HomeHome

Implementing Second-best Environmental Policy under Adverse Selection

Glenn D. Sheriff

Title:
Implementing Second-best Environmental Policy under Adverse Selection
Author(s):
Sheriff, Glenn D.
Date:
Type:
Reports
Department(s):
Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy
Persistent URL:
Series:
ISERP Working Papers
Part Number:
07-01
Notes:
January 2007.
Publisher:
Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy, Columbia University
Publisher Location:
New York
Abstract:
A key obstacle to practical application of mechanism design theory in regulation is the difficulty of obtaining consistent beliefs regarding information assumed to be commonly held in the models. This paper presents a solution to this problem by developing an easily-implemented empirical methodology with which the government can use commonly available data to develop beliefs regarding the technology and distribution of types in a regulated sector characterized by hidden information. Results are used to calibrate a second-best land conservation mechanism and evaluate its cost relative to simpler alternatives.
Subject(s):
Economics
Item views
344
Metadata:
text | xml
Suggested Citation:
Glenn D. Sheriff, , Implementing Second-best Environmental Policy under Adverse Selection, Columbia University Academic Commons, .

Columbia University Libraries | Policies | FAQ