On Human Capital and Team Stability
- On Human Capital and Team Stability
- Chiappori, Pierre A.
- Working papers
- Persistent URL:
- Department of Economics Discussion Papers
- Part Number:
- Updated 2016—This paper builds on material from an unpublished manuscript circulated under the name “The Roommate Problem Is More Stable Than You Think,” which is now obsolete.
- Department of Economics, Columbia University
- Publisher Location:
- New York
- In many economic contexts, agents from a same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called “roommate matching problems”), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We show that when each individual has a close substitute, a stable matching can be implemented with minimal policy intervention. Our results shed light on the stability of partnerships on the labor market. Moreover, they imply that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to many roommate problems.
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- Suggested Citation:
- Pierre A. Chiappori, Alfred Galichon, Bernard Salanie, 2012, On Human Capital and Team Stability, Columbia University Academic Commons, http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15211.