Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty
- Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty
- Holden, Richard
- Persistent URL:
- Department of Economics Discussion Papers
- Part Number:
- Department of Economics, Columbia University
- Publisher Location:
- New York
- We consider full implementation in abstract complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. We also extend our result to settings of incomplete information so long as there is non-exclusive information.
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- Suggested Citation:
- Richard Holden, Navin Kartik, Olivier Tercieux, 2012, Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty, Columbia University Academic Commons, https://doi.org/10.7916/D8GX4KSJ.