Cores of non-atomic market games
- Cores of non-atomic market games
- Amarante, Massimiliano
- Persistent URL:
- Department of Economics Discussion Papers
- Part Number:
- October 2005
- Department of Economics, Columbia University
- Publisher Location:
- New York
- We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley , and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz . We show that the core of such games is norm compact and we provide some representation results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our results.We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative.
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- Suggested Citation:
- Massimiliano Amarante, Fabio Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, L. Montrucchio, 2005, Cores of non-atomic market games, Columbia University Academic Commons, https://doi.org/10.7916/D8R21CK3.