Holden Richard author Kartik Navin author Columbia University. Economics Tercieux Olivier author Columbia University. Economics originator contributor text Working papers New York Department of Economics, Columbia University 2012 We consider full implementation in abstract complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. We also extend our result to settings of incomplete information so long as there is non-exclusive information. Economics 1213-06 http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15208 English NNC NNC 2012-11-07 11:15:37 -0500 2012-11-07 11:19:15 -0500 9210 eng