Working papers:
The Incumbency Effects of Signalling
Francisco Caselli; Tom Cunningham; Massimo Morelli; Ines Moreno de Barreda
Downloads:
- Title:
- The Incumbency Effects of Signalling
- Author(s):
-
Caselli, Francisco
Cunningham, Tom
Morelli, Massimo
Moreno de Barreda, Ines - Date:
- 2012
- Type:
- Working papers
- Department:
- Economics
- Permanent URL:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15207
- Series:
- Department of Economics Discussion Papers
- Part Number:
- 1213-05
- Publisher:
- Department of Economics, Columbia University
- Publisher Location:
- New York
- Abstract:
- Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify a novel implication of incumbent signalling. Because incumbents only care about clearing a reelection hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for reelection. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. We also solve for the optimal threshold when voters have the ability to commit.
- Subject(s):
- Political science
- Item views:
- 120