Academic Commons Search Results
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog.rss?f%5Bauthor_facet%5D%5B%5D=Salanie%2C+Bernard&q=&rows=500&sort=record_creation_date+desc
Academic Commons Search Resultsen-usThe Roommate Problem Is More Stable Than You Think
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:154183
Chiappori, Pierre A.; Galichon, Alfred; Salanie, Bernardhttp://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15211Wed, 07 Nov 2012 00:00:00 +0000Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferable and when it is not. We show that when utility is transferable, the existence of a stable matching is restored when there is an even number of individuals of indistinguishable characteristics and tastes (types.) As a consequence, when the number of individuals of any given type is large enough there always exist "quasi-stable" matchings: a stable matching can be restored with minimal policy intervention. Our results build on an analogy with an associated bipartite problem; it follows that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to the roommate problem.Economicspc2167, bs2237EconomicsWorking papersFrom Aggregate Betting Data to Individual Risk Preferences
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:154180
Chiappori, Pierre A.; Salanie, Bernard; Salanie, Francois; Gandhi, Amithttp://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15210Wed, 07 Nov 2012 00:00:00 +0000As a textbook model of contingent markets, horse races are an attractive environment to study the attitudes towards risk of bettors. We innovate on the literature by explicitly considering heterogeneous bettors and allowing for very general risk preferences, including non-expected utility. We build on a standard single-crossing condition on preferences to derive testable implications; and we show how parimutuel data allow us to uniquely identify the distribution of preferences among the population of bettors. We then estimate the model on data from US races. Within the expected utility class, the most usual specfications (CARA and CRRA) fit the data very badly. Our results show evidence for both heterogeneity and nonlinear probability weighting.Economicspc2167, bs2237EconomicsWorking papersPartner Choice and the Marital College Premium
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:133169
Chiappori, Pierre A.; Salanie, Bernard; Weiss, Yoramhttp://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:10479Wed, 01 Jun 2011 00:00:00 +0000Several theoretical contributions have argued that the returns to schooling within marriage play a crucial role for human capital investments. Our paper quantifies the evolution of these returns over the last decades. We consider a frictionless matching framework á la Becker-Shapley-Shubik, in which the gain generated by a match between two individuals is the sum of a systematic effect that only depends on the spouses' education classes and a match-specific term that we treat as random; following Choo and Siow (2006), we assume the latter component has an additively separable structure. We derive a complete, theoretical characterization of the model. We show that if the supermodularity of the surplus function is invariant over time and errors have extreme value distributions with time-invariant but education-dependent variances, the model is overidentified. We apply our method to US data on individuals born between 1943 and 1972. Our model fits the data very closely; moreover, we find that the deterministic part of the surplus is indeed supermodular and that, in line with theoretical predictions, the "marital college premium" has increased for women but not for men over the period.Economic theory, Educationpc2167, bs2237EconomicsWorking papersCupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:133162
Salanie, Bernard; Galichon, Alfredhttp://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:10478Wed, 01 Jun 2011 00:00:00 +0000We investigate a matching game with transferable utility when some of the characteristics of the players are unobservable to the analyst. We allow for a wide class of distributions of unobserved heterogeneity, subject only to a separability assumption that generalizes Choo and Siow (2006). We first show that the stable matching maximizes a social gain function that trades of two terms. The first term is simply the average surplus due to the observable characteristics; and the second one can be interpreted as a generalized entropy function that reflects the impact of the unobserved characteristics. We use this result to derive simple closed-form formulæ that identify the joint surplus in every possible match and the equilibrium utilities of all participants, given any known distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, we show that if transfers are observed, then the pre-transfer utilities of both partners are also identified. We conclude by discussing some empirical approaches suggested by these results for the study of marriage markets, hedonic prices, and the market for CEOs.Economic theorybs2237EconomicsWorking papersIdentifying Finite Mixtures in Econometric Models
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:128353
Henry, Marc; Kitamura, Yuichi; Salanie, Bernardhttp://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:9465Wed, 18 Aug 2010 00:00:00 +0000Mixtures of distributions are present in many econometric models, such as models with unobserved heterogeneity. It is thus crucial to have a general approach to identify them nonparametrically. Yet the literature so far only contains isolated examples, applied to specific models. We derive the identifying implications of a conditional independence assumption in finite mixture models. It applies for instance to models with unobserved heterogeneity, regime switching models, and models with mismeasured discrete regressors. Under this assumption, we derive sharp bounds on the mixture weights and components. For models with two mixture components, we show that if in addition the components behave differently in the tails of their distributions, then components and weights are fully nonparametrically identified. We apply our findings to the nonparametric identification and estimation of outcome distributions with a misclassified binary regressor. This provides a simple estimator that does not require instrumental variables, auxiliary data, symmetric error distributions or other shape restrictions.Economic theorybs2237EconomicsWorking papersHigher Order Improvements for Approximate Estimators
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:127318
Kristensen, Dennis; Salanie, Bernardhttp://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:9187Tue, 06 Jul 2010 00:00:00 +0000Many modern estimation methods in econometrics approximate an objective function, through simulation or discretization for instance. The resulting "approximate" estimator is often biased; and it always incurs an efficiency loss. We here propose three methods to improve the properties of such approximate estimators at a low computational cost. The first two methods correct the objective function so as to remove the leading term of the bias due to the approximation. One variant provides an analytical bias adjustment, but it only works for estimators based on stochastic approximators, such as simulation-based estimators. Our second bias correction is based on ideas from the resampling literature; it eliminates the leading bias term for non-stochastic as well as stochastic approximators. Finally, we propose an iterative procedure where we use Newton-Raphson (NR) iterations based on a much finer degree of approximation. The NR step removes some or all of the additional bias and variance of the initial approximate estimator. A Monte Carlo simulation on the mixed logit model shows that noticeable improvements can be obtained rather cheaply.Economic theorydk2313, bs2237EconomicsWorking papersMatching with Trade-offs: Preferences over Competing Characteristics
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:127315
Galichon, Alfred; Salanie, Bernardhttp://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:9186Tue, 06 Jul 2010 00:00:00 +0000We investigate in this paper the theory and econometrics of optimal matchings with competing criteria. The surplus from a marriage match, for instance, may depend both on the incomes and on the educations of the partners, as well as on characteristics that the analyst does not observe. The social optimum must therefore trade off matching on incomes and matching on educations. Given a flexible specification of the surplus function, we characterize under mild assumptions the properties of the set of feasible matchings and of the socially optimal matching. Then we show how data on the covariation of the types of the partners in observed matches can be used to estimate the parameters that define social preferences over matches. We provide both nonparametric and parametric procedures that are very easy to use in applications.Economic theorybs2237EconomicsWorking papersDoes Fertility Respond to Financial Incentives?
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:125201
Laroque, Guy; Salanie, Bernardhttp://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:8329Tue, 19 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0000There has been little empirical work evaluating the sensitivity of fertility to financial incentives at the household level. We put forward an identification strategy that relies on the fact that variation of wages induces variation in benefits and tax credits among "comparable" households. We implement this approach by estimating a discrete choice model of female participation and fertility, using individual data from the French Labor Force Survey and a fairly detailed representation of the French tax-benefit system. Our results suggest that financial incentives play a notable role in determining fertility decisions in France, both for the first and for the third child. As an example, an unconditional child benefit with a direct cost of 0.3% of GDP might raise total fertility by about 0.3 point.Economicsbs2237EconomicsWorking papers