The Incumbency Effects of Signalling
- The Incumbency Effects of Signalling
- Caselli, Francesco
Moreno de Barreda, Ines
- Persistent URL:
- Department of Economics Discussion Papers
- Part Number:
- Department of Economics, Columbia University
- Publisher Location:
- New York
- Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a reelection hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for reelection. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit.
- Political science
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- Suggested Citation:
- Francesco Caselli, Tom Cunningham, Massimo Morelli, Ines Moreno de Barreda, 2012, The Incumbency Effects of Signalling, Columbia University Academic Commons, https://doi.org/10.7916/D8NP2CM6.