The case for auctioning countermeasures in the WTO
- The case for auctioning countermeasures in the WTO
- Bagwell, Kyle
Mavroidis, Petros C.
Staiger, Robert W.
- Working papers
- Persistent URL:
- Department of Economics Discussion Papers
- Part Number:
- Department of Economics, Columbia University
- Publisher Location:
- New York
- A major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in creating the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the introduction of new dispute settlement procedures. These procedures were intended to provide a significant step forward, relative to GATT, in the settling of trade disputes, in large part by ensuring that violations of WTO commitments would be met with swift retaliation ("suspension of concessions") by the affected trading partners. While the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO indeed represent a considerable improvement over those in GATT, nine years of experience under the new procedures suggests that significant problems of enforcement remain in the WTO.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization)
World Trade Organization
Dispute resolution (Law)
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- Suggested Citation:
- Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, Robert W. Staiger, 2004, The case for auctioning countermeasures in the WTO, Columbia University Academic Commons, http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:472.