Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Diamantoudi, Effrosyni
- Working papers
- Persistent URL:
- Department of Economics Discussion Papers
- Part Number:
- Department of Economics, Columbia University
- Publisher Location:
- New York
- This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable matching. This implies that, starting from any unstable matching, the process of allowing a randomly chosen blocking pair to form converges to a stable matching with probability one. This result generalizes those of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) and Chung (2000) under strict preferences.
- Economic theory
- Item views
text | xml
- Suggested Citation:
- Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Eiichi Miyagawa, Licun Xue, 2002, Random paths to stability in the roommate problem, Columbia University Academic Commons, http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:353.