.8%	1.2%
	% within How many people live in your household?	26.1%	35.4%	36.6%	29.4%	12.7%	4.5%	9.1%	33.3%	42.9%
	% of Total	5.0%	10.9%	6.2%	6.2%	0.8%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%
<b>District 45</b>	Count	41	72	40	56	22	7	3	1	3
	% within Council member district	16.7%	29.4%	16.3%	22.9%	9.0%	2.9%	1.2%	0.4%	1.2%
	% within How many people live in your household?	25.5%	27.7%	28.2%	31.6%	40.0%	31.8%	27.3%	16.7%	42.9%
	% of Total	4.9%	8.6%	4.8%	6.7%	2.6%	0.8%	0.4%	0.1%	0.4%
<b>TOTAL</b>	Count	161	260	142	177	55	22	11	6	7
	% within Council member district	19.1%	30.9%	16.9%	21.0%	6.5%	2.6%	1.3%	0.7%	0.8%
	% within How many people live in your household?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	19.1%	30.9%	16.9%	21.0%	6.5%	2.6%	1.3%	0.7%	0.8%
<b>Cases</b>										
		<b>Valid</b>		<b>Missing</b>		<b>Total</b>				
		<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>			
		841	87.3%	122	12.7%	963	100.0%			

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.

## Appendix H

### Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Age by District

		Question: What is your age?							
		14 years or under	15 to 19 years	20 to 24 years	25 to 34 years	35 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 to 64 years	65 years and over
<b>District 8</b>	Count	34	29	6	29	18	44	36	50
	% within Council member district	13.8%	11.8%	2.4%	11.8%	7.3%	17.9%	14.6%	20.3%
	% within What is your age?	85.0%	60.4%	27.3%	29.9%	12.7%	25.3%	21.8%	29.2%
	% of Total	4.0%	3.4%	0.7%	3.4%	2.1%	5.1%	4.2%	5.8%
<b>District 32</b>	Count	1	0	0	5	18	21	32	29
	% within Council member district	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	4.7%	17.0%	19.8%	30.2%	27.4%
	% within What is your age?	2.5%	0.0%	0.0%	5.2%	12.7%	12.1%	19.4%	17.0%
	% of Total	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	2.1%	2.4%	3.7%	3.4%
<b>District 39</b>	Count	1	2	3	34	62	55	53	39
	% within Council member district	0.4%	0.8%	1.2%	13.7%	24.9%	22.1%	21.3%	15.7%
	% within What is your age?	2.5%	4.2%	13.6%	35.1%	43.7%	31.6%	32.1%	22.8%
	% of Total	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%	4.0%	7.2%	6.4%	6.2%	4.5%
<b>District 45</b>	Count	4	17	13	29	44	54	44	53
	% within Council member district	1.6%	6.6%	5.0%	11.2%	17.1%	20.9%	17.1%	20.5%
	% within What is your age?	10.0%	35.4%	59.1%	29.9%	31.0%	31.0%	26.7%	31.0%
	% of Total	0.5%	2.0%	1.5%	3.4%	5.1%	6.3%	5.1%	6.2%
<b>TOTAL</b>	Count	40	48	22	97	142	174	165	171
	% within Council member district	4.7%	5.6%	2.6%	11.3%	16.5%	20.3%	19.2%	19.9%
	% within What is your age?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	4.7%	5.6%	2.6%	11.3%	16.5%	20.3%	19.2%	19.9%
		<b>Cases</b>							
		<b>Valid</b>		<b>Missing</b>		<b>Total</b>			
		<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>		
		859	89.2%	104	10.8%	963	100.0%		

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.



**Appendix I**

**Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Outreach by District**

		Question: How did you hear about today's assembly? Mark all that apply.									
		NYC Council member newsletter	News paper article	Word of mouth	Someone came to my door	Mailing was sent to my house	Phone call	Internet/online	A religious institution	A community group	Other
<b>District 8</b>	% within district	14.3%	3.3%	16.1%	3.6%	2.7%	3.6%	5.1%	1.8%	23.0%	26.6%
<b>District 32</b>	% within district	6.4%	13.4%	29.3%	3.8%	3.2%	6.4%	3.8%	0.6%	15.3%	17.8%
<b>District 39</b>	% within district	30.5%	4.1%	15.5%	--	4.3%	4.1%	18.6%	1.3%	3.8%	17.8%
<b>District 45</b>	% within district	15.7%	1.2%	21.8%	7.8%	2.0%	7.3%	5.2%	6.7%	9.9%	22.4%
		Other: mostly people they knew, council members, schools, community groups									N=963

*Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.*

**Appendix J**

**Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Neighborhood Longevity by District**

		Question: How long have you lived in the neighborhood?					TOTAL
		Less than 1 year	1 to 3 years	4 to 7 years	8 to 15 years	More than 15 years	
<b>District 8</b>	Count	17	20	18	51	109	215
	% within Council member district	7.9%	9.3%	8.4%	23.7%	50.7%	100.0%
	% within How long have you lived in this neighborhood?	37.8%	28.2%	19.4%	30.9%	24.0%	26.0%
	% of Total	2.1%	2.4%	2.2%	6.2%	13.2%	26.0%
<b>District 32</b>	Count	3	5	11	15	73	107
	% within Council member district	2.8%	4.7%	10.3%	14.0%	68.2%	100.0%
	% within How long have you lived in this neighborhood?	6.7%	7.0%	11.8%	9.1%	16.1%	12.9%
	% of Total	0.4%	0.6%	1.3%	1.8%	8.8%	12.9%
<b>District 39</b>	Count	14	25	43	50	125	257
	% within Council member district	5.4%	9.7%	16.7%	19.5%	48.6%	100.0%
	% within How long have you lived in this neighborhood?	31.1%	35.2%	46.2%	30.3%	27.5%	31.0%
	% of Total	1.7%	3.0%	5.2%	6.0%	15.1%	31.0%
<b>District 45</b>	Count	11	21	21	49	147	249
	% within Council member district	4.4%	8.4%	8.4%	19.7%	59.0%	100.0%
	% within How long have you lived in this neighborhood?	24.4%	29.6%	22.6%	29.7%	32.4%	30.1%
	% of Total	1.3%	2.5%	2.5%	5.9%	17.8%	30.1%
<b>TOTAL</b>	Count	45	71	93	165	454	828
	% within Council member district	5.4%	8.6%	11.2%	19.9%	54.8%	100.0%
	% within How long have you lived in this neighborhood?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	5.4%	8.6%	11.2%	19.9%	54.8%	100.0%
<b>Cases</b>							
		<b>Valid</b>		<b>Missing</b>		<b>Total</b>	
		<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>
		828	86.0%	135	14.0%	963	100.0%

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.

**Appendix K**

**Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Voting by District**

		<b>Question: Do you plan to vote for the final proposals in your district?</b>			
		<b>YES</b>	<b>NO</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	
<b>District 8</b>	count	181	28	209	
	% within council district	86.6%	13.4%	100.0%	
	% overall total	23.0%	3.6%	26.6%	
<b>District 32</b>	count	102	1	103	
	% within council district	99.0%	1.0%	100.0%	
	% overall total	13.0%	0.1%	13.1%	
<b>District 39</b>	count	231	13	244	
	% within council district	94.7%	5.3%	100.0%	
	% overall total	29.4%	1.7%	31.0%	
<b>District 45</b>	count	219	12	231	
	% within council district	94.8%	5.2%	100.0%	
	% overall total	27.8%	1.5%	29.4%	
<b>total</b>		733	54	787	
		93.1%	6.9%	100.0%	
		93.1%	6.9%	100.0%	
<b>Valid</b>		<b>Missing</b>		<b>Total</b>	
<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>787</b>	81.7%	176	18.3%	963	100.0%

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.

## Appendix L

### Neighborhood Assembly Participants, System of Democracy by District

		Question: All in all, how well or badly do you think the system of democracy in America works these days?					
		It works well and needs no changes	It works well but needs some changes	It needs a lot of changes	It needs to be completely changed	Total	
<b>District 8</b>	Count	14	96	96	27	233	
	% within Council member district	6.0%	41.2%	41.2%	11.6%	100.0%	
	% within All in all, how well or badly do you think the system of democracy in America works these days?	43.8%	32.3%	22.7%	26.5%	27.3%	
	% of Total	1.6%	11.2%	11.2%	3.2%	27.3%	
<b>District 32</b>	Count	2	40	51	13	106	
	% within Council member district	1.9%	37.7%	48.1%	12.3%	100.0%	
	% within All in all, how well or badly do you think the system of democracy in America works these days?	6.3%	13.5%	12.1%	12.7%	12.4%	
	% of Total	0.2%	4.7%	6.0%	1.5%	12.4%	
<b>District 39</b>	Count	6	59	158	35	258	
	% within Council member district	2.3%	22.9%	61.2%	13.6%	100.0%	
	% within All in all, how well or badly do you think the system of democracy in America works these days?	18.8%	19.9%	37.4%	34.3%	30.2%	
	% of Total	0.7%	6.9%	18.5%	4.1%	30.2%	
<b>District 45</b>	Count	10	102	118	27	257	
	% within Council member district	3.9%	39.7%	45.9%	10.5%	100.0%	
	% within All in all, how well or badly do you think the system of democracy in America works these days?	31.3%	34.3%	27.9%	26.5%	30.1%	
	% of Total	1.2%	11.9%	13.8%	3.2%	30.1%	
<b>TOTAL</b>	Count	32	297	423	102	854	
	% within Council member district	3.7%	34.8%	49.5%	11.9%	100.0%	
	% within All in all, how well or badly do you think the system of democracy in America works these days?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	3.7%	34.8%	49.5%	11.9%	100.0%	
<b>Cases</b>							
		<b>Valid</b>		<b>Missing</b>		<b>Total</b>	
		<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>
		854	88.7%	109	11.3%	963	100.0%

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.

**Appendix M**

**Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Trust in Government by District**

		<b>Question:</b> How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right--just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?				
		<b>just about always</b>	<b>most of the time</b>	<b>only some of the time</b>	<b>almost never</b>	<b>total</b>
<b>District 8</b>	Count	7	59	134	38	238
	% within Council member district	2.9%	24.8%	56.3%	16.0%	100.0%
	% within How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right--just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?	70.0%	38.3%	25.0%	23.0%	27.5%
	% of Total	0.8%	6.8%	15.5%	4.4%	27.5%
<b>District 32</b>	Count	0	14	63	27	104
	% within Council member district	0.0%	13.5%	60.6%	26.0%	100.0%
	% within How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right--just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?	0.0%	9.1%	11.8%	16.4%	12.0%
	% of Total	0.0%	1.6%	7.3%	3.1%	12.0%
<b>District 39</b>	Count	0	29	168	58	255
	% within Council member district	0.0%	11.4%	65.9%	22.7%	100.0%
	% within How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right--just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?	0.0%	18.8%	31.4%	35.2%	29.5%
	% of Total	0.0%	3.4%	19.4%	6.7%	29.5%
<b>District 45</b>	Count	3	52	170	42	267
	% within Council member district	1.1%	19.5%	63.7%	15.7%	100.0%
	% within How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right--just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?	30.0%	33.8%	31.8%	25.5%	30.9%
	% of Total	0.3%	6.0%	19.7%	4.9%	30.9%
<b>TOTAL</b>	Count	10	154	535	165	864
	% within Council member district	1.2%	17.8%	61.9%	19.1%	100.0%
	% within How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right--just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	1.2%	17.8%	61.9%	19.1%	100.0%
<b>Cases</b>						
<b>Valid</b>		<b>Missing</b>		<b>Total</b>		
<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	
	864	99	10.3%	963	100.0%	

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.

## Appendix N

### Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Contact Public Official by District

Question: Have you ever contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express your views?							
		I have done it in the past year	I have done it in the more distant past	I have not done it but I might do it	I have not done it and would never do it	TOTAL	
<b>District 8</b>	Count	97	43	62	18	220	
	% within Council member district	44.1%	19.5%	28.2%	8.2%	100.0%	
	% within Have you ever contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express your views?	21.1%	29.5%	30.4%	60.0%	26.2%	
	% of Total	11.6%	5.1%	7.4%	2.1%	26.2%	
<b>District 32</b>	Count	55	19	28	4	106	
	% within Council member district	51.9%	17.9%	26.4%	3.8%	100.0%	
	% within Have you ever contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express your views?	12.0%	13.0%	13.7%	13.3%	12.6%	
	% of Total	6.6%	2.3%	3.3%	0.5%	12.6%	
<b>District 39</b>	Count	183	32	39	3	257	
	% within Council member district	71.2%	12.5%	15.2%	1.2%	100.0%	
	% within Have you ever contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express your views?	39.9%	21.9%	19.1%	10.0%	30.6%	
	% of Total	21.8%	3.8%	4.6%	0.4%	30.6%	
<b>District 45</b>	Count	124	52	75	5	256	
	% within Council member district	48.4%	20.3%	29.3%	2.0%	100.0%	
	% within Have you ever contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express your views?	27.0%	35.6%	36.8%	16.7%	30.5%	
	% of Total	14.8%	6.2%	8.9%	0.6%	30.5%	
<b>TOTAL</b>	Count	459	146	204	30	839	
	% within Council member district	54.7%	17.4%	24.3%	3.6%	100.0%	
	% within Have you ever contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express your views?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	54.7%	17.4%	24.3%	3.6%	100.0%	
<b>Cases</b>							
		<b>Valid</b>		<b>Missing</b>		<b>Total</b>	
		<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>
		839	87.1%	124	12.9%	963	100.0%

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.

**Appendix O**

**Neighborhood Assembly Participants, Work with Community by District**

		Question: Have you ever worked with others in this community to try to solve some community problems?				
		YES	NO	TOTAL		
<b>District 8</b>	Count	151	84	235		
	% within Council member district	64.3%	35.7%	100.0%		
	% within Have you ever worked with others in this community to try to solve some community problems?	26.3%	30.2%	27.5%		
	% of Total	17.7%	9.8%	27.5%		
<b>District 32</b>	Count	77	21	98		
	% within Council member district	78.6%	21.4%	100.0%		
	% within Have you ever worked with others in this community to try to solve some community problems?	13.4%	7.6%	11.5%		
	% of Total	9.0%	2.5%	11.5%		
<b>District 39</b>	Count	157	98	255		
	% within Council member district	61.6%	38.4%	100.0%		
	% within Have you ever worked with others in this community to try to solve some community problems?	27.3%	35.3%	29.9%		
	% of Total	18.4%	11.5%	29.9%		
<b>District 45</b>	Count	190	75	265		
	% within Council member district	71.7%	28.3%	100.0%		
	% within Have you ever worked with others in this community to try to solve some community problems?	33.0%	27.0%	31.1%		
	% of Total	22.3%	8.8%	31.1%		
<b>TOTAL</b>	Count	575	278	853		
	% within Council member district	67.4%	32.6%	100.0%		
	% within Have you ever worked with others in this community to try to solve some community problems?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
	% of Total	67.4%	32.6%	100.0%		
<b>Cases</b>						
		<b>Valid</b>		<b>Missing</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Percent</b>
	853	88.6%	110	11.4%	963	100.0%

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Author generated crosstabs using SPSS.

**Appendix P**

**GSS Regional Comparative Data**

All in all, how well or badly do you think the system of democracy in America works these days? (GSS code: DEMWORKS)  
 [DEMWORKS/REGION/XNORCSIZ]

	<b>New England City GT 250,000</b>	<b>Middle Atlantic City GT 250,000</b>
It works well and needs no changes	0	12.5%
It works well but needs some changes	66.9%	54.1%
Needs a lot of changes	33.1%	29.2%
Needs to be completely changed	0	4.2%
<i>column total</i>	100%	100%

How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never? (GSS code: FEDTRUST)  
 [FEDTRUST/REGION/XNORCSIZ]

	<b>New England City GT 250,000</b>	<b>Middle Atlantic City GT 250,00</b>
Almost always	0	2.1%
Most of time	75%	17.8%
Some of time	25%	58.6%
Almost never	0	21.5%
<i>column total</i>	100%	100%



Have you ever contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express your views? (GSS code: CNTCTGOV)  
 [CNTCTGOV/REGION/XNORCSIZ]

	<b>New England City GT 250,000</b>	<b>Middle Atlantic City GT 250,000</b>
Have done it in the past year	100%	24.7%
Have done it in the more distant past	0	14.1%
Have not done it but might do it	0	36.4%
Have not done it and would never do it	0	24.7%
<i>column total</i>	100%	100%

Have you ever worked with others in this community to try to solve some community problems? (GSS code: LOCPROB)  
 [LOCPROB/REGION/XNORCSIZ]

	<b>New England City GT 250,000</b>	<b>Middle Atlantic City GT 250,000</b>
Yes	25%	28.7%
No	75%	71.3%
<i>column total</i>	100%	100%

## Appendix Q

### Coded Participatory Budgeting Project Ideas by District

	Coded Participatory Budgeting Project Ideas by District							
	D8		D32		D39		D45	
	count	% of district	count	% of district	count	% of district	count	% of district
<b>SAFETY AND SECURITY</b>								
Street/Outdoor Lights	20	3.4%	5	2.0%	28	3.2%	18	6.6%
Security Cameras	30	5.2%	5	2.0%	18	2.1%	18	6.6%
Safety Measures, Other	14	2.4%	8	3.0%	14	1.6%	10	3.7%
<b>TRANSPORTATION AND MOBILITY</b>								
Traffic Sign or Lights	6	1%	12	5.0%	40	4.6%	16	5.9%
Speed Bumps and Traffic Calming	6	1%	1	0.4%	18	2.1%	10	3.7%
Street Repair and Repaving	8	1.4%	24	9.0%	21	2.4%	16	5.9%
Sidewalks and Pedestrian, Other	12	2.1%	10	4.0%	43	4.9%	10	3.7%
Handicapped Accessibility	6	1%	2	0.8%	16	1.8%	--	--
Parking	--	--	7	2.7%	17	1.9%	3	1.1%
Bus Shelters	--	--	2	0.8%	15	1.7%	7	2.6%
Bus Services	3	0.5%	2	0.8%	9	1.0%	--	--
Subway	8	1.4%	--	--	27	3.1%	3	1.1%
Public Transportation, Other	1	0.2%	6	2.3%	7	0.8%	--	--
Bicycle Infrastructure	9	1.5%	9	3.4%	29	3.3%	3	1.1%
Infrastructure, Other	--	--	--	--	13	1.5%	1	0.4%
<b>PUBLIC SPACE</b>								
Park Improvements	77	13.3%	49	18.8%	54	6.2%	15	5.5%
Green Space, Other	9	1.5%	4	1.5%	79	9.1%	10	3.7%
Public Seating	16	2.8%	--	--	14	1.6%	--	--
Beautification	7	1.2%	6	2.3%	53	6.1%	11	4.1%
Garbage and Recycling Receptacles	11	1.9%	2	0.8%	42	4.8%	8	3.0%
Sanitation, Other	3	0.5%	1	0.4%	15	1.7%	2	0.7%
Signage	3	0.5%	2	0.8%	5	0.6%	--	--
Public Art and Cultural Heritage	10	1.7%	1	0.4%	17	1.9%	1	0.4%
<b>PUBLIC FACILITIES OR SERVICES</b>								
Libraries	6	1%	7	2.7%	28	3.2%	10	3.7%
Schools	67	12%	17	6.5%	90	10.3%	17	6.3%
Housing	2	0.3%	--	--	3	0.3%	1	0.4%
Homeless Shelters	2	0.3%	--	--	1	0.1%	--	--
NYCHA Buildings	53	9.1%	--	--	--	--	--	--
Specific Building Repair or Alteration	14	2.4%	3	1.2%	7	0.8%	5	1.8%
Pest Control	3	0.5%	--	--	4	0.5%	--	--
<b>COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT</b>								
Existing Community Centers	20	3.4%	7	2.7%	2	0.2%	9	3.3%
New Center or Program, Other	52	9%	9	3.5%	31	3.6%	20	7.4%
New Senior Center or Program	18	3%	5	1.9%	8	0.9%	7	2.6%
New Youth Center or Program	29	5%	3	1.2%	12	1.4%	14	5.2%
Assistance for Nonprofit Program, Specific	17	2.9%	1	0.4%	--	--	--	--
Job Training or Employment	5	0.9%	1	0.4%	--	--	4	1.5%
Economic Development	2	0.3%	1	0.4%	4	0.5%	6	2.2%

	Coded Participatory Budgeting Project Ideas by District							
	D8		D32		D39		D45	
<b>Community Amenities</b>	14	2.4%	12	4.6%	25	2.9%	5	1.8%
<b>Food and Health</b>	7	1%	--	--	5	0.6%	5	1.8%
<b>ENVIRONMENT</b>								
<b>Environmental/Sustainability Efforts</b>	1	0.2%	8	3.1%	43	4.9%	2	0.7%
<b>Sewer or Drainage</b>	7	1.2%	16	6.1%	10	1.1%	4	1.5%
<b>Flood Prevention</b>	--	--	15	5.7%	--	--	--	--
<b>PUBLIC POLICY</b>								
<b>Policy, Other</b>	3	0.5%	--	--	5	0.6%	--	--
	581		263		872		271	

Source: Participatory Budgeting in New York City (PBNYC). Codes and calculations are the author's own.