Chichilnisky Graciela author Columbia University. Economics Heal Geoffrey M. author Columbia University. Business Columbia University. Earth Institute Columbia University. International and Public Affairs Streufert Peter A. author Swinkels Jeroen M. author Columbia University. Economics contributor originator text Working papers New York Department of Economics, Columbia University 1992 If agents have common priors concerning the probability with which equilibrium is selected, they have an incentive to trade beforehand. If their trading process satisfies a certain notion of individual rationality, these trades will reduce and ultimately remove all uncertainty concerning equilibrium selection. In this sense, multiple equilibria engender institutions which can uniquely determine equilibrium. Economics 684 http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15576 English NNC NNC 2011-02-17 11:06:52 -0500 2011-08-04 14:09:50 -0400 2720 eng