Enlisting Workers in Monitoring Firms: Payroll Tax Compliance in Mexico
- Enlisting Workers in Monitoring Firms: Payroll Tax Compliance in Mexico
- Kumler, Todd Johnson
Verhoogen, Eric A.
- Persistent URL:
- Department of Economics Discussion Papers
- Part Number:
- Department of Economics, Columbia University
- Publisher Location:
- New York
- Non-compliance of firms with tax regulations is a major constraint on state capacity in developing countries. We focus on an arguably under-appreciated dimension of non-compliance: under-reporting of wages by formal firms to evade payroll taxes. Comparing wage distributions for similar sets of workers in the administrative records of the Mexican social security agency and a household labor-force survey, we document extensive under-reporting of wages. We further argue that the 1997 Mexican pension reform had a differential effect by age on the incentives of workers to ensure that their wages were reported accurately. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we present evidence that the increase in the incentive for workers to ensure accurate reports led to a significant decline in under-reporting. The results suggest that enlisting workers in monitoring their employers is an effective way to increase payroll tax compliance.
- Labor economics
- Item views
text | xml
- Suggested Citation:
- Todd Johnson Kumler, Eric A. Verhoogen, Judith Frias, 2012, Enlisting Workers in Monitoring Firms: Payroll Tax Compliance in Mexico, Columbia University Academic Commons, https://doi.org/10.7916/D8B283HT.