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Behavioral game theory : towards a realistic representation of strategic behavior?

Giovanna Devetag

Title:
Behavioral game theory : towards a realistic representation of strategic behavior?
Author(s):
Devetag, Giovanna
Date:
Type:
Working papers
Department:
Italian Academy
Persistent URL:
Series:
Italian Academy Fellows' Seminar Working Papers
Publisher:
Italian Academy for Advanced Studies in America, Columbia University
Publisher Location:
New York
Abstract:
The domain of strategic interaction includes all those decision tasks in which the outcome of a decision depends on the decisions taken by a plurality of individuals, so that each individual must try to devise the most likely moves of the others in order to pursue the best course of action, knowing that all other actors are engaged in the same type of strategic thinking. Problems of strategic interaction in economics have been traditionally modelled using the formal language of game theory, first introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 1944 seminal book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Game theory subsequently developed into a highly formal mathematical language used to describe the behavior of hyperrational individuals in strategic contexts. Although born as a branch of applied mathematics and originally developed with the intention of making it the science of military conflict, its diffusion within economics has been extremely rapid, and related fields in the social sciences have recently begun to apply it to model behavior in a variety of social settings.
Subject(s):
Organizational behavior
Economic theory
Item views
307
Metadata:
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Suggested Citation:
Giovanna Devetag, 2004, Behavioral game theory : towards a realistic representation of strategic behavior?, Columbia University Academic Commons, http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:10097.

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