Chichilnisky Graciela author Columbia University. Economics Heal Geoffrey M. author Columbia University. Business Columbia University. Earth Institute Columbia University. International and Public Affairs Starrett David author Columbia University. Economics contributor originator text Working papers New York Department of Economics, Columbia University 1993 Not all possible distributions of a given total of emission permits are compatible with the attainment of first-best Pareto efficiency. In fact, of the infinitely many ways of distributing a given total of permits between a fixed number of parties, only a finite number can lead to efficiency. We can therefore evaluate permit allocations not only in terms of their equity, but also in terms of their efficiency. If there are no other redistributive instruments in the policy environment, the traditional orthogonality of equity and efficiency does not hold here. This has important implications for arguments about the initial international distribution of entitlements to produce carbon dioxide. Economics 686 http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15578 English NNC NNC 2011-02-28 09:37:33 -0500 2011-06-26 22:41:22 -0400 2797 eng