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Cores of non-atomic market games

Massimiliano Amarante; Fabio Maccheroni; M. Marinacci; L. Montrucchio

Title:
Cores of non-atomic market games
Author(s):
Amarante, Massimiliano
Maccheroni, Fabio
Marinacci, M.
Montrucchio, L.
Date:
Type:
Reports
Department(s):
Economics
Persistent URL:
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Papers
Part Number:
0506-10
Notes:
October 2005
Publisher:
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Publisher Location:
New York
Abstract:
We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [12]. We show that the core of such games is norm compact and we provide some representation results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our results.We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative.
Subject(s):
Economics
Item views
326
Metadata:
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Suggested Citation:
Massimiliano Amarante, Fabio Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, L. Montrucchio, , Cores of non-atomic market games, Columbia University Academic Commons, .

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