Title:

College admissions with affirmative action

Author(s):

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila

Date:

2003

Type:

Working papers

Department:

Economics

Permanent URL:

http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:508

Series:

Department of Economics Discussion Papers

Part Number:

0203-19

Publisher:

Department of Economics, Columbia University

Publisher Location:

New York

Abstract:

This paper first shows that when colleges' preferences are substitutable there does not exist any stable matching mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student. The paper introduces student types and captures colleges' preferences for affirmative action via type-specific quotas: A college always prefers a set of students that respects its type-specific quotas to another set that violates them. Then it shows that the student-applying deferred acceptance mechanism makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student if each college's preferences satisfy responsiveness over acceptable sets of students that respect its type-specific quotas. These results have direct policy implications in several entry-level labor markets (Roth 1991). Furthermore, a fairness notion and the related incentive theory developed here is applied to controlled choice in the context of public school choice by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003).

Subject(s):

Higher education
Education policy

Item views:

279

Metadata:

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