Working papers:
Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty
Richard Holden; Navin Kartik; Olivier Tercieux
Downloads:
- Title:
- Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty
- Author(s):
-
Holden, Richard
Kartik, Navin
Tercieux, Olivier - Date:
- 2012
- Type:
- Working papers
- Department:
- Economics
- Permanent URL:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15208
- Series:
- Department of Economics Discussion Papers
- Part Number:
- 1213-06
- Publisher:
- Department of Economics, Columbia University
- Publisher Location:
- New York
- Abstract:
- We consider full implementation in abstract complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. We also extend our result to settings of incomplete information so long as there is non-exclusive information.
- Subject(s):
- Economics
- Item views:
- 69